



**THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION ON
PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA**

BY

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**Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD degree in the
Graduate programme in Political Science at the School of Social Sciences,
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July, 2020.

ABSTRACT

The African Union (AU) in response to the many violent conflicts that had erupted on the continent endorsed the agreement with regards to the formation of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Durban in July 2002 and this became operational as the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in December 2003. The AU has sought to develop capacities for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building to deal with endemic conflict on the continent, but all of these is limited in their reach and effect. The AU has noted the challenges to its peacekeeping efforts, therefore cooperation with the United Nations has been one way to address these challenges. The African Union and the United Nations are presently collaborating in peace keeping missions in Somalia (AMISOM), Darfur (UNAMID) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This thesis focused on AU peacekeeping capacity and specifically on how the cooperation between the AU and UN, has worked in practice and contributes to the discussion on peacekeeping operations as an effective mechanism of resolving conflicts in Africa. This thesis accessed new areas such as the strategic nature of the African state, international interest and involvement in the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and CAR, legitimacy issues, such as the local ownership of the peace operations, impact of Armed no state actors on peacekeeping operations in Africa, using Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic where the AU and UN are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations to assess that. This thesis adopted a case study and qualitative paradigm which involved a structured gathering , presentation, analysis of data on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic and adopted the collective security theory as its theoretical framework. This thesis finds out that seven factors such as funding, mandates that are clear and achievable, the doctrines of the United Nations peacekeeping, external actors, regional dimension of the conflict, issues of legitimacy, acceptance, local ownership, the roles of Africa's regional economic communities and coordination between them and the African Union, the activities of armed non-state actors impacted significantly on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. This thesis recommends increased collaboration and coordination amongst the African Union, the United Nations and Africa's regional economic institutions.

Keywords: African Union, United Nations, African Union Peace and Security Architecture, Peace and Security Council. Somalia, Darfur. Central African Republic, Peacekeeping.

DECLARATION

I, Olumide Adetokunbo Fafore, 214585645 declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, and is my original research.

2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.


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Date: July 2020

Supervisor: Dr. Khondlo Mtshali

Date: July 2020

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the African Union Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and Africa's Regional Economic Communities involved in Peacekeeping Operations across Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My profound appreciation goes to the Almighty God, the one that through His mercies am able to complete this dissertation. I appreciate my PhD supervisor Dr Khondlo Mtshali, for the effort he invested in mentoring me and guiding me through this dissertation. Your expertise has played a key role in this dissertation.

Most of all I thank my wife, Dr Mrs Elizabeth Motunrayo Ojo-Fafore for her encouragement, support and care together with my sons, Tobiloba and Toluwalase Fafore

Also, my appreciation goes to Prof Alexander Johnston and Dr Bheki Mngomezulu formerly of the department of politics, University of Kwazulu-natal and Prof Cheryl Hendricks of the department of politics, University of Johannesburg, all of whom I have had the privilege of being under their assistance and guidance at the initial stage of this dissertation.

I am grateful to my parents, Prince and Mrs Joseph Oladipupo Fafore and Mrs Bolaji Akinbola all of blessed memory. My siblings, Dr Pastor Tope Ade, Dapo Fafore and Tiwalade Ehiametalor and my inlaws, Captain and Mrs Bode Oloko.

I would like to thank my Pastors, Pastor Gbenga and Titi Ojo, my friends and senior colleagues, Dr Legend Asuelime and Prof Bolanle Ikotun for their immense contribution directly or indirectly to this dissertation.

I appreciate all those who spared their time for the interviews especially researchers from ACCORD, Institute of Peace and Security Studies in Pretoria and Addis Ababa University and to all these individuals across Africa.

Finally i owe my motivation to my lecturers at the University of Jos and Portharcourt who nurtured me in the field of Political Science and International Relations and kindled my enthusiasm in Peace and Security.

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction

In 2001, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union and in July 2002, in Durban, the African Union established the African Union Peace and Security Council to respond to the several violent conflicts that had erupted on the continent. This resulted to the formation of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in December 2003 comprising of the following components, the African Union peace and Security council, African Standby force, the Continental Early Warning system, the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund, all key components of this architecture (Vines, 2013:22).

In spite of the formation of these security instruments the continent remains vulnerable to conflict, with terrorism, war and political violence the core of Africa's security challenge (Bugnacki, 2015). In 2019 the Global Peace Index (GPI) came out with the list of 162 nations, ranked according to lack of conflicts or violence. This list created by the Institute of Economic Peace (IEP), analysed by the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), listed Somalia as number 158, Libya 156, South Sudan 161 and the Central African Republic 157 (Ventura, 2020). This analysis indicates increasing conflict on the continent of Africa, resulting to the African Union trying to develop capacities for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a solution to increasing conflict on the continent although with limitations towards achieving this security goals (Makinde, Okumu and Mickler, 2015: 131).

Among the limitations and challenges of the African Union in peacekeeping are lack of institutional capacity with regards to troops deployment, development of policy plans, management of peacekeeping operations and lack of adequate funds needed to make its security architecture functional (AU 2012; Vorrath 2012). Therefore, the African Union had to establish peacekeeping cooperation with the United Nations to address some of its peacekeeping challenges. In 2013, the African Union developed a framework for cooperation

with the United Nations and its stakeholders (AU, 2013), comprising of the following components:

- An annual joint consultations of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations which commenced in 2006.
- The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the United Nations facilitating the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in advisory in areas such as sanctions committee, institutional memory building coupled with assistance in maintainance of peace to the Gender Directorate of the African Union.
- The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the United Nations facilitating the African Union secretariat of its Peace and Security Council since 2008 in Joint Task Force of the AU/UN, Bi-annual Joint Task Force based on discussions on peace and security, political regional developments, responses on the prevention and management of conflicts with all based on mutual sharing.
- The building of capacity and assistance in mediation in areas such as strategic policy development, institutional knowledge management, strategic policy development, institutional knowledge management, lessons learned and tools, development of an African Union mediation strategy, electoral assistance, advise on democratic principle, trying to make functional the panel of the wise coupled with the establishment of the United Nations office of the African Union (UNOAU) which was formed in 2010 with the following goals;
- Enhancement of the collaboration on peace and security between the African Union and the United Nations.
- Provision of coordination, advise based on long term capacity building with operational support on a short term basis to the African Union by the United Nations (UN, 2014).

On the 7th December 2011, the AU/UN Multidisciplinary mission to the Sahel was established (UN, 2012), followed by the African-led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA). In June 2012, the African-led Regional cooperation initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was established (Boutellis and Williams, 2013:8), all the above are joint peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Somalia (1991), Darfur (2003), there have been literatures on the collaboration in peacekeeping missions in Africa between the African Union and the United Nations. (Deconing, Gelot and Karlsrud 2015; O'Hanlan and Singer 2004; Vorrath 2012;

Williams 2010), argued that factors such as financial and logistical constraints, African Union weak bureaucratic capabilities, affect the African Union's decision making abilities on the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of its peacekeeping cooperation with the United Nations. Using the Central African Republic as an example, the African-led international support mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) had an earlier take over by the United Nations because of inadequate funding.

Therefore, several scholars came out with their various views, (Boutellis and Williams, 2013) is of the view that one of the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa is the nature of regional arrangements and its ambiguity that failed to distinguish between regional and sub-regional arrangements. Structural balances as an impediment were postulated by (Derblom, 2008), (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg 2004; Murithi 2009; Sanderholm, Moller, Simion and Hallonsten 2012), viewed the different peacekeeping doctrines and approaches as an impediment to effective peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations. Using the crisis in Libya (2011) and Mali (2012) as a case study, (Alfredo, 2013) argued that this case study presented a clear instance of intra-AU dynamics. The views of the African Union was different to those of ECOWAS and SADC and were inconsistent and contradictory with regards to the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 over Libya.

Therefore, most of the literature on African Union collaboration with the United Nations on peacekeeping missions in Africa focused mainly on the financial, military and bureaucratic aspect of this cooperation but have failed to deal with the origin of the crisis in Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic such as poverty, underdevelopment, weak and failed states and crisis of development and the political aspect of this cooperation on peacekeeping of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. Although more studies have been conducted on the collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. This thesis focus on areas this studies failed to cover such as issues of mandate, local ownership and most importantly the activities of armed non-state actors and their impact on the effectiveness of this peacekeeping collaboration. Issues of poverty and underdevelopment although not the focus of this thesis are the root causes of conflicts in Africa. A peacekeeping operation, a key area of the AU's engagement in peace and security is therefore in need of an in-depth review. This thesis will focus on AU's peacekeeping capacity and specifically on how the cooperation between the AU and UN, outlined above, has worked in practice. Also, while some of the factors outlined above could

be some of the reasons limiting the effectiveness of the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, this thesis will assess new areas such as the strategic nature of the African state with regards to ethnicity and religion, international interest and involvement in the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and CAR, legitimacy issues, such as the local ownership of the peace operations, role of the civil societies and the impact of the root causes of the conflict, using Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic where the AU and UN are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations to assess that.

1.1. Statement Of The Research Problem

The AU, acting on its own and in concert with the UN has constructed ambitious institutional arrangements for order-keeping in Africa through both military and non-military means. These ambitions are hindered by a number of shortcomings including financial, logistic and bureaucratic weakness, ambiguities in the UN's peacekeeping arrangements under its charter, differences of approach between the UN and AU, rivalries between African regions and states.

Another challenge confronting the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping in Africa is Intra-AU rivalries, principally among the African Union and the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs). Where the AU and RECs adopted different policies such as happened with the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010-2011, Mali in 2012 these differences complicate the cooperation between the UN and AU. This was evident in the crisis in Libya between the AU, the South African Development Community (SADC), Sahel and the AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia and Mali. There are also the political and strategic calculations of the AU and the UN, several African states feel that the views of the AU are not always respected and as a result refuse to be involved in AU-UN peacekeeping operations. The UN on its part feel that AU member states are not united on key issues and are slow to act on urgent matters (UN, 2012). The African Union and the United Nations are collaborating in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan and the Central African Republic and this peacekeeping operations are facing several challenges impacting on its effectiveness, therefore this thesis while reviewing some of these arguments, also review other areas that most studies neglected such as issues over mandates, ownership of this peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations, legitimacy issues and entire new areas such as activities of

armed non-state actors on the effectiveness of this peacekeeping collaboration. An analysis of the literature on peacekeeping operations in Africa acknowledges the fact that lack of adequate funding, over dependence on external donors, coupled with bureaucratic and logistical constraints on the part of the African Union impact on the African Union peacekeeping operations and necessitated collaborative peacekeeping operations with other international organisations such as the United Nations in Africa,

1.2. Research Objectives

The objectives of the present study are:

1. To what extent does the collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations affect the success of peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic.
2. To examine the failures, successes, differences and similarities of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa using Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic as case study.
3. To identify lessons for future cooperative interventions.

1.3. Significance Of The Study

The significance of this thesis lies in its contribution to the field of peacekeeping operations in Africa and the prospects for peace and security on the African continent. The desire to execute this research emanated from the realization that for the past decade, Africa has become the principal continent for UN peace keeping operations and of the thirteen (13) peace keeping operations presented under the authority of the UN department of peace keeping operations, (7) are in Africa (Blanchfield, Arieff and Blanchard, 2019). Unfortunately only few have been successfully handled or result in lasting peace. The AU-UN peace keeping operations while desirable are facing several challenges limiting its effectiveness.

This thesis offers ways to improve the cooperation in peacekeeping for the African Union and the United Nations to achieve more successful burden sharing and a unity of effort that is indispensable in bringing peace and development to Africa. Therefore it is hoped that the findings of this research will lead to further research in the area of institutional

cooperation on peace and security. The insights gained from an in-depth qualitative study should assist in developing strategies and policy for organizational collaboration in peacekeeping.

Applying comparative methods will introduce comparative methodology to the study of institutional collaboration and supplement local work done recently in the general field of peacekeeping. Also the management of conflict is the most serious challenge facing the AU and conflict within ‘failed states’ is one of the most serious obstacles to Africa’s aspirations for growth and continental (or even regional) integration. This, the subject of this proposed research is central to Africa’s prospects for peace and security.

1.4. Research Questions

1. How do the AU/UN Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic illustrate the effectiveness and failures of AU/UN Peacekeeping operations?
2. What do the AU/UN Peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic have in common and how do they differ?
3. What is the prognosis for future cooperation between the two bodies and how could the prognosis be improved to bring about effectiveness in peacekeeping operations in Africa.

1.5. Scope Of The Study

The sphere of this study is on cooperation on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa of the African Union and the United Nations with Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic as the field of study. This is mainly because the peacekeeping operations in these countries are models of cooperative peacekeeping operations. We shall focus mainly on the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to 2016, the United Nations-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from 2007 to 2016 and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) from 2014 to 2016 as test cases of the peacekeeping cooperation mechanism of the African Union and the United Nations. Therefore, the period of time stipulated for this study is from 2007 to 2019.

1.6. Outline Of The Thesis

The thesis is splited into eight (8) chapters from the introduction to the conclusion. In other to give the reader a quick overview of the structure of the thesis, this section will provide a brief review of the chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction.

This chapter explained the background of the study, as it provides an overview on the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, its challenges and how conflict and terrorism, war and political violence remain the core of Africa's security challenges despite various peace and security mechanisms of the African Union. The purpose of the research is to assess the alliance of the African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The research hypotheses were presented here and these were answered at the end of the research, in addition to its significance, the scope and focus of the study as well as objectives.

Chapter 2: Concept, History and Evolution of Peacekeeing Operations.

This chapter gave a detailed and elaborate literature review through the relevant literature, such as journals, conference proceedings, articles, books and reports. This thesis was conducted in other to access the collaboration on peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. Therefore, the concept and definitions of peacekeeping operations, history and evolution of peacekeeping operations were reviewed. This served as a background for this research development.

Chapter 3: The African Union and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

This chapter gave an overview of United Nations peacekeeping missions in other regions of the world. It reviewed the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa and institutional cooperation and concluded with a review of the collaboration in peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

Chapter 4: The Development of the conflict in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic.

This chapter reviewed from the historical development of the conflicts to the present conflicts where the African Union and the United Nations are presently involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 5: Theoretical Framework.

This chapter discussed the theoretical framework used in the course of this thesis. The theoretical framework adopted for this thesis is the realist theory, major theories relating to peacekeeping operations were also discussed.

Chapter 6: The Research Methodology.

This chapter described the research methodology of this study and detailed the chosen method for the data collection and analysis. It includes sections like research design, sampling and the research method. The relevant methods in the thesis are literature reviews, interviews and the case studies. For each of these methods, a detailed description was provided, in other to inform the reader on how these methods were applied in the study.

Chapter 7: Data Analysis and Findings.

The analysis were mainly based on the findings from the qualitative data collected. The analysis in this chapter is according to the objectives of the research, that were mentioned earlier in this chapter. The research results obtained were then presented from the interview conducted and compared with the relevant past literature sources.

Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations.

This chapter presented the main conclusions, based on the findings from the interviews and case studies. Gaps in the literature are discovered and the contributions, recommendations, direction for further research are suggested as well. The limitations of the study also form part of this chapter.

Appendices:

The appendices attached to this thesis include the interview guide, consent form and ethics approval.

Conclusion

This chapter which is chapter one introduced the topic of this dissertation which is collaboration on peacekeeping missions in Africa between the African Union and the United Nations. This started with an introduction followed by the reasons for this thesis. The objectives, research questions, purpose and an outline of this thesis was stated in the course of this chapter. The next chapter will however review the conceptualization of peacekeeping operations, followed by an analysis of the history and evolution of peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT AND HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2.0. Introduction

In 1989, when the cold war was terminated, international establishments like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union, began to be involved in peacekeeping operations as a means of promoting peace and security. This led to the formation of peacekeeping operations like the United Nations Mission in Lebanon (UNMIL) established in 2006. El-Salvador, Cambodia and Nicaragua (1989-1994). This resulted to the enlargement of peacekeeping operations in areas such as in scale and complexity. This transformation in the scale and complexity of peacekeeping operations across continents impacted on the definition of peacekeeping based on its transforming demands, This chapter will pursue the development of the concepts and practises of peacekeeping operations. The chapter will begin with a critical discussion of the concept of peacekeeping.

2.1. The Conceptualisation of Peacekeeping

In the 1960's, peacekeeping operations were established in Cyprus, the Congo, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and West New Guinea, which ushered in the phrase 'peacekeeping' (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). From this period, definitions of peacekeeping began to change with earlier definitions of peacekeeping limiting peacekeeping to an action ongoing in an international environment, through the usage of light or zero force, with the consents of the countries involved (Fortna and Howard, 2008).

(Boutros-Ghali, 1992:20), through the United Nations peace and security document titled an Agenda for peace written in 1992, argued that peacekeeping is the United Nations stationing of a military/police/civilian personnel with the consents of all parties involved to the field. (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:11) argued that this definition of peacekeeping by Boutros-Ghali, defines mainly responses to inter-state conflicts of the first generation peacekeeping and not intra-state. (Doyle, Ian, and Robert, 1997) went further by defining peacekeeping in an inter-

state war as second generation peacekeeping, involving such tasks as separating forces, disarming combatants, organising elections and protecting humanitarian and United Nations personnel. (Eyre, 1998) using the model of peacekeeping spectrum and terminology outlined in Table 1 below to define the various tasks and patterns of of different peacekeeping endeavours.




Figure 1: Peacekeeping Spectrum and Terminology

Source: Eyre, K.C (2001).

A broader definition of peacekeeping is gotten from the manual of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations which defines peacekeeping as “a technique designed to preserve the peace however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers, working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace” (UNDPKO, 2008:18). Making use of the traditional or first generation peacekeeping as a point of reference, (Pugh, 2004) defines peacekeeping as a multinational force, tasked with the following duties, monitoring and patrolling of ongoing conflict zones, using light arms, must be impartial in carrying out his duties with the assent of the conflicting parties. In 2008, the Capstone Doctrine, an handbook of the United Nations Department of peacekeeping operations was established and it used an instrument for peace and security by three mutually combined with the non use of force to describe peacekeeping (UN, 2008). While the outlined three principles of the United Nations peacekeeping above can determine the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation, this thesis argued that other conditions such as legitimacy, national and local ownership of the peacekeeping operation and

strategic nature of the environment are critically important conditions for an effective peacekeeping operation especially in Africa.

Major critics of the Capstone Doctrine such as (Brahimi and Ahmed, 2008:12) are of the view that the following criterias can determine the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation. They argued that peacekeeping operations has its criterias, one of which there is a peace to keep, concluding that without advanced mediation efforts, and in situations where there exist only partial peace and an ambiguous peace agreement, peacekeeping operations are bound to fail. Using the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez in 1967, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 as case studies, (Hillen, 2000) argues that this case studies illustrated the importance of the assent of the host parties in peacekeeping missions. With regards to peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality, force must not be applied except for the purpose of self defence, (Frohlich, 2001) argues that getting the trust of the major warring parties, coupled with their consent are vital conditions to peace agreements, while neutrality must involve not only peacekeeping actors but also devoid of national interest..

Using chapter 7 of the United Nations charter as a point of reference, (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:11), defines peacekeeping under the category of third generation peacekeeping, involving elements of peace enforcement, based on the deployment and mandate of peacekeeping forces with Somalia and the Central African Republic as case studies. With the analysis of peacekeeping operations, it point to more major assumption, which is that scholars define peacekeeping operations according to its aims and means (Bellamy, Willaims and Griffins, 2004: 3).

The charter of the United Nations in chapter six and a half, defined by Dag Hsammarskjold, placed peacekeeping between embargos and military, the traditional methods of a peaceful resolution of conflicts (Findlay, 2002). While (Olonisakin, 2006: 274-276), agrues that the intention of a peacekeeping operation is keeping of arranged or about to be concluded peace by the deployment of troops for the purpose of containing violence, crisis defusioun, speration of warring parties and creation of zones with the host government giving its approval.

The end of the cold war resulted into peacekeeping operations such as those of the United Nations Mission in Namibia in 1989 becoming more complex and its troops composition was expanded to include components such as military police, police, civilians and extensive mandates (Durch, 2006). This period urshered in changes in peacekeeping operations with the inclusion of not only the military but also civillians in tasks such as peace-building,

democratic processes, rebuilding the economy and reformation of the judiciary institutions (Durch, 2006). From this period, peacekeeping operations became multidimensional, complex and multi-functional resulting to definitions of peacekeeping according to these changes (Bellamy, 2010). (Schirch, 2006:27-29), argues that civilians became more involved in roles such as the rebuilding of political institutions and monitoring which resulted to the United Nations using the phrase Multidimensional with multiple tasks such as in in peace-building, improving governance, human rights and economic development. (Higate and Henry, 2009:43-45) argue that over the time, peacekeeping operations transformed into the 'New Military Humanism' aiming while promoting human security and rights also with the right to use force. This resulted into mandates being extended to include tasks such as protection of civilians, monitoring and supervision of elections, rebuilding of political institutions, disarmament and involvement in peace negotiations.

Inspite of several attempts, the term peacekeeping has still not been formally defined and this lack of clear definition provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes with corresponding disadvantages because the term peacekeeping can be loosely used and vaguely understood (Rikhye, 1984:1).

(Helch and Wallenstein, 2006:11) defined peacekeeping as intervention from a third force, involving the stationing of military troops, observers, civilian and police to a conflict zone created for the motive of resolving conflict, observing the ceasefires, establishing neutral zones while trying to restore peace and security between warring groups. (David, 1999:26) argues that peacekeeping involves several operations such as, peace-building, while using the root causes of conflicts such as underdevelopment, poverty, degradation of the environment, humanitarian crisis, to commence peacemaking using diplomatic mean through restoring peace after the conflict. And as a result peacekeeping operations now involves a wide range of tasks like preventive diplomacy, classic peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace-building, post-war security, sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction (Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012:56).

Therefore, the definition of peacekeeping has changed overtime as reviewed above and has the practice of peacekeeping. The literature on peacekeeping operations is also still dominated by case studies and most are studies of peacekeeping operations that pose special challenges or introduce new elements into the concept of peacekeeping operations such as Sierra Leone (Adebayo, 2002), Sri Lanka (Misra, 2004), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Ginnifer, 2002) and Somalia (Razak, 2004). Literatures from (Hillen, 1998), (Fortna, 2008) and

(Howard, 2008) limit the describing peacekeeping to measures to stop war occurring again after all hostilities has ended. (Walter and Snyder, 1999), (Creig and Diehi, 2005) and (Gillingan and Sergenti, 2007) defined peacekeeping as efforts to contain or terminate hostilities or even to prevent hostilities. This point to the fact peacekeeping is defined according to their functions (Durch 1996; James 1993).

Peacekeeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties and that these operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-time political settlement. The objectives of these operations is to fulfil a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-time political settlement. And that the peacekeepers main function is to establish a presence which inhibits hostile actions by disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process while supporting continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve normalised peaceful relations (Galadima, 2006:51).

According to the Clingendael Strategic Monitor Project (2015), a peacekeeping operation is defined using the Stockholm international peace research institute (SIPRI) definition which defines a peacekeeping operation using the following objectives:

- To facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.
- To assist the procedure of peace.
- To help in elimination of conflict and/or peace-building endeavours.
- Operations carried out by regional organisations and alliances.
- Operations carried out by adhoc coalitions of states that have been authorised for the purpose by a United Nations Security Council resolution and may include the following activities:
 1. Monitoring and multidimensional peacekeeping operations carried out by the United Nations Department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO), including joint AU/UN hybrid operations such as the one in Darfur.
 2. political and peace-building missions that are organised by the Department of political affairs (DPA).

The international peace academy (1984) has a broader definition of peacekeeping operations by defining peacekeeping operations as “the prevention, containment, moderation and

termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internally using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace” (Diehl, 1988:485). This study is of the view that the various definitions and concept of peacekeeping have their merits and demerits and argue that the best definition of peacekeeping is the one that comprises of all the attributes of peacekeeping operations. For the purpose of this study, (Williams, 2011) definition of peacekeeping operations will be adopted which he defined as requiring the military usage of uniformed forces (police/military) with or without the United Nations authorisation, with an instruction or programme to:

- Help in forestalling hostilities by reinforcing a procedure of peace.
- Serve as a tool to monitor or help in the enforcement of ceasefires or peace accord or
- Ensure ceasefires, peace accords or the order from the Security Council of the United Nations so that stable peace can be built (Williams, 2011).

2.1 Types Of Peacekeeping

Over the time, generations of peacekeeping operations are identified based on their distinct activities limited to each generations which are :

2.2.1. Traditional Peacekeeping

During the era of the cold war, peacekeeping operations were deployed to inter-state conflicts. Chapter vii of the United Nations charter which encompasses the following, peaceful resolution of disagreements, taking action in matters related to risks to the peace, contravention of the peace and acts of aggression contains traditional peacekeeping which is characterised by the following activities:

- Watching and observing suspension of hostilities and ceasefires. While military staff may be asked personally to watch, observe, make enquiry and report that parties to a conflict abide by agreements signed like the suspension of all hostilities. They may be asked to observe an evolving condition and inform the establishment that gave authorisation. The soldiers participating in such duties are referred to as observers or monitors and they carry out their tasks under the command of an international agreement or instruction and they must play a neutral part and answerable to the authority that gave such authorisation.

- Examination of complains and breaches. Observers may be asked to investigate complains and supposed breach of the provisions of an agreement, which must be done in an unprejudiced way.
- Negotiations and Mediation. Observers may be asked to perform operations on behalf of all conflicting parties and mediate among the warring parties while neutrality of the observers is very importance to the fulfillment of these duties.
- Supervision of truces. Traditional peacekeeping conduct truce supervision operations, this is to allow negotiations take place in a diplomatic manner in an environment that is free of conflict. The withdrawal and disengagement of conflicting parties may need the supervision of truce supervisory forces. These operations as stipulated in chapter vi and chapter vii of the United Nations charter point to peaceful and forceful course of action with the following essential characteristics.
- Non-enforcement. Peacekeeping troops under traditional peacekeeping are not to restore order but are only deployed following a ceasefire agreement and their aim was to mitigate between conflicting forces and safeguard the ceasefire agreement.
- Limited military capability. According to traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping troops are not to be involved in enforcement of peace or process the capabilities to be involved in peace enforcement.
- Neutrality/Impartiality. Peacekeeping troops are expected to remain neutral and not take sides with any of the conflicting parties involved in the dispute.
- Consent. According to (Higgins, 1994:4), traditional peacekeeping operations recognise and regard the authority of the states and must have the approval of the state on whose boundary the troops will be deployed and since its first peacekeeping operations in 1948, the practice of the United Nations is that the consent of the major warring parties to a conflict is needed before a peacekeeping operation can be deployed and this is the cornerstone of peacekeeping.
- Traditional peacekeeping operations also have the following functional attributes:
- Peacekeeping operations is a response to international conflict.
- The Security Council of the United Nations specify the mandates of a peacekeeping operations.
- Peacekeeping missions remain distinctly ad-hoc.

2.2.2. Modern Peacekeeping

According to (Mackinlay, 1993), modern peacekeeping operations is defined according to certain laid down parameters by the United Nations, consisting of second and third generation of peacekeeping. This was a departure from the first generation peacekeeping based on the fact that consent of the warring parties are not needed before deployment while also applying force when such is necessary (Ruggie, 1993).

2.2.3. Second generation peacekeeping

The second generation peacekeeping is distinct from the first generation peacekeeping because, there is a time-frame stipulating end of operations. Also, the second generation peacekeeping operation are involved in the resolution of internal conflicts, making its domestic political environment more complex with the following characteristics.

- Involvement of peace enforcement methods such as military force or the threat to make use of it although with authorisation while also compelling compliance with regards to universally accepted resolutions or sanctions.
- Implementation of sanctions and exclusive zones.
- Safeguarding humanitarian assistance.
- Forcible separation of belligerent parties.
- Other mandate include non-military in composition such as verification, involvement in democratic processes such as elections through supervision, humanitarian responses with regards to refugees, reliefs and restoration of civil administration. (Galadima, 2006).

2.2.4. Third generation peacekeeping

The third generation peacekeeping operation comes with its own distinct features and are usually deployed into an ongoing conflict situation or a state of anarchy. Some of its operations involves peacemaking, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and peace-building which its operations involving the following:

- Overthrow of existing leaders.
 - Support to democratic leaders and principles.
 - Safeguarding human right.
 - Coaching the local police.

- Protecting the deliveries of humanitarian reliefs.
- Helping in maintaining law and order.
- Monitoring cease-fire agreements between conflicting parties (Galadima, 2006).

Five classifications of peacekeeping missions such as traditional, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, enforcement of peace/peace support missions were listed by (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004). Six generations of peacekeeping operations were identified by (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001), which are traditional, non-UN expanded, peace enforcement, peace restoration through partnership and multinational peace restoration/UN state creation. Twelve types of peacekeeping operations were described by (Diehi, 2002), such as traditional peacekeeping, observer missions, support for democratic processes and enforcement of sanctions intervention.

The Asian conference (2002) with regards to peacekeeping operations articulated a strong desire for quiet diplomacy and non-forceful responses in “extra-ordinary and exceptional” cases, (Caballero-Anthony and Acharya, 2005). Therefore, while traditional peacekeeping as defined by (Pugh, 2004) was established to deal primarily with interstate conflict, multidimensional peacekeeping addresses intrastate conflict.




Figure 2: The linkages of Peace Operations

Source: Choi, Y. (2013)

2.3. History and Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations

The history and evolution of the United Nations peacekeeping operations can be traced to the League of Nations controlled international force in (Saar, 1934-35) which according to (Diehi, 2008:34-35), may be the first partial example of an international observer force. (Diehi, 2008) argues that in 1948, observers team were stationed in the Middle-East, 1949, observers were stationed at the border of India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947. In 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed to supervise the warring groups in the Suez canal, modelled on Pearson's ideas recommending unarmed, lightly armed military personnels from several countries under the command of the United Nations (UN, 1956). (Monnakgotha, 1996) identified the 1815 congress of Vienna, 1899 Hague peace conference and the 1919 Versailles peace conference as the evolution of peacekeeping operations. This concert of Europe led to the raising of the notion 'settlement of disputes' (Cilliers and Mills, 1995:1). In 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations established a special committee on peacekeeping operations, to deal with peacekeeping matter hereby formalising the term peacekeeping operations (Rikhye, 1984: 1). According to (Osmancavusogly, 2000), United Nations peacekeeping operations went through transformation after 1988 due to the following reasons: An unprecedented co-operation among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council over Glasnost and Perestroika. The end of the cold-war which resulted to reduced East-West tensions and rivalry and led to an unprecedented era of expansion and optimism in peacekeeping operations.

The aforementioned factors resulted to the establishment of more peacekeeping operations from 1989 than in the historical years of the United Nations. This era from 1989 was defined as second generation peacekeeping, lacking the explicit consent of the classical era of peacekeeping operations, with new levels of involvement such as the availability of consent of the warring parties, complex peace agreement with multidimensional tasks such as the following:

- Electoral assistance
- Monitoring of Human rights
- Resettlement of refugees
- Training of Police
- Protection of humanitarian relief efforts
- Disarmament and Demobilisation of armed forces (Osmancavusoglu, 2000:3).

(Jett, 2001:264-99), used his five period of peacekeeping operations namely, the Nascent period (1946-1956), the Assertive period (1956-1967), the Dormant period (1967-1973), the Resurgent period (1973-1978), the Maintenance period (1978-1985) and the Expansion period (1988-1992) to access peacekeeping operations.

2.3.1. The Nascent period: 1946-1956

During this period from 1946-1956, fewer observer missions such as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Israel (1948), the first peacekeeping operations established by the United Nations (UN, 1948). The United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) established in 1951, in India and Pakistan with the mandate of observing and reporting violations of ceasefire. This period peacekeeping operations were involved mainly in inter-state conflicts (Sumantra 2003; Wiseman 1987).

2.3.2. The Assertive period: 1956-1967

The assertive period was characterised by renewed conflict in the Middle-East and decolonisation struggles which result to innovations and new opportunities for peacekeeping operations, while breaking new grounds such as the following: The addition of civilia police, establishment of a large scale operations involving the use of arms, drafting of the peacekeeping principles of the United Nations which are, that peacekeeping missions must only be stationed, with the assent of the warring groups, force must not be applied except for the purpose of self-defence, neutrality and impartiality of the peacekeeping operation in the conflict (Jeff 2001; Urquhart 1997).

During the assertive period eight new peacekeeping operations were established such as the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965, the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF1) in Egypt in 1956, the United Nations operation in the Congo in 1960, the United Nations Security for West New Guinea (UNSF) in 1962 and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964.

2.3.3. The Dormant period: 1967-1973

This period witnessed inactivity or establishment of new peacekeeping missions by the United Nations due to the following factors.

- The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) regional security mechanism.
- Super power rivalry. Deadlock between the super powers over matters of procedure and principle and the inflexibility of their positions in the United Nations Security Council prevented during this period any progress in development of new concepts for peacekeeping (Rikhye and Skjelsbaek, 1991).

2.3.4. The Resurgent period: 1973-1978

During this period, renewed conflict also in the Middle East resulted a resurgence of peacekeeping operations although limited to classical peacekeeping on a larger scale like;

- The second United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEFII) formed by the United Nations General Assembly, in accordance with the Security Council of the United Nations Resolution 340 (1973), to monitor the armistice between Egyptian and Israeli forces at the end of the Yom Kippur War (UN, 1996).
- The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) established on 31 May 1974 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) following the accepted withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights (UN, 1974).
- The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established by the United Nations with the acceptance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 and 426 on 19th March 1978, to confirm Israeli disengagement from Lebanon (UN, 1978).

2.3.5. The Maintenance period: 1978-1988

Increased anxiety and rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the lack of crisis in the Middle-East, resulted into a second period of peacekeeping operations dormancy.

2.3.6. The Expansion Period 1988-1993

This period witnessed a resurgence of peacekeeping operations as a result of the following factors.

- The end of the cold war, new levels of global cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the end of the Iraq-Iran war, invasion of Kuwait in 1991 by

Iraq, changed the patterns of peacekeeping operations (Hume, 1994:214), leading to peace enforcement.

- From 1988, the dimension, nature and numbers of conflict changed, to ethno-religious, conventional armies, diminishing importance of states and frontiers and fragmented conflicts of several armed non-state actors (Voncreveld, 1991: 193). Civilians became the target of conflicts rather than soldiers, resulting into humanitarian crisis and war crimes (Nordstrom, 1992:261).
- According to (Evans,1994:4), 29 of the 30 conflict recorded during this period were intra-state conflicts. This was as a result of increasing capitalism and reducing ability of military power. This transformed peacekeeping operations to a multidimensional force and complications with the involvement of armed non-state actors in conflict (Jett, 2001:28).
- This was the period that saw the emergence of Globalisation, making peacekeeping operations more desirable. Global electronic village such as the CNN, transmitted live images and news of ongoing conflict with negative and positive impact on peacekeeping operation. Positive because issues of national sovereignty and non intervention declined for the purpose of humanitarian interventions (Jett 2001; Mandelbaum 1994; Pearce 1995).

This study also argues that the global broadcasting of the horrors in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda in 1994 might have been one of the factors that necessitated the adoption of article 4 (h) of the African Union constitutive act which extend the right of the African Union to respond to conditions like war crimes, acts of genocide and crimes against humanity when they occur in a member state. The negative factor is that while the international community will quickly deal with the humanitarian effects of an intrastate conflict, rarely will it be willing to do what is necessary militarily or politically to bring these intrastate conflicts to a definitive end (Jett, 2001:29). The case studies of this study, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic are examples of such negative factor.

There was an increase of peacekeeping troops from 9000 to over 80000, peacekeeping operations became more complex with broader mandate (Jett, 2001; Deconing 2007). (Uvin, 2002) argues that organisational framework has shown to be an intimidating assignment for the United Nations and in order for these interlinkage in the field of peacekeeping operations to be managed, the United Nations has established the integrated missions model that is particularly directed at increasing consistency between the United Nations Country Team, that

concentrate on humanitarian and development, and the United Nations peace operations, that is peace and security focused. A former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2005 defined an integrated peacekeeping mission as:

A mission that is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at the various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the United Nations system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.

Examples of an integrated peace operation are the United Nations missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo and Sudan (Deconing, 2007). Finally, the United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1992 known as the contraction period in the history of peacekeeping despite its failures such as in Rwanda (Bercovitch and Regan, 2003) have recorded several achievements majorly by carrying out the following tasks.

- Helping countries transformation from civil war to stable governance. Examples are countries like Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Haiti and Liberia with the United Nations having distinctive experience in the executive management of states and territories in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo and Timor-Lesk (Fortna, 2008:113).
- Reducing tensions across borders, from 1974, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has assisted in stabilising relations between Israel and Syria, and a multinational force still monitor the Israel-Egypt border (Jones, Gowan and Sherman, 2009),
- Mitigating humanitarian crisis, peacekeeping operations as well as to adding to the resolution and prevention of conflict frequently providing a structure within which humanitarian bodies and non-governmental organisations can assist those that are vulnerable (Jones, Gowan and Sherman, 2009).

(Kenkel, 2013) argues that the evolution of peacekeeping operations can be traced through five analytical generations centred on the following factors:

- The state of the debate surrounding issues of sovereignty and intervention.

- The accompanying change in peacekeeping operations propensity to use military force.
- The United Nations attitude towards the conflict varying from reactive to proactive.
- The attendant type of peace.
- The concrete mandate and tasks.
- The actors required to carry out the mandate.

(Fetherston, 1994), in continuation of Boutros-Ghali's an Agenda for Peace, proposed a postulation of peacekeeping built on the concept of a peaceful response from a third party. Fetherston pursued the development of peacekeeping from its emergence to its present expansion period and stated that the adhoc method of peacekeeping of the United Nations did not meet up with the demands caused by the post-cold war. She reviewed the United Nations peacekeeping and concludes that better coordination of all these three rules and a framework of intervention are crucial for more effective peacekeeping operations

United Nations peacekeeping operations from mid-1990s experienced some failures as a result of many challenges with regards to the aim and means of such operations. This led to the proceedings of the panel on United Nations peace operations known as the "Brahimi Report" issued in August 2000. The Brahimi report offered an in-depth analysis of the conduct of the United Nations peacekeeping operations and made several recommendations for change for it to be able to meet the critical 21st century peacekeeping challenges (UN, 2004). The Brahimi Report argues that Peacekeeping since its inception has transformed from its traditional primary model such as observing ceasefire during inter-state conflicts to a compounded blue-print involving both military and civilians involving also peace-building roles (UN, 2004).

The United Nations operation in Somalia 11 (UNOSOM 11) in 2002 compromised its impartiality by directing action against the Mohammed Farah Aidid rebel group going against its mandate of impartiality and failed (Boulden, 2005). In contrast, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established in 1999 combined dialogue and negotiation with credible military deterrence against Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels and were successful (UN, 2003).

The outlined success and failure of peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality and that force must not be applied except for self-defence purposes led to a new interpretation of the peacekeeping doctrine with the realisation that the issue of impartiality should not be

confused with neutrality, with the following assumption, military force even though it involves coercion, can be used impartially to ensure compliance with a given mandate without designing an enemy, using force in this manner precisely because it is impartial and ever handed will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict in question (Mats Berdal, 2000:56).

The above made the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in its peacekeeping doctrine to conclude that “any transformation to peace enforcement from a mission only approved for peacekeeping need responsive political resolution, a new instruction and more robust rules of engagement” (NATO, 2011). The above defined peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in 1992 which ended in disgrace and massacre at Srebrenia (Mats Berdal, 2000:64).

(Williams, 2013) is of the opinion that peacekeeping missions are tools, not a blue-print and to be effective, peacekeeping operations must be part of a constructive political blue-print, peacekeeping missions should not be the solution to all wars. (Jones, 2009:12) shares the same views by arguing that “It is not sensible to deploy a peacekeeping operation to a region where there is an ongoing war except the peacekeeping operation is a part of a feasible political procedure to resolve or manage the conflict”. Peacekeepers should not be deployed unless the host government is ready to work together with them and they should avoid crossing the “Darfur line”, deploying a peacekeeping operation without the full approval of the host country”. (Williams, 2013:5) argues that legitimacy is a very important factor in peacekeeping operations and that sustaining legitimacy among the important audience, like the conflicting groups, local populace, international non-governmental institutions (NGOs), and foreign government, is a vital part of achieving effectiveness.

That peacekeeping operations regarded as legitimate by major audiences are likely to achieve their aims and those regarded as lacking legitimacy will struggle on both counts. As evident with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in 2007 and the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 1999, whose peacekeeping operations legitimacy were eroded as a result of behaviors such as involving in acts of war crimes (AMISOM), could not safeguard the local populace from

violence (MONUSCO), corruption (AMISOM) and sexual exploitation and abuse (MONUC, UNMIL), (Williams, 2013).

According to (Mandoyi, Choane and Twala, 2013), peacekeeping operations have proven to be one of the most successful tools accessible to the structures such as the United Nations in order to assist host countries to steer through the most demanding part from conflict to peace and it has distinctive strengths such as legitimacy, burden sharing, and the capability to station and sustain troops and police from around the globe, and combining them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandate. (Fleck, 2008:3) sharing the same views argues that “peacekeeping is a mechanism created to help war-torn states to establish the conditions for lasting peace and that peacekeepers should supervise peace processes in countries emerging from conflicts and help ex-combatants to implement the peace accords that has been agreed upon.

Critics of peacekeeping operations such as (Adebajo 2007; Langille 2007) linked peacekeeping operations to a new type of neo-colonialism by arguing that the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council only get involved actively in peacekeeping operations when it involves their former colonies or the regions that are of strategic importance to them.

(Bellamy, 2004:4) argue that even though peacekeeping is an action embarked upon by separate actors, its history and development is linked to the United Nations and as a result, peacekeeping is frequently perceived as a major function of the United Nations. United Nations peacekeeping is based on the assumption that the presence of an unbiased United Nations can reduce tensions and make room for resolving the conflict peacefully. The first step, which involves extreme diplomacy by the United Nations Secretary General, is to secure a cessation of hostilities and get the approval of the conflicting groups before deployment of peacekeepers. United Nations peacekeeping operations normally fall into two major classifications which are:

- Military observer’s missions comprising of few unarmed officers, expected to perform duties like observation of ceasefires, establishing the disengagement of troops, or guarding borders or neutral zones.

- Peacekeeping forces comprising of national delegation of troops stationed to carry out duties that is close to the duties of military observers and frequently to mitigate between conflicting parties (Galadima, 2006).

2.4. Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations:

Peacekeeping operations have over the years transformed into one of the primary tools used by the international community to manage and resolve complex crises. (Crichton, 2009:39) argues that the following factors led to contemporary peacekeeping operations:

- Peacekeeping as a practice has progressed from a traditional blue-print.
- The direction of peacekeeping missions has expanded above inter-state conflict.
- Peacekeeping has developed from a meek emergence into a compounded international operation.

Therefore, the assumptions of traditional peacekeeping have been challenged by a fast evolving security environment and new principles have been adopted to meet the several threats caused by several different conflict conditions (Johnstone, Torfolani and Gowan, 2005:56). Meaning that peacekeeping in contemporary time has surpassed the traditional peacekeeping model and now involves multidimensional activities. Globalisation also brought about several challenges to traditional peacekeeping operations as contemporary peacekeeping have to deal not only with ceasefires but the transnational nature of 21st century intra-state conflicts such as illicit arms and weapons, conflict minerals, regional powers involved in the conflict and non-state actors such as terrorist groups. According to (Kofi Annan, 2000:9) “this is the world of globalisation, a new context for and a new connectivity among economic actors and activities throughout the world, in which threats to peace and security faced by the people of the world have become distinctly transnational”. This point to the fact that due to the changing nature of conflicts around the world, a broader and far more structured approach than that of traditional peacekeeping model is needed, (Deconing, 2008:6) therefore proposed the Four Ps which are prevention of conflict, making of peace, keeping of peace and building of peace. According to the Four Ps, prevention is the first step in reacting to a situation of conflict, while peace-building is the last. (Deconing, 2008:6)

argue that the Four Ps will not only stabilised a conflict situation but also deal with the origin of the crisis and preventing a relapse in the long term.

Therefore, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are usually stationed as part of a higher global efforts to help countries coming out of conflict achieve viable peace (Crichton, 2009:44). According to the (Capstone Doctrine, 2008:23), the major tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping are:

- Establish an environment that is safe and stable while enhancing the capability of the state to provide security, with regards for the rule of law and human rights.
- Enable the political procedures by aiding negotiation and reconciliation and bolstering the formation of lawful and effective governmental establishments.
- Come up with a blue-print for making sure that all global actors go about their activities at the country level in orderliness and well coordinated.

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations also apart from the major military functions of monitoring and observing cease-fires provide the following;

- Giving assistance to national law enforcement bodies.
- Provision of security at major government facilities, ports and other important infrastructure.
- Create the needed security surroundings for free movement of people, goods and humanitarian support.
- Provide protection to the local populace directly.
- Disarmaments, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of militias.
- Clearance of mine.
- Security Sector Reform (SSR).
- Electoral support.
- Aiding the reinstatement and extension of the authority of government.

Table 1: Peacekeeping Operations From 1988-Date.

Source: The United Nations Database

MISSION NAME	COUNTRY	DATE	TYPE
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Pakistan and Afghanistan	May 1988-15 February 1989	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Iran and Iraq	August 9 1988- February 1991	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. (UNIKOM)	Iraq and Kuwait	April 9, 1991- October 6, 2003	Peacekeeping
The United Nations The United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. (UNOMUR)	Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993- September 1994	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. (MINURSO)	Western Sahara	24 April 1991- April 2009	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Former Yugoslavia	February 1992- March 1995	Peacekeeping
The United Nations	Georgia	August 1993- 15 July 2009	Peacekeeping

Observer Mission in Georgia. (UNOMIG)			
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia. (UNOMIL)	Liberia	1993-2003	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMH)	Haiti	1993-1996	Peacekeeping
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Rwanda	1993-1996	Peacekeeping
United Nations Angola Verification Mission 1& 2 (UNAVEM)	Angola	1989-1995	Peacekeeping
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Central America	1989-1992	Peacekeeping
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Cambodia	1991-1992	Peacekeeping
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Cambodia	1992-1993	Peacekeeping
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	Somalia	1992-Date	Peacekeeping

CHAPTER 3

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND COOPERATION IN OTHER REGIONS

3.0. Introduction

Literature review is an in-depth analysis of literature and involves the summary, analysis and evaluation of literature on a particular research area. Literature review also afford the researcher the ability to establish what has already been written or reviewed about a particular research area, have an understanding of the current situation of that research area, relate such understanding to the research work in progress and identify gaps that needed to be filled in the course of the ongoing research work (Arshed and Danson, 2015).

Therefore the objective of a literature review is to furnish the researcher with an organised summary of research done on a particular research area, gives a critical and evaluative perspective to the research in progress, review the arguments of other authors, unravel the similarities and differences within an existing research work, identify gaps to be filled by the research and helps to justify research qusetions and hypotheses.

This chapter will therefore examine existing literature on the United Nations peacekeeping missions and collaboration between the United Nations and other international institutions in other regions such as in Europe and the Middle-East in peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping operations of the African Union will also be reviewed and the strenghts and weakness of these cooperation in peacekeeping operations and the United Nations peacekeeping operations will be critically discussed. Gaps in the literature will also be identified that will be filled in the course of this dissertation.

3.1. United Nations And Peacekeeping Operations In Europe

This part will review the peacekeeping collaboration of the United Nations and international institutions in Europe like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Strenghts and weakness of these peacekeeping operations in Europe will also be discussed.

In 1998 and 1999, series of conferences in Europe such as the Franco-British Saint-Malo summit with the European Council of Cologne resulted to the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 2000, the United Nations established peacekeeping collaboration with the European Union at the European Council of Nice with two major objectives which are, development of approaches to prevent conflict that will be enforced mutually and ensuring that the European Union civilian and military abilities will be of real quality for conflict administration of the United Nations (Novossoloff, 2012:9). In September

24, 2003, the EU-UN crisis management cooperation pointed out four areas of collaboration to be enlarged like:

- Planning; Mutual support in assessing missions and more contact and collaboration between mission drafting components.
- Training; Formation of combined training standards and Establishment of joint training standards and regulating training seminars, conferences and exercises.
- Communication; Exchange of liaison officers and formation of desk-to-desk talks through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels.
- Best Practices; Regular and structured interchange lessons learned and details on best practices on handing over and procurement of mission (EU, 2003).

Despite the aforementioned, in March 1964, inter-communal violence in Cyprus resulted to the first United Nations peacekeeping missions in Europe. The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established, this was a traditional peacekeeping operation because it was a consent force mandated to monitor the cease-fire and enhance conducive conditions for the negotiation of a peace agreement (Birgisson 1993; Siekmann 1991). Peacekeeping operations categorised as consent forces are those that the consent of the warring parties is vital not only to its deployment but also to the restoration of its mandate. The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was able to achieve the following; tame the vast majority of the incidents, reduce the probability of war, created an atmosphere of peace, promoted and coordinated bi-communal activities leading to communities social cohesion and confidence (Lindley, 1997). Peacekeeping collaboration of the United Nations and the European Union has been mainly operation driven after the conflict in Cyprus. After Cyprus, the next case study of these peacekeeping cooperation was during the conflict in former Yugoslavia between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 (Novosseloff 2012; Oliver 2002). The breakout of hostilities in former Yugoslavia in 1991, resulted to the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 with the following mandate: To establish the United Nations protected areas (UNPA), disarm the UNPAs, protect persons from armed attacks and human rights violations (UN, 2002).

The intervention of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did not prevent the escalation of hostilities which resulted to the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Bolger, 1995: 375-359). But why did the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) failed to stop the civil war in former Yugoslavia until the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened? According to (Abass, 2004), Only the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) possessed the military might because of its traditional collective defence formations to respond to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, while a lack of clear frame work and command led to the challenges encountered by UNPROFOR in the conflict.

In December 14th 1995, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was formed by the United Nations under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation due to the Dayton peace accord in Bosnia (Un, 1995). In 2004, the stabilization force (SFOR) replaced IFOR while in December 2004, SFOR was replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR). A review of the cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the United Nations, European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the former republics of Yugoslavia showed the following challenges; lack of adequate coordination in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement among the various organisations, the lack of a single command of all the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations weakened the cooperation leading to lack of competencies, different mandates and behaviours (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004: 223). In December 20 1995, UNPROFOR's mandate was terminated due to the following: the reluctance of the United Nations to act in the conflict in Bosnia led to the escalation of the conflict coupled with the vague mandate of UNPROFOR and no real design (Rikhye, 2000). The humanitarian mandate of UNPROFOR was made ineffective due to their rules of engagement such as that force must be applied only for the purpose of self defence and non use of military enforcement (Rikhye, 2004: 45). Therefore a major failure of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was the lack of a clear purpose and after the adoption of the joint statement on the United Nations and the European Union Cooperation in 2007, both organisations cooperated together in Kosovo (Janka-Oertel 2008; Novosseloff 2012). The United Nations Mission in Kosovo was to be entrusted to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) but was interrupted by the following factors;

- The unsuccessful negotiations held in the Security Council in 2008 about the termination of the United Nations Mission.
- The threat by Russia to veto any resolution recognising the independence of Kosovo and as a result putting an end to resolution 1244 (1999) of the United Nations Security Council.

- The lack of global legal grounds for the presence of UNMIK and EULEX weakened their legitimacy.
- Not all European Union member states recognised the independence of Kosovo (Novosseloff, 2012).

The question here is this, how successful has the United Nations been in its peacekeeping missions in Europe? The effectiveness of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Europe cannot be determined because the United Nations has never acted alone in Europe but in collaboration with other international organisations such as the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Georgia in 1993. The transnational nature and dimension of the threat of terrorism has forced international organisations towards the ideal of enhanced inter-institutional cooperation and has also obliged them to demonstrate their relevance and served as a useful example for cooperation between the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Tardy 2004; Thakur 2006).

Although the United Nations is the appropriate organisation that can provide effective peacekeeping operations in Europe, it is faced with several challenges such as lack of adequate resources to be involved in a more effective level and on long-term peacekeeping operations in Europe (Oertel, 2008). The United Nations also intervened in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, through the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) formed in August 1993 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 858 with the following mandate;

- To observe and substantiate the execution by the parties of the ceasefire agreement and forces separation signed in Moscow on May 14 1994.
- To monitor the commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping operations within the blue-print of execution of the agreement.
- To observe troops of the Republic of Georgia withdrawing from the Kodori Valley to areas outside the frontiers of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia.
- Patrolling the Kodori valley frequently.
- To keep close contacts with the two parties to the crisis and collaborating with the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States and be part of the

situations favorable to secured and organised return of refugees and displaced persons (UN, 2006).

In Georgia, the United Nations operated a complex peacekeeping operation resulting to the United Nations Observer Mission in the Georgia (UNOMIG) not been able to be effective due to the following; the mediation process involved an existing country and a separatist region, which automatically placed the United Nations in a position of bias as the United Nations had to support the state against the separatist rehigion leading to rejection of United Nations proposals in the Georgian-Abkhazian case (Steward, 2003). The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was a good test of cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and a continental hegemony, the Russian federation. The coordination between the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Forces (CISPKF) in the Georgian-Abkhazia conflict was effective and an indication that the United Nations cooperation with continental powers and organisations can be potentially fruitful despite its challenges especially in the facilitation of peace accords(Ekberg 2003; Macfarlane 1999).

Finally, Europe have had its share of peacekeeping operations with over 19 multilateral peace operations and till 2009, nine peace operations were active in former Yugoslavia and another eight in the former Soviet Union with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) a response to an older conflict (SIPRI, 2009). From the analysis of peacekeeping operations in Europe, most peacekeeping operations in Europe were conducted by regional organisations like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) supported and authorised by the United Nations Security Council. However, Europe present the ideal case study for cooperative peacekeeping since no single organisation have conducted peacekeeping operations in Europe.

3.2.United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations in Asia and the Middle East

This section will review cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and international institutions in Asia and the Middle East and United Nations peacekeeping operations in these regions.

In 1949, due to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1947, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan intervened to observe the situation (Karel, 1990). After North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, the Korea war started resulting to the intervention of the United Nations. This was one of the United Nations early challenges in peace and security in Asia (Rottman, 2002). Two of the United Nations most ambitious operations have taken place in Asia, which are the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) formed on 28 February 1992 and the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) formed in 1999 (Allden and Amer, 2007).

The Mandate for the United Nations Mission in East Timor included three components which were: An electoral item that gives details about the voting exercise and course of action, a political item used for observing the political environment and making sure political parties exhibit their freedom and NGOs perform their functions while an information item gives details about voting exercise and course of action (Marker, 2003).

The increasing insecurity in East Timor resulted to the formation of an International Peace Enforcement Force (INTERFET) which was not a United Nations force and was led by Australia although authorised by the United Nations Security Council to restore peace and security, engage in humanitarian assistance and supporting the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). In East Timor, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was effective in electoral, humanitarian assistance, security related issues and military-civil relations and one of the lessons learned is the significance of have mandates that are clearly defined, commenced contact and dialogue with the national leadership with sufficient financial and human resources (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, 2005:110).

The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was effective serving as an ideal model for forms of collective security interventions as stipulated in chapter vii of the United Nations charter. According to (Marrack 1993; Shpiro 2003), since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the United Nations has been involved in extensive peacekeeping operations in the Middle-East because of its importance to the super powers who wanted stability in the region.

An analysis of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) reveals the following;

- That although UNTAC was unsuccessful in establishing a real politically unbiased atmosphere for elections in Cambodia, the general elections in May 1993 was a success.
- UNTAC failed to deal with the dilemma of reoccurring armed attacks against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia which worsened the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese.
- The large influx of foreign troops resulted to Cambodian women being abused, encouraging prostitution and introducing AIDS, which resulted to Cambodia becoming one of the countries with the highest rate of AIDS infection in Asia.

In Cambodia, the United Nations vision with regards to the mandate of UNTAC was not cleared while the Party of Democratic Kampuchan (PDK), a major party to the conflict in Cambodia was absent from the peace agreement because of the use of non military responses by the UNTAC (Allden and Amer, 2007). In 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), the first United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Middle-East was formed with the purpose of supervising the Palestine truce (UN, 2003). There was also a response from the United Nations in 1956, through the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). UNEF is a concept of Lester Pearson, the former Prime Minister of Canada geared towards resolution of conflict among states. This was to be achieved through the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed personnel from United Nations member states to conflict areas to observe the peace negotiations on a neutral level (UN, 1956).

The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established in 1958 to stop the unlawful penetration of personnel or proliferation of arms from the United Arab Republic across the Lebanese borders (UN, 2003). To end the civil war in 1963, the Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) was established in 1963 (UN, 2003). To maintain the cease-fire agreements between Egypt and Israel, also cease-fire along the Israeli-Lebanon border, the United Nations Emergency Force II was formed in 1974 and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDIF) in 1978 (Diehi, 2008). The United Nations was also involved in peacekeeping operations at the demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait as a result of the August 2 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was formed in 1991 to monitor the demilitarized zone and the Khawr' Abd Allah water way between Iraq and Kuwait but UNIKOM was unable to fulfil its mandate as a result of increasing insecurity in the demilitarized zone (UN, 2003).

Finally in Asia and the Middle-East, the peacekeeping cooperation of the United Nations was based on cooperation with other organisations and were effective compared to its peacekeeping operations in Europe.

3.3. The United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations as of September 2019 operates thirteen (13) peacekeeping operations among which seven (7) are in Africa (Blanchfied, Arieff and Blanchard 2019). Of the seven peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa, six are of the United Nations largest on-going peace operations, which are MONUSCO in Western Sahara (1991), UNMISS in South Sudan (2011), MINUSMA in Mali (2013) and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (2014) (Blanchfied, Arieff and Blanchard, 2019). African countries also contribute about 50% of United Nations peacekeepers with 75% of United Nations peacekeepers deployed in Africa with over 75% of United Nations peacekeeping budget spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa and the United Nations now deploys its keepkeeping operations to Africa only in a situation where the African Union is unable to do so and peacekeeping operations in Africa now involves not only the African Union and the United Nations but also the sub-regional institutions in Africa (De Coning and Peters, 2019).

On the African continent, the dominant peacekeeping operations has been that operated by the United Nations and the United Nations pecekeeping budget in Africa since 2006, is over 36million dollars with approximately 70,000 peacekeepers. Several of these United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa has gone well such as those in Namibia and Mozambique while those in Angola and Somalia were ineffective (Bellamy and Williams, 2010). According to (Williams, 2011), factors such as inadequate funding, lack of adequate logistics, corruption, vague mandate, legitimacy issues, influence of external actors, sexual exploitation and human rights violations created challenges for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa such as AMISOM, MINURAT, MONUSCA, AMIS, MONUC and UNMIL. Lack of local ownership of its peacekeeping operation in Africa affected the African Union leadership of its peacekeeping operations despite the United Nations increasing the size of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 and 2001, the poor quality of peacekeepers of UNAMSIL, coupled with mining of diamonds impacted on its effectiveness. The United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo deployed in 1999 is encountering several challenges such as a large local population hostile to

the peacekeepers, difficult and large terrains, lack of a peace agreement and political solution to the crisis, impacting on its effectiveness (Farah 2000; Jett 2001).

In the Global Policy Forum (GPF) report of 2013, desertification caused by climate change, external interventions over natural resources such as crude oil is leading to rising insecurity in Chad and the Central African Republic. The strategic nature of the African environment makes the United Nations peacekeeping operations more challenging compared to other continents across the world (Downs and Stedman, 2002). Other factors such as involvement of multiple conflicting groups, absent of a peace accord before deployment, state failure, lack of functional state institutions, involvement of thousands of soldiers, illegal mining of national resources and hostile neighbours equally complicates the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa (Downs and Stedman, 2002). The problems of scale of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the process of its mandate delivery coupled with dimension of the operational theatres involved posed a challenge. The size and harsh terrains make logistics difficult affecting the growth in the number of United Nations peacekeepers. Lack of adequate infrastructure worsen scale problems while the implementation of mandates that are complex in such harsh environment result an excessive dispersion of forces, limiting responses to military challenges (Jones, Gowan and Sherman, 2009).

The following challenges such as inadequate manpower, logistical constraints, lack of cooperation from the warring warlords, vague mandates, lack of adequate arms embargo enforcement, ignoring the root causes of the conflict, developed countries non deployment of troops and the United Nations slow response to the conflict were identified by (Agada, 2008) as some of the major challenges UNOSOM II faced in Somalia. According to (Nkiwane, 2001: 102), in spite of the effectiveness of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (VNAVEM I) and The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the small size composition of the operations coupled with its inability to ensure an end to clashes at the initial stage of its intervention drew several criticisms.

The under resourcing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) deployed to Rwanda impacted on its effectiveness and rendered it ineffective leading to the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda (Melvern, 2009). UNASMIL in Sierra-Leone until the British forces intervened in May 2000 suffered several harassments from the RUF rebels while MONUC deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 operated with very few

troops until the assassination of President Layrent Kabila in January 2001 (Williams; 2001: 140).

In April 20 2015, four members of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) died from a suicide bomb attack on a United Nations vehicle while from the period between 1st September 2014 to 31st May 2015, over 32 United Nations peacekeepers were killed in Mali (UN, 2015). This cases showcased the arguments over the importance of the host government giving its assent, such as in Darfur that would have enabled peacekeepers operate in a less hostile environment (Sen Gupta and Gettleman, 2014).

Lack of coordination among the several peacekeepers in Africa presented another challenge to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. The United Nations despite it being the most important peacekeeping organisation in Africa especially after the cold war, lacked control of the activities of these multiple peacekeepers in Africa. Also the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa was impacted by these multiple peacekeeping actors, which resulted to varieties of peacekeeping doctrines, methods, goals and strategies (Jones 2002; Williams 2011).

Another challenge of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa was lack of enough soldiers as evident with MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized over 100,000 troops for MONUC, but below 6000 troops were deployed (Roessler and Prendegast, 2006:259). There is also the challenge of complex mandates such as monitoring of elections, safeguarding human rights, protecting the local populace, enhancing security and order, reinforcing the rule of law and supervising the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and reforming the security sector (SSR), these complex mandates are seen by troop contributing countries as too broad and too all encompassing (UN, 2009).

According to the final report on the in-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations start-up phase released by the United Nations office of oversight services in March 1995, "there are provisions for peacekeeping operations with the United Nations charter and the basis for each peacekeeping operation is the mandate given to it". Therefore the mandate of a peacekeeping operation can make it to fail if it sets unachievable goals coupled with inadequate funding and political dynamics in the United Nations Security Council (Durch 1993; Jett 2001). (Anstee , 1996:39) while assessing the earliest peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Somalia (UNOSOM) formed in April 1992 is of the view that, Somalia (UNOSOM)

operational mandate was unclear, adjusted regularly during the process while opened to multiple interpretations. This thesis argues in support of the mandate theory which states that mandates of peacekeeping operations should be reflective of a political strategy such as a diplomatic resolution to the crisis and peacekeeping just a part of that political solution not an alternative (Nadin, 2014).

An analysis of the mandate of UNAMID in Darfur, AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic reveals a vague and limited mandate without a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. The above made President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya while addressing the African Union summit in January 2016 in Addis Ababa to call for an evaluation of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate with regards to its rules of engagement, adequate and sustainable funding (Daily Nation, 2016).

The United Nations mandated MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo to safeguard civilians and support the President Joseph Kabila led government. Despite this, government soldiers in the FARDC, were involved in several atrocities against the local population resulting to the withdrawal of MONUC support to the FARDC (HRW, 2009). The withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations was demanded by the Burundian government in 2006, while consent for the UNMEE forces were equally withdrawn by Eritrea because Asmara was of the opinion that the United Nations was refusing to implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary commission rulings (Williams, 2011: 199). There is also the lack of likeness and the vagueness that regularly perpetrated the texts handed over by the Security Council of the United Nations and according to the United Nations Department of peacekeeping operations, “the United Nations peacekeeping mandates more complex than ever but there remains a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled” (UN, 2009:9). The above was evident with UNAMIR during the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and according to the Canadian force commander General Dallaire:

The Bangladeshi contingent commander has persistently voiced out that he was commanded by his government that evacuating Rwandese will put his men in danger. They will evacuate expatriates but not local people. His junior officers have clearly stated that if they are stopped at road block with local people in the convoy they will hand over these local people for inevitable killing rather than use their weapons in an attempt to save local people. This reticence to engage in dangerous operations and

their stated reluctance to use their weapons in self defense of crimes against humanity has led to widespread mistrust of this contingent among its peers in other units and amongst staff officers/United Nations military observer at the headquarters when they are tasked to go with this men on dangerous missions. (Melvern, 2009:187).

This led to the Bangladeshi delegation in UNAMIR to abandon the peacekeeping operations before United Nations Security Council resolution 912 officially withdrew most of the peacekeeping operations including their delegation and another challenge was that of misconduct of United Nations peacekeepers as evident in early 1990s when Canadian peacekeepers were involved in the murder of Somalian locals (Williams, 2011:202). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, United Nations peacekeepers illicitly were dealing in gold and other conflict trade goods including arms (UN, 2008) and there have also been several scandals involving United Nations peacekeepers abusing local women and children sexually, while involving in human trafficking which led to the United Nations ensuring the starting of the so-called “Zero Tolerance Approach” (UN, 2005).

The United Nations also conducted investigation into the alleged sexual abuse of French military personnel in the Central African Republic (CAR) before the establishment of MINUSCA, the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (UN, 2015). These misconducts by United Nations peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations in Africa put most of the entire peacekeeping operations at hazard, impacting negatively on its capability to bring about constructive adjustment in the host countries (Wiharta, 2009:115).

The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa has faced a major challenge of legitimacy which has dealt a severe blow to its image and credibility as a vehicle of peacekeeping in Africa. This has led to the argument by the special committee on peacekeeping operations about the necessity for a code of conduct to be developed for peacekeepers as well as the universalisation of standards for peacekeeping whether by the United Nations, regional organizations or willing coalitions and has resulted into the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa being reliant not on their capability to impose their will immense force but on the moral authority conveyed by their multilateral presence and to regain its legitimacy in Africa, applications of some peacekeeping practice must be re-examined (Otunnu, 1996:7).

3.4. The African Union And Peacekeeping Operations In Africa

In July 2000, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was converted into the African Union (AU) for it to be able to deal more proficiently with several challenges, particularly the challenges caused by conflicts within borders. In its constitutive act, the African Union gives priority to all its members to live peacefully (AU Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4 (11)). Intervention of members is allowed in other states with the continent in conflicts where war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are being committed is stipulated in Article 4 of the African Union constitutive act (Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4(h)).

Any member state can also ask for the intervention of the African Union for the purpose of restoring peace and security within its boundaries (Article 4(5)). This gives the African Union the right to respond with the approval of the Assembly in a member state where there are issues such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as was the case of Rwanda and Burundi (Eze, 2003). The founders of the African Union also realized that the burden of conflicts in Africa is a significant barrier to the socio-economic development of the continent and this was addressed with the adoption of the protocol establishing the peace and security council of the African Union in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002 (AU, 2004). The objective for which the peace and security council of the African Union was formed is stipulated in Article 3 of the agreement dealing to the following: Advancing peace, security and stability in Africa so that life and property can be safeguarded and maintained, welfare of the people of Africa and its environment, coupled with the establishment of circumstances favorable to viable development, foresee and avert conflicts. In situations where conflicts have taken place, the Peace and Security Council is obligated to commenced peace-making and peace-building tasks for the settlement of these conflicts. Safeguard and apply peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to solidify peace and stop the resurgence of violence, organise and integrate continental efforts in the stopping and tackling of international terrorism in all its ramifications. Produce a common policy of defence for the Union as stipulated by article 4 (d) of the constitutive act and safeguard and inspire democratic principles such as good governance, the rule of law, safeguard human rights, fundamental freedoms, regards for dignity of life and international law, as part of efforts for averting conflicts. The principles stated in constitutive act, the United Nations charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human rights shall assist the African Union Peace and Security Council. The following principles stipulated in article 4 shall of importance assist it:

Resolution of disputes and conflicts peacefully, quick interventions limit crisis situations to avert its escalation, honour for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the dignity of human life and international humanitarian, interlinkages between socio-economic development and the safety of people and states, honour for the sovereignty and probity of the territories of fellow African states, states must also not interfere in the internal concerns of other members. Inter-linkages, supremacy and fairness of member states, every state has the right to its supremacy and its boundaries inherited from independence must be honoured. The African Union can only be involved in the domestic concerns of member states after the general assembly of the African Union take such decisions in situations involving crimes against humanity, as stipulated by article 4 (h) of the African Union constitutive act, and its members have the right to ask the African Union to intervene for the purpose of reinstating peace and security as stipulated by article 4 (J) of the African Union constitutive act. The duties of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is stipulated in Article 6 of the agreement which are: Enhancing of peace, security and stability in Africa, diplomacy based on quick warning and preventative, peace support operations and responses, stated in article 4 (h) and (j) of the African Union constitution act, building of peace and reconstruction after conflict, actions geared towards humanitarian purposes and management of disaster, coupled with any other tasks given by the African Union General Assembly together with the commission chairperson.

For the African Union Peace and Security Council to be effective, the ensuring commission was established to support its activities such as the panel of the wise, continental warning system, African standby force and the peace fund. And to help states gavelly impacted by extreme conflicts, the African Union Peace and Security Council will perform the various tasks stipulated in article 4: The negotiated peace agreements must be solidified, formation of circumstances of political, social and economic rehabilitation of governmental and societal establishments, the programmes of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programmes must fulfilled, such as programmes involving kid soldiers, reestablishing and rehabilitating of refugees and those that were displaced internally and help to those that are at risk such as children, the elderly, women and other endangered societal groups.

The panel of the wise is provided for in Article 11 of the agreement. This is to compliment the work of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The composition of the panel of the wise is made up of distinguished figures across the African continent that has contributed greatly to the purpose of peace, security and development in Africa. They also give advise to

the African Union Peace and Security Council together with the Chairperson of the commission on virtually everything relating to the enhancement, and preservation of peace, security and stability in Africa. Article 12 provided for the continental early warning system to facilitate the expectation and elimination of conflicts in Africa. According to article 12 of the protocol, the early warning system shall be made up of the following: A surveillance and tracking hub to be called “The Situation Room” that will be situated at the conflict administration department of the African Union, and will be in charge of collecting data and review based on a suitable early warning indicators module and examination and tracking units of the regional mechanisms connected directly through suitable methods of communications to the situation room, and which shall gather and process data collected and transfer the processed data to the situation room.

The African Union standby force is accounted for in Article 13. The African Union standby force is to make sure that the peace and security council of the African Union discharge its tasks with regards to the deployment of peacekeeping operations and responses as stipulated in article 4 (h) and (j) of the constitutive act of the African Union. The functions of the African standby force include the following: Observation and monitoring missions, other kind of peace support missions, responding to severe conditions as a result of a demand from a member state in a member state for the purpose of restoring peace and security as stipulated by article 4 (h) and (J) of the African Union constitutive act, deployment of troops for the purpose of stopping a dispute from an upsurge, a conflict that is ongoing from spreading across borders and the renewal of hostilities after conflicting parties have arrived at an agreement, peace building, including disarming and demobilising of combatants after the resolution of the conflict, humanitarian support to reducing the suffering of the local populace in areas affected by conflict and assistance to deal with significant natural disasters and other tasks instructed by the the Peace and Security Council or the assembly.

Regional mechanisms are a part of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture which is in charge of advancing the process of peace, security and stability in Africa. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Chairperson of the commission shall: integrate and organise the tasks of regional mechanisms in the area of peace, security and stability and to make sure these tasks are in line with the goals and assumptions of the African Union and work together with regional mechanisms, to guarantee successful collaboration between them and the Peace and Security Council in the enhancement and maintenance of

peace, security and stability. The procedures of such collaboration shall be comparative advantage and the conditions that are prevailing.

The Peace and Security Council shall in deliberation with regional mechanisms, enhance initiatives directed at expecting and stopping conflicts and in conditions where conflict had taken place in peace-making and building tasks. In carrying out these efforts, regional mechanisms involved will through the Chairperson of the commission, make sure that the Peace and Security Council are constantly informed of their tasks and make sure these tasks are closely integrated and organised with the duties of the Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council shall keep the regional mechanisms regularly aware of its tasks. In order to make sure that integration, coordination and facilitation of frequently exchanging of information is close, meetings shall be conducted periodically at least once in a year between chairperson of the commission, chief executive or officers incharge of peace and security within the regional mechanisms.

The Chairperson of the commission shall take appropriate measures, to make sure that regional mechanisms are fully involved in the formation and successful functioning of the early warning system and the African Standby Force. Regional mechanisms shall be invited to be part of any question presented to the Peace and Security Council when such a question is been dealt with by a regional mechanism is of significant to the particular institution. The chairperson of the commission shall take part in the meetings and negotiations of regional mechanisms. In order to enhance coordination and collaboration, the commission shall form liaison offices to the regional mechanisms. The regional mechanisms shall be motivated to form liaison offices to the commission. On the premises of this services, a memorandum of understanding on collaboration shall be agreed upon between the commission and regional mechanisms.

The Peace fund of the African Union is accounted for in article 21, which deals with the needed financial requirements for carrying out peacekeeping operations coupled with other functioning duties related to peace and security in Africa. Article 21 made provisions for a peace fund, which is to come up with the necessary financial resource for peacekeeping operations and other operational tasks in relation to peace and security in Africa. The provisions of article 21 stated that the functions of the peace fund shall be regulated by the basic financial rules and regulations of the African Union. The peace fund source of financing shall be from appropriations from the African Union normal budget, outstanding

contributions, funds given freely by African Union member states, such as from the private sector, civil society and individuals including from fund raising functions.

The African Union commission chairperson can source for funds outside the African Union. So far such funds conform with the goals and assumptions of the African Union, a revolving peace fund will also be constituted from the trust fund. The relevant policy making arms of the African Union, will determine the amount of the revolving trust fund after recommendation by the African Union peace and security council. Also when it is needed and after the basic policy arms of the African Union has decided, members of the African Union will assess the cost of the peacekeeping operations defined under Article 13 (3) of the agreement determined by their level of contributions to the normal budget of the African Union. The delegates from member states contributing towards the peacekeeping operations will be asked to bear the first (3) months. The union shall refund the expenses incurred by the concerned contributing states within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to finance the operations. Therefore, the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa is anchored on the peace and security architecture and with the formation of the African Union peace and security council in 2002, the African Union embarked on peacekeeping operations starting in Burundi in 2003, with the African Union Mission in Burundi in 2003, followed by the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur and the African Union Mission in Somalia in 2004 (Okumu and Jaye, 2010: 13).

Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) founded in 1963, the African Union now have a broader peace and security architecture in place, but many of the new structures provided by its constitutive act however, still need to be fully operational (Bakwesegha, 2003:377-81) and the major short coming of the African Union peacekeeping operations is inadequate institutional capacity, especially human resources, to adequately develop policy, plan and manage its peace operations (Berman and Sams, 2010). Also the African Union has significantly less staff, dedicated to the planning and management of peace operations, than its United Nations and European Union counterparts, even when taking the number and scope of mission managed into account and benefactors having the ideal of investing in African peace operations capacity need to understand that investments in training and equipping peacekeepers are unlikely to prove sustainable unless matched by a corresponding investment in developing an appropriate headquarter capacity and the African Union Peace and Security architecture is evolving in an environment with dramatic challenges, if Africa is to live up to its motto of solving its own problems and that the African

Union is severely restrained by limited resources and trained manpower (Deconing, 2010:42) and (Okumu and Jaye, 2010:11).

(Olonisakin, 2006) using the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) as case studies argues that the effectiveness of Africa's peacekeeping operations can only be effective as regional mechanisms allow them to be and that the dynamic nature of Africa's strategic environment and by implication its regional security environment requires that planning processes for peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations reflect this reality.

(Neethling, 2006) argued that while the African Union may have normatively and theoretically succeeded in developing a comprehensive peace and security framework revolving around the Peace and Security Council (PSC), there nevertheless remains a pivotal divergence between aspiration and actual implementation and that indeed, at the conceptual level, the African Union has undoubtedly made great progress in moving towards an African peace support operations capability, significant challenges and even problems remain in translating political statements and ideals into reality.

(Ramsbotham, Bah and Calder, 2005:10) shared the above views by arguing that the significant stumbling block hampering the growth of the African Standby Force, is the continued absence of a memorandum of understanding between the African Union and regional economic communities (RECs) and the resultant lack of coordination between the African Union and regional standby brigades and that regional economic communities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are now moving at a much faster pace than the African Union itself, while other regions such as North Africa appear to be practically disengaged from the entire process and that the African Union is currently lacking the organizational structures to deploy integrated missions or to substantially implement long-term oriented peace-building programmes such as those envisioned for the African Standby Force.

The African Union politically in some cases is captive to the internal politics or interests of member states, foreign powers and host governments, which prevent it from acting effectively with governments such as in Sudan, out of fear or reaction from key African member states or foreign powers which effectively undermines the African Union's peacekeeping operation credibility a major weakness of its forbear the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) this lack

of member states political will is a major impediment to effective deployment of the African Union peacekeeping operations and also the peacekeeping operations of the African Union in Africa is faced with the difficulty of reconciling the apparent contradictions between state sovereignty and the need for intervention in intra-state conflict and that although the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) 2004-2007, represented a bold step by the African Union to intervene in Sudan and Darfur and the African Union mission in Sudan demonstrated that the African Union have not yet overcome the political weakness inherent in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) because of its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and resulting indifference to the grave humanitarian and human rights situations in the country(Kobbie, 2009).

On funding of the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa, (De coning, 2010) is of the opinion that the future of effective African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa will depend on how they are financed, that the African Union experience in Somalia and Darfur has shown that the African peace fund or the budget of the African Union cannot solely finance its peace operations. Using Nigeria's role with ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990) and South Africa's support to AMIB in Burundi (2003) as case studies of the only fully funded peacekeeping operations by African Union member states in Africa, the African Union remains dependent on voluntary contributions to finance its peacekeeping operations which impact of the African Union liberty to take free decisions on strategic and even tactical aspects of its peacekeeping operations.

And while AMIB in Burundi and AMIS in Sudan are landmarks for the African Union in terms of operationalizing peacekeeping operations in Africa, they also provided lessons for the African Union on how to better fulfill its roles and readiness in peacekeeping operations and notwithstanding its severe challenges such as lack of consent from conflicting parties, non a ceasefire agreement in place, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) can be credited with stabilizing Burundi and made a positive difference despite financial, logistical and planning difficulties. While the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) achieved only limited results because AMIS was not large enough, had a weak mandate, lacked funding, manpower and political will to complete the mission (Pham 2007; RGA 2006; Sharamo 2006).

Another major challenge of the African Union peacekeeping operations has been the disinclination to draw on its rich experiences and that when the African Union was pressured to respond to the crisis in Darfur in 2004, it experienced several difficulties in planning and

deploying the monitors and protectors and that observers of the African Union wondered why the African Union did not draw on its experiences in Burundi since the African Union mission in Burundi in 2003 should have provided useful lessons in mission planning, deployment and sustainability and that the African Union were ‘re-inventing the wheel’ whenever faced with a new situation that needs deployment of a peacekeeping force (Okumu and Jaye, 2010).

On United Nations peacekeeping doctrine which is seen as a challenge to African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa, Africa deserve another “developmental peacekeeping doctrine”, because the motivating force of conflict in Africa are conflicts over natural resources and peacekeeping operations in Africa which is majority composed of use of military should be replaced by a more multidimensional developmental approach, the nature of conflict in Africa has changed with many societies in Africa becoming depended on war, where the displacement of populations, destructions of lives and properties and vast violations of human rights are a way of accruing resources, a vital dynamic which they claim peacekeeping operations in Africa has ignored and therefore developmental peacekeeping is offered as a substitute to Africa, opinioned as post conflict reconstruction responses geared towards achieving viable levels of human security through a mix of several responses geared towards facilitating capacity building and socio-economic development (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004).

Several conclusions were drawn about the African Union peacekeeping since its establishment in 2002 some of which are, the African Union peacekeeping operations depend on the participation of a small handful of main troop contributing countries which translate into an uneven level of support for peacekeeping in Africa. South Africa was crucial to the African Union peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Comoros and in Darfur. Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Ethiopia were crucial in AMISOM and UNAMID and African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa rely upon external assistance as evident with AMISOM in Somalia which received nearly \$800 million dollars from the United Nations in addition to nearly \$40 million dollars pledged to the United Nations AMISOM trust fund between 2009 and 2011 (UN, 2012). This dependence on foreign assistance for its peacekeeping operations undermines a core rhetorical tenet of the African Union approach to conflict management, namely African solutions to African problems and despite the dependence on foreign assistance for funding of its peacekeeping operations, the African Union still lack sufficient funds, troops, police, materials, strategic airlift capabilities, training facilities, management structures, and qualified staff to sustain even relatively small scale peacekeeping operations

(Williams, 2011).The Prodi report on the African Union peacekeeping operations also supported the argument of by emphasizing that:

The African Union will only be able to respond to crises effectively if there is sufficient political and financial commitment of its own member states and, more generally, of the international community. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising expectations of the people that cannot be fulfilled worse still, it undermines the capability of peacekeeping and weakens the organisation that is responsible. (UN, 2008).

The African Union also has difficulty agreeing on mandates for its peacekeeping operations, especially when the host state is a member of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) or has friends on the council willing to support its position as was evident with AMIS (2004) in Sudan and Ethiopia in the case of AMISOM (2006-2007), in both cases, negotiations on mandate terms became a delicate and overtly politicized process with another new challenge to African Union peacekeeping operations identified as the impact and spread of disease such as HiV/AIDS, Malaria, yellow fever and tuberculosis (Feldman 2008; Williams 2011).

Conflicts in Africa remain one of the First World War and conflicts between western nations in the distant pasts where the spread of disease impacted on the conflicts. In February 2007, a Rwandan peacekeeper in UNAMID in Darfur, died of malaria. African Union peacekeepers serve in areas where they may not have immunity against some of the local microbes, especially gastrointestinal leaving most of them incapacitated with traveler's diarrhea and unable to complete against the enemy forces, who have lived in that region their whole lives and are immune to some of these diseases (Feldman 2008; Munyaneza 2007; Schlim 2004).

Therefore one major argument of the various scholars on the challenges of the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa despite its peace and security mechanisms and is that in comparison to other international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) with a rich case of effective peacekeeping operations in Europe, the African Union lack the military capacity, logistic and

planning and administrative structure of NATO and the EU and in support of a coalition of the willing model that was applied in the Middle East in the case of Iraq and also cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union, the United Nations and other international organisations.

3.5. Institutional Cooperation In Peacekeeping

The end of the cold war in 1989 and the nature of post-cold war politics encouraged regionalism and a reconsideration of regional security organizations and new thoughts on how regionalism and globalism might be paired to advance international peace and security (Barnett, 1995:412). The United Nations, recognizing that it could work together with regional organizations to fulfill a shared goal of pacific dispute settlement and global justice, made Boutros-Ghali to write in *An Agenda for Peace* that, “the future security order should realize the promise of chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations because regional action could foster security and contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (UN, 1992).

This necessitated the need for institutional cooperation in peacekeeping between the United Nations and regional organizations and began a series of cooperation in peacekeeping between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Bosnia, with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Burundi and Rwanda, with the Organisation of American States (OAS) in Haiti and El Salvador, with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia (UN, 1994) and of recent with the African Union (AU) in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic.

Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping became necessary as a result of the shift of international conflict from basically that of conflicts between states to conflicts within the borders of a state, which led to the advocacy for a return to the balance of power and alliance politics of the cold war era with the emerging multilateral view that states with common interest, largely driven by increasing interdependence, which requires joint action to obtain their common goal (Ruggie, 1994:31). Two factors that brought about the establishment of institutional collaboration among the United Nations and regional institutions as : The United Nations was looking for burden sharing arrangements to lighten the load and security challenges of its peacekeeping operations and to create new mechanisms

to foster regional security and order and to fulfill the spirit of chapter viii of the United Nations charter (Barnett, 1995:418).

Articles 52-54 of Chapter VIII of the United Nations charter reiterate the following salient points with regards to regional arrangements and collaboration among the United Nations and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. It is stipulated in Article 52 of the United Nations charter, that the present charter of the United Nations do not stop arrangements between regions or agencies in finding solutions to matters consisting of maintenance of international peace and security so far such regional initiatives are within the purposes and objectives of the United Nations. Article 53 states that the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But this regional initiative shall not be implemented without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council and Article 54 of the charter of the United Nations stipulates that the United Nations Security Council must be properly informed of all forms of regional arrangements with regards to international peace and security. It is therefore glaring that as stipulated by the three articles under chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations that those that founded the United Nations visualised a place for regional arrangements and collaboration in the peaceful settlement of disputes wherever possible (Birender, 2003). According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (2012);

Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations has become central to the analysis of contemporary peacekeeping operations. From the Balkans to Sudan, Somalia to Afghanistan, peacekeeping operations are now characterised by the simultaneous involvement of several international organizations. This evolution carries hope for a more effective management of current crisis as institutions allegedly intervene on the basis of their comparative advantage.

Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations have been carried out based on realities that are operational, not by any special blue-prints and over two-third of the European Union (EU) peace operations have been stationed together with a United Nations peacekeeping operations and all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ground operations have involved cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and since 2007, the United Nations and the African Union (AU) Have run a hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan),

integrating their military and mediating efforts (Gowan, 2012). Also peacekeeping operations partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations have advanced considerably both in operational and institutional terms and that recent progress on institutional linkages in peacekeeping operations include the establishment of a new United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) liaison office in Brussels, the creation of United Nations-African Union joint task force on peace and security and the appointment of a civilian North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) liaison officer at the United Nations Headquarters (Koops, 2012:1).

The Center on International Cooperation in its annual review of global peacekeeping operations (2008) divided institutional cooperation in peacekeeping into three broad variants which are;

- Sequential operations: Where different peacekeeping operations platforms succeed each other.
- Parallel operations: These are platforms that are two or more operating in the same theatre under separate command but to the same broad purpose.
- Hybrid operations: Characterised by unified or joint command, the rarest form of partnership.

Therefore institutional cooperation in peacekeeping has demonstrated an impressive amount of flexibility with regards to the global community community in addressing diverse conflict situations, and has been useful in joining up global legitimacy to regional actors or vice versa, matching different comparative advantages among peacekeeping platforms and marrying legal frameworks with operational capacities (CIC, 2008).

In 1995, the then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Ghali, in celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, released the supplement to an Agenda for Peace. (Boutros Ghali, 1995) identified five ways of institutional cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations such as;

- Formal and informal consultations geared towards swapping opinions relating to conflicts involving the United Nations and regional organisations.
- That diplomatic support and technical input will be provided to regional organisations involved in peacekeeping functions of the United Nations.

- The provision of operational and technical support such as was provided by NATO to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.
- The United Nations will be involved in joint-deployment with the peacekeeping troops from regional organisations with the regional organisations bearing the major weight while the United Nations will provide a little bit of technical support after proper verification by the Security Council of the United Nations. However, the political, operational and financial aspects of such an arrangement would require attention prior to deployment.
- The United Nations and regional organisations will collaborated through a joint peacekeeping operations.

And that the capacity of regional organizations varies considerably and that while a general style for collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and regional organisation was not viable, the identification of certain principles based on the following guidelines can be implemented such as: Formation of accepted formal/informal mechanisms for consultation, regard for the priority of the United Nations in maintainance of international peace and security, division of labour should be properly defined to prevent overlapping and institutional rivary in situations where both organisation are jointly involved in restoring peace and common areas of interest between both organisations must dealt with appropriately (Boutros Ghali, 1995).

And this had resulted into the argument that despite the fact that institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations are yet to mature, the general consensus is that the world is headed towards greater integration between the United Nations and regional establishments like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or the African Union (AU), and that such institutions play an important role, especially in a world with power imbalances, distrust and unrest and that cooperation among states towards peacekeeping mechanisms gives birth to opportunities for burden sharing, balancing power, pursuing self-interest and generally preventing the collapse of world order as it stand and that in the contemporary security environment, institutional cooperation in peacekeeping are forged under three scenarios which are: To protect Civilians, as an antecedent to peace building and to engage in the war on terrorism (Bubna 2010; Gowan and Johnstone 2007).

Institutions cooperate in peacekeeping operations mainly for what they will gain or to their own self advantage/interest, collaboration is known to bring about a reduction in costs implications of transaction, result to access of information, expertise, financial or other types of resources such as equipments that institutions prepared to share. Global institutions like the United Nations and the European Union are seen as “natural partners”, unified by the major values stipulated in the 1945 charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights with the two organisations involving in joint peacekeeping operations as a result of their shared beliefs and values in international law and multilateralism, preferring disputes being settled peacefully to settlement of disputes through the use of force (Haugevik 2007; Tardy 2009). Therefore institutional cooperation or partnerships in peacekeeping could be a technique to become visible or become powerful within the partner institution or to improve ones status as a major actor in security and developing partnerships to improve the effectiveness of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Which can be accepted in theory but in practical it undergoes fundamental difficulties and affected by several structural factors that will be hard to deal with such as:

- Heterogeneous institutions.

The mandate of regional organisation is highly diverse, institutional form, resources, political weight and developmental levels as resolution of conflict actors and because of this, the collaborations becomes factional distinguished by spreading of the mutual benefits among partners, distance from a global burden-sharing or connecting systems based on the various strengths of international institutions.

- Inter-institutional competition.

Collaboration between international organisations in peacekeeping is distinguished by organisations competing among each others. These organisations are always struggling for resources that are limited, ability to access information and identity while developing their self-interest which may affect complementary collaboration.

- The North-South Divide.

Collaboration between international organisations in peacekeeping operations are considerations bordering on a division between North and South that defines the global community, while drawing attention to the politicization of North-South relations rather than weaken it.

- Division of labour and comparative advantage.

Institutional cooperation in peacekeeping and burden sharing have partly developed on the basis of comparative advantages displayed by each organisation, and that nearly all institutions aspire to embrace activities, with little prospect for the emergence of an interlocking system based on different competencies leading to issues of duplication and overlap in a context of scarce resource.

- External versus internal coordination.

That although partnerships are officially promoted by all institutions, internal coordination and coherence are, for each of them, a more important task than building inter-institutional links and the compartmentalization of activities between different bodies of the same institution such as secretariat versus agencies on the United Nations side, European commission versus council secretariat complicates the establishment and the visibility of partnerships. That in practice, partnerships often develop between organs of international organizations, the European commission and the UNDO, DPKO and the European Union council secretariat, rather than between the organizations per se (Tardy, 2009).

On challenges facing institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations, institutional differences constrain field-level cooperation between the various organizations and organizations maintain very difficult and sometimes incompatible command and control systems and this has made the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation unable to share intelligence with partners in many cases and lack of adequate top-level political contacts between organizations and the only organisation that meets regularly with members of the United Nations Security Council is the African Union Peace and Security Council and that there is no indication that any other regional organizations such as the European Council or the North Atlantic Council have any interest in meeting directly with the United Nations Security Council (Artinano 2012; Kugel 2012).

This had resulted into lack of coordination between institutions on decisions affecting the peacekeeping operations as evident between the European Union and the United Nations in the case of Chad and the Central African Republic, in 2008, the European Union deployed a military force to assist humanitarian operations in Chad while the United Nations sent a parallel police operation (Novesseloff and Gowan, 2012).

The internal oversight services office of the United Nations (OIOS) in its 2011 oversight report, is of the view that collaboration between the United Nations and regional organisations in peacekeeping operations is conducted on adhoc basis and the result of demanding operational needs, leading to small systematic institutional learning and is expensive, due to the involvement of a large investments of the time of staffs in areas such as planning and communications, divergent institutional structures and cultures, and these obliviousness, disrupted smooth collaboration (UN, 2011). The United Nations will continue to count on cooperation with regional organisations and its bilateral partners to meet up with peacekeeping demand. Such collaboration will result to a rising demands on coordination. Coordination on its own is affected by a lack of adequate system for sharing of information and secret by the United Nations. Therefore the United Nations must take note that it cannot always rely on its partners to intervene everytime there is crisis. Because of the individual interests and constituencies of each organisations. Competitions over areas of activities will continue to disrupt effective cooperation between the United Nations and its regional partners who are anxious to show their existence and show that they have a critical role to play (Novesselloff and Gowan, 2012).

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) reflected a new engaging method in the international security architecture where international and regional organizations are increasingly working in close partnership to further regional and international political and security interest (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). Therefore institutional collaboration in peacekeeping operations such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that is supported by a United Nations Support Mission (UNSOA), European Union deploying a training mission to Mali (EUTM-Mali) in January 2013 to build the capacity of the Malian army, to restore the territorial integrity of the country and to reduce the threat from terrorist groups, the mission was modelled on the European Union (EU) Training Mission to Somalia (EUTM-Somalia), which has been ongoing since 2010 (Freear and De coning 2013; Wiklund and Skeppstrom 2014).

Since 2005, following request from the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has supported the African Union in peacekeeping operations and capacity building with NATO providing airlift support and training for African Union personnel for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2005. NATO has also provided planning and strategic air and sealift support to the African Union member states involved in the African Union

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and was involved in capacity building for the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades (Smith-Windsor, 2013:19).

The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) support for the African Union has improved with the United Nations' financing of peacekeeping operation, as it has helped provide financial and logistical assistance to the African Union and other regional organizations in a timely manner and that international crisis such as the one that occurred in Mali in 2012-13, demonstrate the continuing need for institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations (Vines, 2013).

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the major objective of this thesis which is partnership of the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. It started with a review of cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Europe and Asia, such as cooperation in peacekeeping operations between the United Nations and the European Union and the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe. Also in Asia between the United Nations and organisations across Asia like the Association of South East Asian Nations among others and also a review of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa followed by the collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The purpose was to examine other models of cooperative peacekeeping between the United Nations in other continents apart from Africa. This chapter also reviewed institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations from existing literature and discussed the goals and objectives of institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations as well as its challenges especially on the African continent.

In Europe the United Nations was involved in peacekeeping cooperation with organisations like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in conflicts such as those in Cyprus, former Yugoslavia and Georgia. In Yugoslavia, lack of a clear framework (Abass 2004) and the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine such as that force can only be used for the purpose of self defence impacted on the effectiveness of these peacekeeping cooperation. It is however difficult to fully determine the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Europe because they had never acted alone in peacekeeping operations in Europe.

In Asia and the Middle East, the United Nations was involved in cooperation in peacekeeping operations with organisations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States in places such as in South Korea, Cambodia, East-Timor, Lebanon and in Iraq and was successful although in Iraq it was a collection of the willing. From a critical review of literature of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, the major weaknesses identified were inadequate funding, lack of a framework for cooperation and the United Nations peacekeeping doctrines such as that force can only be applied for the purpose of self defence while the major strength is the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a traditional defense organisation with the military might to respond to conflict in Europe, Asia and the Middle East (Abass 2004).

In Africa as of September 2019, the United Nations operates seven peacekeeping operations (Blanchfield, Arieff and Blanchard 2019). An analysis of literature on the United Nations peacekeeping operations and its cooperation in peacekeeping operations with the African Union focused majorly on factors such as lack of adequate funding and logistical constraints (Agada 2008; Williams 2011). However the dimension of conflict in Africa has changed to fragmented conflicts with a regional spread and challenges has gone beyond just funding and logistical constraints of the reviewed literature to factors such as the roles of non armed actors that are the major actors in the conflicts in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic contradicting peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Most of the literature reviewed did not discuss some of this contradictions to peacekeeping operations in Africa such as the strategic African environment with its porous borders and harsh terrains. Another gap identified in the literature is its failure to discuss in details the impact of a peace accord in the effectiveness of the cooperation in peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. For peacekeeping operation to be effective, its mandates must be reflective of a political strategy and peacekeeping must be part of a political solution and not an alternative (Nadin, 2014).

Also the literature reviewed did not discuss the involvement of the sub-regional organisations in Africa and their impact on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. These gaps identified in the course of the literature review will be filled by these thesis. The next chapter however will focus on the theoretical framework of this study which is the collective security theory and its application to the

collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa.

CHAPTER 4

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR (SUDAN), SOMALIA AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

4.0. Introduction

This chapter will examine the root and causes of the crisis in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. The consequences of the conflict on peace and security in the various countries and region and the actors involved and their impact on the conflict.

4.1. DARFUR (SUDAN)

Darfur is a region within the western part of Sudan, its population consist of a multitude of ethnic and linguistic groupings, since 23rd February 2003, Darfur has been engulfed in an ethnic conflict resulting into an humanitarian crisis. The African Union and the United Nations are involved in collaborative peacekeeping operations in Darfur through the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) since 31st July 2007. This sub-section will review the historical evolution of the conflict in Darfur, the consequences of the environment and ethnicity on the conflict and the role of Janjaweed an armed non-state actor in the conflict in Darfur.

4.1.1. Historical development of the conflict in Darfur

Sudan was colonised firstly by Egypt from 1898 and from 1914 by Britain, the biggest country in Africa, Sudan is one of the major country in Africa highly diversified along religious and ethnic lines, consisting of over 20 linguistic groups with around six hundred sub-dialects. Islam, African traditional and indigenous beliefs and Christianity form the basis of the religion in Sudan with the Islamic religion the most dominant religion in Sudan (Bechtold 1991; Mekankamp, Van Tongeren and Van de Veen 1999).

From the Addis Ababa treaty in 1983, the introduction of Islamic law with unequal regional development led to a series of rebellion and secessionist revolts mainly from Southern Sudan. This started with the Anya-Nya, later the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM),

therefore for decades Sudan have been experiencing civil wars combined with armed struggles based on the agitation for autonomy and equal development (Tar, 2006).

In March 1983, the violations of the Addis Ababa agreement by General Numayri together with the imposition of the Islamic law led to the formation of the Southern Sudan Peoples Army (SPLA), which became the military or armed wing of the Southern Sudan Revolutionary Movement (SPLM). Darfur is situated in the Northern Sudan with approximately a population of over five million people, a territory the size of France, is the largest region in Sudan with regards to population and landmass and is one of the most underdeveloped regions in Sudan having a substantial history of racial and ethnic crisis (Lval 2001; Tar 2006).

Darfur borders with its neighbours are penetrable particularly its borders with Chad as a result of similar demographic characteristics like trading and other socio-economic ventures, and divisions between Chad and Sudan bordering on racial, ethnicity and religion. Therefore conflict have been mainly over resources, such as grazing areas and farmlands between sedentary farmers and itinerary nomads such as the Fur, Masalit, the pastoral Arab tribes from the Kabkabiya region in North Darfur and Beni Halba in South Sudan (UNCHR, 2004).

Conflict arising between the Arab tribes that are mainly pastoral and the African communities that are mainly living a life of inactivity were settled through revered generational methods of settling conflict, influenced by Anglo-Egyptian legal heritages where community leaders and tribal chiefs known as Sheikh Kabilal served as legitimate instruments for the managing conflict. Although these traditional means of conflict resolution were effective in matters relating to agricultural compensations, they also had the tendencies of generating into further conflict as evident in January 1999 between Arab and Masalit resulting into death and destruction of properties (Woodward, 2003). The crisis in Darfur over resources started ages ago and enhanced by a mix of socio-economic, political and security factors like reoccurring droughts over a long period of time, struggles over declining resources, absent of good governance and principles of democracy. The proliferation of small and light weapons is also a cause of increasing insecurity with the some of the following factors identified as the origin of the conflict in Darfur.

- The draught and famine in 1984-1985 resulted into heavy loss of human lives and wealth.

- The commencement of the use of small arms and light weapons into the pastoral and farming communities transformed the the nature of the clashes over land and agricultural products.
- Interventions by various Sudanese governments were partial and unproductive, policising the ethnic, there was also racial divide among African and Arab identities in Darfur in issues such as representation and local governance. Coupled with the appointment of Arabs into favorable positions of power, governmental support for the Murahellen militia and judicial favoritism of Arabs over land matters and communal crisis (Tar 2006; Woodward 2003; Stohl and Smith 1999).

In February 2003, the recent crisis in Darfur started after rebel groups invaded military posts in the region, citing allegations of neglecting the region and unfairness against its inhabitants (Peterson, 2008:1). The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked Al-Fashir the capital of North Darfur and the Sudanese government reacted to the attacks with its military and the Janjaweed and by October 2003, according to various reports, villages were raided and thousand of people were killed and raped and destruction of agricultural products by the Janjaweed against the non-Arab Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masalit ethnic groups in Darfur (Clough 2005; Williams and Bellamy 2005). And the following factors escalated the conflict between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Sudanese government:

- The lack of the Sudanese government recognition of the rebel groups and respecting their demands which was based on the structural imbalance in the country.
- The absent of the advancement of the peace agreement made in 2002 amongst the Sudanese People Liberation Army/Movement and the Sudanese government. The Southern peace agreement in 2002 were followed by the Navasha peace accord in 2003 and instead of ensuring the terms of the Southern peace agreement, the Sudanese government laid emphasis on its military might.
- The discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in Sudan in 1999, led to production and exportation of petroleum resulting impacted positively on the Sudanese economy but the proceeds were not used to develop the regions and the people of Sudan.

- The massive geopolitical terrain and the porous nature of the borders between Chad and Sudan provided a conducive advantage for the rebellion by the JEM and the SPLA/M. They recruited part of their members from the Zaghawa ethnic groups in Chad (Tar, 2006).

The current conflict in Darfur that started in 2003 with roots as far back as 1983 is now fragmented along ethnic lines with increasing violence despite the setting out of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 and the Mission in Darfur of the African Union and the United Nations (UNAMID) in 2007. The independence of South Sudan in 2011, the renewal of war in South Kordofan and the blue Nile resulted in the rebel groups in Darfur to unite with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Northern wing (SPLM-N) to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). While the Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) continue its insurgency in the eastern plains between Mellit in North Darfur and Gereida in South Darfur leading to displacement of over 2.5 million people (Ali, 2012). Some 2.8 million people were displaced in Darfur by December 2015 mainly from the Non-Arab/African tribal groups, tens of thousands of girls and women raped with over 2million people suffering from acute malnutrition, thousand of villages destroyed with over 600,000 people dying from the outbreak of the current conflict in 2003 till December 2015 (Reeves, 2016).

4.1.2. The impact of the environment and ethnicity on the conflict in Darfur.

Agriculture is the major sustenance and mercantile in Sudan and eighty percent of the people of Sudan are involved in agriculture in a territory where fertile land is insufficient as a result of the ecological characteristics of the country such as inadequate access to water and unsuitable soil condition for agriculture due to desert encroachment which inhabits up to 45.3 percent country's locality amounting to 1,123,000km² and therefore land in Darfur is a major determinance of the survival of the people of Darfur, a region grossly affected by droughts and desertification (Ahmed and Shazalli, 1999:15).

In Darfur, several famines that have occurred formed part of historical account that played a vital part in the collapse of governments, the movement of people from one region to another, leading to religious insurgencies. The droughts in Darfur in 1984 and 1985 led to hunger and destitution in Darfur while the resulting famine resulted into an increase in competition for resources caused by droughts and desertification have a direct link to the conflict in Darfur (Dewaal 2005; De Almeida 2008). Apart from conditions like political, religious, ethnic,

tribal, clan divisions, economic considerations, land tenure insufficiency and historical disputes, the sufferings caused to the pastoralist societies in Darfur by drought is part of the root causes of the present conflict in Darfur.

Between 1968 and 1976, there were three main conflict in Darfur related to struggles for resources and from 1976 to 1980 there were five related environmental contentions in Darfur and from 1980 to 1998, over 21 crisis were connected to contentions over resources and livestock (De Almeida 2008; UNEP 2007). The Arab groups in Darfur invaded the Fur and Masalit communities in order to gain access to pasture and water and excluding the crisis with regards to the Jesel Amir gold mine in North Darfur, several of the recent crisis is as a result of prolonged feud over land and most community conflict in Darfur are between traditional land rights owners against those regarded as immigrants, hosts and branches of the landowners (Crisis Group 2015; Mohammed 2004). The people of Sudan practice several religious traditions under three major religion which are Islam, traditional or indigenous African beliefs and Christianity. Muslim consist of 70 percent and the rest 30 percent shared between Christianity and indigenous African believers which ethnic groups are 39 percent Arabs and 61 percent African. and that the diversity of Sudan is one of the world's most heterogenous society and its diversity poses an extraordinary challenge to any government.

The Arab Muslims due to being in majority with regards to religion constitute the dominant group in the political scene in Sudan from its independence in 1956 and therefore the conflict in Darfur reveals the complex dimension of denomination and anti-denomination encounters in Sudan. It is therefore clear that Sudan is extremely heterogeneous and maybe the most explosive with regards to socio-cultural diversities in Africa. Therefore, this diverseness is the major factor behind the crisis involving people of seperate language, religion, racial and cultural sources over power and resources. The conflict in Darfur is due to disputed abrasions emerging from socio-economic and political divides among separate ethnic and racial groups combined with relegation with uneven access to power and its priveledges (Bechtold 1991; Tar 1991).

4.1.3. The role of the Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur

According to the international commission of inquiry on Darfur constituted in 2005, Janjaweed interpreted as a man (a devil) on a horse, is the name accorded to the militia group

deployed as a form of counter-insurgency by the Sudanese government in the Darfur crisis and the Sudanese government is reported to have recruited 20,000 Janjaweed militia members (HRW, 2004). The Janjaweed was used as a tool of counter-insurgency by the Sudanese government in Darfur as far back as 1991 during the failed rebellion in Southern Darfur by David Bolad in conjunction with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and from 2000, the Janjaweed began to get more assistance in form of vehicles, communication devices and weapons from the government of President Al-Bashir and in 2002, the Janjaweed executed its first significant attack against the civilians of the Fur tribe in Darfur. The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in its 2005 report stated that the Janjaweed is divided into three divisions which are:

- Members that have no direct affiliation with the government of Sudan and act independently for personal profits from looting of properties.
- The second division is directly coordinated by military officials of the Sudan military in conjunction with tribal leaders.
- These comprises of members from the Popular Defence Force defined under the Sudanese law as paramilitary (Flint and De Waal 2005; ICID 2005).
- Most members of the Janjaweed are Arabs from the camel-herding tribes of North Darfur and Chad, from the tribes and clans of the Irayqat and Ouled Zeb, sub clans of the camel-herding Northern Rizeigat, the Mahariya and the Beni Hussein (HRW, 2004). Members of the Popular Defence Force receive payments from the government of Sudan with the tribal leaders in form of grants and gifts, compensation, in form of development such as schools, health centers and water pumps in their villages. The involvement of the Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur has resulted into increasing humanitarian crisis in Darfur as a result of the attacks on civilians (Flint and De Waal 2005; Tar 2006).

The Sudanese government together with members of the Janjaweed are involved in the deaths of thousands of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, mostly in cold blooded, raping of women and destruction of villages and means of livelihood of the local population. Their actions have resulted to the displacement of over a million people, especially farmers into various settlement camps in Darfur with little or no means of survival coupled with several abuses from the Janjaweed. Over 110,000 civilians have been forced to migrate to Chad with several

others unable to flee the conflict in Darfur. And Janjaweed raids are preceded by aerial bombardments by the Sudanese airforce and their commanders live in government garrison towns and using racism as a rally point (HRW 2004; Koerner 2005).

4.2. SOMALIA

Somalia lies within the eastern part of Africa, on the horn of Africa. Its population consist majorly of clan-based muslims with their major means of sustenance being nomadic pastoralism and has one of the most complex environment in Africa. Since 1991, Somalia has been engulfed in a civil war that has completely distabilised the country and the region. Since 2007, the African Union has been taking part in joint peacekeeping missions in Somalia with the United Nations through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This subsection will review the historical development of the crisis in Somalia, the disintegration of the Somalia nation, the involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the conflict in Somalia and the emergence of political Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab and their impact on the conflict in Somalia.

4.2.1. Historical development of the conflict in Somalia.

Somalia before colonialism was a large ethnic group comprising of several clans and sub-clans and its pre-colonial history was that of a peaceful one because Somalis shared a common language, ancestry, nomadic pastoral culture and a common religion which was the Islamic religion (Elmi, 2000). Prior to independence in 1960, Egypt wanted the unification of Somalis under a single flag while Ethiopia was busy reclaiming its large territories in Somalia and by 1960, colonies under Italy and Britain were almagamated into independent Somalia and the almagamation of the colonies under Italy and Britain was regarded as decolonization without regards to the opinion and views of the Somalians who were against the almagamation of the colonies (Agada, 2008).

Many leaders from Somalia particularly those from the Northern part were not happy about the almagamation because after independence in 1960, political power was concentrated mainly in the Southern region, key government institutions were concentrated in the South and headed by Southern Somalis and policies were made that were only of advantage to the South and this resulted into the underdevelopment and socio-economic inequalities in the North and from independence in 1960, governance in Somali were characterised by corruption, incompetence and oppression (Ani, 2016).

In October 1969, the Somalian Army under the command of General Mohammed Siad Barre took over power in a military coup and under the government of Mohammed Siad Barre, clan solidarity became the norms of the Somali elites. Many clans became divided in Somali as a result of being disparaged and disheartened. Mohammed Said Barre introduced a socialist platform for self-enrichment and oppression of opposition groups. The defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden war between 1977-1978 led to disintegration and disunity and resulted into proliferation of arms in Somalia (Ani, 2016).

Mohammed Siad Barre gave himself and his Darod clan more authority and entitlements to the detriment of other clans, as a result, other clans who felt marginalised began an opposition movement against the government of Mohammed Siad Barre which led to its collapse in 1999 (Rotberg, 2002:95). The overthrow of General Mohammed Siad Barre led to a vacuum in governance in Somalia which led to armed conflict over whom is in the position of authority in Mogadishu, the Somalian capital, between forces loyal to the interim President Mahdi Mohammed and the United Somalia Council (USC) and the armed group led by General Mohammed Faiah Aidid and the armed conflict later spread to other parts of Somalia with various armed groups in control of different parts of the country (Agada, 2008).

4.2.2. The collapse of the Somalia State.

In 1991, the eruption of civil war in Somalia resulted to the disintegration of all the institutions of governance, coupled with the outbreak of famine and drought which led to significant humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Over half a million Somalis died from hunger, malnutrition and related disease by the end of 1991, the overthrow of the government of Mohammed Siad Barre created a political vacuum leading to the breakout of armed conflict between clans, warlords, devious religion leaders, migrants and herdsmen (Agada 2008; Pham 2010).

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali in 1992 obtained a cease-fire agreement between the caretaker President of Somalia, President Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aidid and on April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (1992) which established the United Nations Operation in Somali (UNSOM1) with the mandate of implementing the ceasefire agreement. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1) could not achieve its mandate of implementing the ceasefire agreement due to

the armed group led by General Aidid who were suspicious of the United States led peacekeeping forces (Agada, 2008).

In December 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM11) took over from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1) with an additional mandate of restoration of peace and stability in Somalia and in 1993, the involvement of UNOSOM11 in the armed conflict in Somali resulted to the death of 18 contingents of the United States. This led to President Bill Clinton of the United States asking the United States troops to leave Somalia in October 1993 which resulted to the undermining of the achievement of UNOSOM11 and led to the United Nations ordering the withdrawal of UNOSOM11 from Somali on 31st March 1995 (Agada 2008; Ani 2016).

The withdrawal of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM11) led to increasing proliferation of weapons and insecurity in Somalia. It also led to the emergence of warlords competing for the control of Somali cities and through proliferation of weapons, piracy along the coast of Somalia and organised criminal activities increased and equally transformed the conflict from that of clan to warlords and the conflict also led to the decentralisation of power in Somalia with the formation of many self-governing states like Somaliland in 1991, Puntland in 1998, Galmudug state in 2006 and Himanlyo Heeb in 2008 (Muigel 2013; Pham 2010).

4.2.3. The involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the conflict in Somalia

The conflict in Somalia have been the intervention of several actors both regional and international actors. Apart from the interventions from the United Nations with the following peacekeeping operations; the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM1) in August 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) a peacekeeping partnership between UNOSOM 1 and the United States in December 1992 and the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM 11) in 1993 (Miyandazi, 2012:2).

4.2.4. The involvement of Kenya in the conflict in Somalia.

The 2002-2004 Somalia peace talks were hosted by Kenya and equally provided a base for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed till 2005 when it moved to Mogadishu, the capital Somalia. The 2004-2004 Somalia peace talks in Kenya were held under the authority of member states of IGAD with the Global community establishing the

TGF and on the 16th October 2011, Kenyan military step into Somalia and have been in action against the Al-Shabaab armed group since 2011 till 2020 due to the following reasons;

- Frequent kidnapping and killings by Al-Shabaab of tourists in its coastal and North-Eastern provinces was having a negative impact on Kenya economy.
- Exploration of oil in Somalia waters.
- The military intervention of Kenya in Somalia was a demonstration of its military capability and strenght as a regional power and to address a major regional threat.
- The Intervention by Kenya was an act of counter-terrorism due to the influx of Al-Shabaab militias into Kenya and the carrying out of terrorist attacks inside Kenya territories such as in Westgate in 2013.
- The effect of piracy in Somalia which paralysed the activities of Mombasa seaport in Kenya (Miyandazi 2012; Warner 2012; Williams 2018).

Ethnicity and geographical conditions led to historical linkages between Kenya and Somalia and the North-Eastern province of Kenya is occupied by a Somali ethnic tribe and since the outbreak of war in Somalia in 1991, Kenya have hosted over 500,000 Somalis and apart from the influx of refugees into Kenya from Somalia, Kenya have been participating in negotiations and peace processes in Somalia to reconcile the warring groups in Somalia. Kenya intervened in Somalia in other to protect its national security and that Kenya continue to work towards stability and peace in Somalia through the creation of a security neutral zone in Jubaland to safeguard Kenyan domestic interest and national security and the intervention in Somalia by Kenya have transformed the conflict in Somalia to a regional conflict and the role of Kenya in the conflict in Somalia cannot restore peace because kenya's motive is based on national interest (Eriksson, 2013) and (Mohammed, 2014).

4.2.5. Ethiopia involvement in the conflict in Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia share a history characterised by hostility over the Ogaden region of Eastern Ethiopia inhabited by Somalia and with the breakout of civil war in Somalia in 1991, Islamic groups such as Al-Itihad declared war against Ethiopia and carried out several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia and apart from armed attacks from Al-Itihad, the civil war in Somalia spread to Ethiopia creating instability in the region spearheaded by groups with

affiliation in Somali such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) waging war against Ethiopia (Abink, 2006:8).

The activities of these Islamic groups in Ethiopia influenced by conflict in Somalia led to the military intervention by the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in 2006. The intervention of Ethiopia in the conflict in Somalia transformed the conflict into a transnational conflict and because it resulted into the insurgency against Ethiopia by several Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda and by proxy the Eritrea government and Ethiopia equally providing military support to warlords in Somalia against the Islamists groups and Ethiopia intervention in Somalia created a humanitarian crisis as thousands of civilians were displaced in the Armed conflict between between the Ethiopia National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Islamists groups in Somalia worsened the humanitarian situation in the region (Mohammed, 2014).

4.2.6. The Emergence of Political Islamist Groups and its Impact on the Conflict in Somalia.

The emergence of political Islamist groups in the conflict in Somalia can be traced to the activities of the Al-Itihad group which began in 1995 with the establishment of a base in the Gedo region and the setting up of an administrative pseudo state and Islamic courts were therefore established in constituencies by Al-Itihaad for the basis of governance and maintenance of law and order. Other Islamic groups such as Al-Itisan Wal Sunnah attempted to establish Islamic courts in the Somalia courts in the Somalia capital, Mogadishu but such efforts did not work due to divisions between Northern and Southern Mogadishu and the first fully operational Islamic court was established in 1997 by the Abgal followed by the establishment of four main Islamic courts which were Hararyagale (Murosade), Shirkole (Saleebaan), Ifka Halane (Ayr) and Warshahada Aazaha (Duduble) (Bendtsen 2012; Hansen 2013).

In 2000, after the Somalia National Peace conference in Djibouti, the Islamic courts united to form the United Islamic court (UIC) and the establishment of Islamic law and in 2006, the United Islamic court (UIC) created an armed wing called Mu'ashar Mahkamad and remained Jamaa'a AlShabaab (Al Shabaab) After the defeat of the United Islamic Court by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Ethiopia Armed Forces in 2006, Al Shabaad

left the United Islamic court and became an Independent Insurgent group fighting with the Transitional Federal Government, Ethiopia and Kenya and other islamic groups in Somalia (Hansen 2013; Reid 2016).

Since 2006, Al Shabaad have changed the dimension of the war in Somalia into a global war directed against the United States and Europe with terrorist attacks carried out in Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti with a jihadist agenda such as the 2010 Kampala bombing and the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi and Al-Shabaab have been able to capture and control territory, sea ports and lines of communication like Southern and Central Somalia, the port city of Kisumayo and Baido which has assisted their operations and are a source of generating resources and with the imposition of sharia law as their mode of governance, they have been able to maintain and consolidate their grip on occupied communities (Uluma 2014; Horadam 2011). The conflict in Somalia have been complicated by the activities of Al-Shabaab who continue to commit crimes against humanity and engage in terrorist atatchs and armed conflict with the government in Somalia, the regional countries involved in the conflict such as Ethiopia and Kenya and also the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

4.3. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

The Central African Republic is a noncoastal country in the Central African region. Its population is made up of christianity, Islam and indigenous beliefs. Since gaining its sovereignty from France in 1960, the Central African Republic has been unstable. Despite its abundant mineral resources such as diamond, gold, oil and uranium, the Central African Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Since 2013, the Central African Republic has been involved in a political, ethnic and religious conflict that has created an humanitarian crisis and has spread across the region. Since 2014, the African Union has been involved with the United Nations in joint peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stablization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

4.3.1. The conflict in the Central African Republic.

The conflict in the Central African Republic will be analysed briefly starting with the historical development of the conflict, the current conflict of which is the focus of this thesis, the religious dimension of the conflict and the involvment of local actors such as the Seleka

and anti-Balaka groups, regional actors like Chad, Sudan, Cameroun, Angola and the Republic of Congo, Foreign actors like France and South Africa, International institutions like the Economic Community of Central African States and the European Union and Non state actors like the Lord's Resistance Army.

4.3.2. The development of the conflict in the Central African Republic.

The Central African Republic is a non-coastal country with a history of political uncertainty after gaining independence from France in 1960 and its political history has been characterised by military coups, mutinies, political instability and violence with civil conflicts in 1996-1997, 2001-2003, 2006-2007 before the current conflict started in 2013. The Presidency of David Dacko after independence in 1960 was characterised by draconian laws and ethnicity and was deposed in a military revolt by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 1965 and he suspended the constitution and renamed the state "Central African Empire" with the declaration of himself as Emperor for life (Call 2012; ICG 2007).

Jean-Bedel Bokassa 14 years reign was characterised by gross human rights violations. Bokassa was overthrown in 1979 and David Dacko was restored as President and removed in 1981 by Andre Kolingba. Andre Kolingba was overthrown in March 2003 by General Francois Bozize a Presidency characterised by corruption that affected the economic development of the Central African Republic. Since independence in 1960, few developments have been achieved in infrastructure, health and education with difficulties in accessing public goods and basic services and regional, ethnic and religious identities among the population of the Central African Republic were influenced by Geographic conditions, historical patterns of human settlement and interactions between Muslims and the Christian groups (Amadou and Copley, 2015).

Apart from the capital Bangui, where infrastructure, basic services and state institutions are concentrated, the rural areas have been grossly neglected by successive governments resulting in abject poverty and isolated villages especially the Northern part of the country and the actions of several Presidents have resulted in weak national security forces which resulted in large areas of the Central African Republic being controlled by local criminal groups, transnational armed actors like the Lord's Resistance Army (Amadou and Copley 2015; Diallo 2015).

4.3.3. The current conflict in the Central African Republic

The recent crisis in the Central African Republic began in 2012 but escalated in 2013 after President Francois Bozize was overthrown in March 2013 by the Seleka rebellion. The Seleka Militias a predominantly rebel group of a coalition of Muslims from the Northern part of the country engaged the anti-Balaka, a group of christian militias in an armed conflict and the intervention of the African Union together with France resulted to the defeat of the Seleka and the drafting of a new constitution in December 2015 and elections in February 2016 (Knoope and Buchanan-Clark 2017; Klienfeld 2017).

In 2014, the Seleka group splitted into several factions fighting among themselves over domination of resources and migration and targeting civilian communities leading to destruction of lives and properties and the Central and North Central regions of the Central African Republic is undergoing a resurgence of violence and in the North-Western part of the country, rivalry amongst rebel militias and bandits over the dominance of periodic migration pathways and the livestock market continue to undermine the implementation of the various paece process (Knoope and Buchanan-Clark 2017; Kleinfield 2017).

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have taken over the Eastern towns of Nzako and Sam Quandja and The Central African Republic continue to witness armed conflicts between pastoralists and farming communities, between christians and Muslim communities which have resulted into an humanitarian crisis with an estimated 478,848 internal displaced persons (UNOCHA, 2017).

4.3.4. The Religious dimension of the conflict in the Central African Republic

The November 2015 report by conciliation resources on the review of conflict and peacebuilding in the Central African Republic stated that religion and ethnicity are not the primary causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic but the elites exploited the religious identities and the religious based discrimination especially within the Muslim communities to fuel the crisis. The various government in the Central African Republic from independence in 1960 refused to recognise Muslim organisations due to the historical ideal that the Central African Republic was a frontline state of christian facing the Muslim North and that this conspiracy theory had long determined the political culture of the local populace. Therefore since the current conflict started in 2012, Muslim Seleka rebels that overthrown the government of Francois Bozize continue to engage the anti-Balaka militia groups made up of Christians and animists in large scale reprisal attacks (Cadman 2015; HRW 2016).

The fall of the Seleka Muslim rebel group in 2014 led to widespread anti-Muslim violence and displacement of a significant population of the Muslim communities leading to the crisis in the Central African Republic been portrayed as a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians and the discrimination against Muslims in the Central African Republic was a major factor that led to the rebellion by the Seleka who tired of being regarded as second class citizens in their own country and those attacked by the Seleka rebels were attacked based on their religious beliefs (Cadman 2015; Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels 2014).

Also in 2014, the anti-Balaka militias consisting of Christians and animists attacked not just members of the Seleka rebel group but people of a different religious identity and the anti-Balaka militias attacked religious buildings such as the Bangui Foul neighbourhood mosque among others, Muslim women were raped and various war crimes and gross human rights violation committed against the Muslim population in the Central African Republic (AI 2014; Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittals 2014).

Although the various acts of violence perpetuated by the Seleka and the anti-Balaka groups in the Central African Republic led to the conflict been described as a religious conflict by several scholars and the media and violence between the Seleka and the anti-Balaka rebel groups had social and economic roots such as the profits from artisanal mining of diamond and gold, control over border crossings and checkpoints and pastoralism, religious ideology or differences did not lead to the violence but deepened the faultline between the local actors involved in the conflict (Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels, 2014)

4.3.5. The Regional and International actors in the conflict in the Central African Republic

Regional organisations like the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), regional actors like Chad, Sudan, Cameroun, Angola and the Republic of Congo and international organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and the International Contact Group on Central Africa Republic and international actors such as France and South Africa and non-state actors like the Lord's Resistance Army have impacted and played various roles in the Central African Republic crisis.

4.3.6. Regional actors involved in the conflict in the Central African Republic.

4.3.6.1. Chad

Chad and the Central African Republic have communities within their border areas that share common languages and traditions and as a result both countries share similar political, historical and anthropological orientations and Chad has been a key actor in the present crisis in the Central African Republic as a result of the involvement of Chad's President Deby in the overthrow of President Bozize of the Central African Republic and equally remain a major actor in the resolution of the conflict, making Chad's role in the conflict not only ambiguous but also highly problematic. Also since 2002-2003 till date, Chad kept on playing a central role in Central African Republic politics and security. And the following reasons can be used to explain Chad's involvement in the Central African Republic.

- The Northern Central African Republic served as a base for opposition groups challenging the government of Chadian President Deby.
- The inundation of refugees from the crisis in the Central African Republic led to a scarcity of resources in Southern Chad.
- Pastoralism is Chad's major source of revenue after oil and increasing desertification have resulted in migration of Chadian pastoralists into the Central African Republic and the conflict in the Central African Republic have resulted into rivalry over access to water and land between Chadian pastoralists and Central African Republic Farmers.
- The need by Chad to protect its oil wells and reservoirs in the border regions between the country and the Central African Republic.

And although Chad's President Deby has been a major actor in the current Central African Republic crisis and processes of resolving the crisis, Chad participation in the conflict has been of a more negative impact to the Central African Republic (Carayannis and Lombard 2014; Welz 2014).

4.3.6.2. SUDAN

The Sudanese government provided military and financial assistance to the Muslim Seleka rebel groups between 2012 and 2013 and relationship between Khartoum and Seleka's leaders such as Michel Djotodia existed since the 1990s when Micheal Djotodia was based in the town of Nyala in Southern Darfur. Apart from military, financial and logistical support given

to the Seleka rebels by the Sudanese government, the following factors were given as reasons for Sudan involvement in the conflict in the Central African Republic;

- Increasing regional insecurity with the support given to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) by President Bozize of the Central African Republic.
- Sudan support of the Seleka rebels was to gain more allies and to become more influential in the region and to exploit Central African Republic natural resources (Weyns, Hoex, Hilgert and Spittaels, 2014).

4.3.6.3. CAMEROON

The commencement of hostilities in the Central African Republic in December 2012 led to increasing insecurity in Eastern Cameroon and Cameroonian authorities had to intervene in the Central African Republic to stop the use of Cameroon as a new base for anti-Balaka and Seleka rebels. There are accounts of smuggling of diamond and gold shared between the Central African Republic and Cameroon into Cameroon and since most of Cameroon's gold mines are situated in Eastern Cameroon in close proximity to the Central African Republic border, increasing Diamond and Gold smuggling as a result of the conflict in the Central African Republic impacted negatively on Cameroon's gold and diamond sales (Matthysen and Clarkson, 2013)

4.3.6.4. ANGOLA

Angola's involvement in the conflict in the Central African Republic began in 2014 to support the transitional process in the Central African Republic and in 2015, Angola under the Kimberly process began discussions on the partial resumption of the exports of diamond West and South-West Central African Republic ((Marchal, 2015).

4.3.6.4. REPUBLIC OF CONGO

In 2013, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo was made the mediator of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The government of the Republic of Congo has also assisted the ECCAS Peacekeeping Operations in the Central African Republic with funding and provision of troops and since September 2014, the leader of the Front Democratique Du Peuple Centrafricain's (FDPC) leader Abdoulaye Miskine has been hosted and protected by President Denis Sassou Nguesso and the interest of the Republic of Congo in the conflict is based primarily on security and the goodwill of the international community despite allegations of an hidden agenda (Marchal, 2015)

4.4. International organisations involved in the conflict in the Central African Republic

The involvement of the United Nations and the African Union in the conflict in the Central African Republic will form the basis of Analysis in the next chapter and because of this only the involvement of global and regional institutions like the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the European Union will be discussed briefly here.

4.4.1. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have been involved significantly since the outbreak of the Central African Republic crisis through provision of troops and financial support and also leading several mediation talks. The involvement of ECCAS in the conflict in the Central African Republic have been driven by political and economic interest from members such as Chad and as a result ECCAS has been unable to prevent increasing instability and insecurity in the Central African Republic resulting in the transformation of ECCAS led Peacekeeping operation, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR (MICOPAX) into an African Union led peacekeeping mission, the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 1st August 2013 (Welz, 2014) and (Bakari, 2014).

4.4.2. The European Union

The European Union on 1st April 2014 deployed EUFOR CAR under the authorisation of the Security Council of the United Nations. EUFOR CAR provided temporary support to the other forces involved in the peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic for six months and was given order to do the following; Stabilising and protecting some districts in Bangui and making possible humanitarian services (EU, 2014). EUFOR CAR was withdrawn on 31st March 2015 and before its withdrawal, the European Union launched a numerous trust fund connecting relief, rehabilitation and development in July 2014 with a sum of 64 million Euros and an additional 72 million Euros in 2015 (EU, 2015).

4.5. International actors involved in the conflict in the Central African Republic.

4.5.1. FRANCE

Since independence of the Central African Republic from France in 1960, France has continued to play major economic and political roles in the Central African Republic. In December 2013, France launched Operation Sangaris consisting of over 1600 troops from

France and the African Union under the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2127 and France was also involved in the electoral procedures and involved the European Union in the conflict and also contributed significantly to the Transformation of MISCA into MINUSCA (Dukhan, 2016)

4.5.2. SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa in 2007 signed a military pact with the Central African Republic renewed in 2012 by President Bozize with other agreements in natural resources exploration and defence and on the 2nd of January 2013, South Africa deployed over 400 soldiers to the Central African Republic but withdrawn from the Central African Republic after the overthrow of President Bozize by Seleka Muslim group and the involvement of South Africa in the conflict in the Central African Republic is based on economic interest especially in the diamond and oil sectors (Dukhan 2016; Weyns, Hoex and Spittaels 2014).

4.6. Non State Actors Involved in the Conflict in the Central African Republic

After the end of the cold war, several conflicts particularly in Africa has transformed from that of inter-state to intra-state and from the 2000s, several African nations like Nigeria, Uganda and the Central African Republic among others began to witness conflict involving states and non-state actors such as Boko Haram in West Africa and the Lake Chad basin region and the Lord's Resistance Army in East and Central Africa.

4.6.1. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The Lord's Resistance Army emerged in the Central African Republic South-East region of Haut-Mbomu Prefecture and that the weakness of the various regimes in the Central African Republic and the absent of a strong and national army coupled with geographical factors like remoteness and the Central African Republic porous borders made the Central African Republic attractive to the Lord's Resistance Army. The Lord's Resistance Army is a major hinderance to Peace and Security in the East and South East of the Central African Republic. The Lord's Resistance Army has been entangled in human rights abuses and other acts like banditry, exploitation and trading of ivory and gold. And since 2013, EX-Seleka groups and the LRA has been operating within the same region and the attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army on rural communities in the Central African Republic has displaced hundreds of thousands of people (Cakaj 2015; Dukhan 2016).

The LRA issue show that the lack of capacity by failed/weak nations and global organisations to deal with armed groups like the LRA that are versatile and move across national borders, consitute a major challenge to various efforts to stop violence (Cakaj, 2015).

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the conflicts in the research area of this thesis namely Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. This chapter dealt with the root causes and the historical development of the conflicts and the role played by religion and ethnicity especially in the conflict in Darfur and the Central African Republic and the roles played by regional and global institutions like the Economic Community of Central African States in the Central African Republic and the European Union in Darfur and countries like the United States, France and African countries like Angola, Cameroon and South Africa in the conflicts in the Central African Republic, Darfur and Somalia. Apart from the roles played by state actors also non state actors like the Lord's resistance movement, the Balakas and Seleka in the Central African Republic, the Jajanweed in Darfur and political islamic groups like the Al-Shabaab in the conflict in Somalia. The next chapter which is chapter 7 will examine the data gathered in the course of this thesis inconjunction with the aims and objectives of this thesis and the research questions.

CHAPTER 5

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the theoretical framework that guides this study. This chapter will commence with a discussion of what theoretical and conceptual framework are. This will be followed by the discussion of some of the theories that have been used to study African Union and United National cooperations. Section 4.3 will critically discuss the theory of collective security.

5.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Theories are formulated to explain, predict and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical sounding assumptions. A theoretical framework is the structure that can hold or support the theory of a research study and it introduces and describes the theory that explains why the research problem under study exists (Abend, 2008), (Swanson, 2013). According to (Caliendo and Kyle, 1996), a theoretical framework differentiates the research of scholars from that of a journalist. Theoretical framework is made up of two words which are “theory” and “framework”. (Kerlinger, 1986:9) defined a theory as “a set of interrelated constructs, definitions and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena and a framework is a set of ideals that you use when you are forming your decisions and judgements”.

(Kerlinger, 1996) argued that a theory can be successfully used to make predictions that can guide researchers to ask appropriate research questions, while a framework provides structure within which the relationships between variables of a phenomenon are explained. (Iecompte and Preissle, 1993) defined theoretical framework as a collection of interrelated concepts that can be used to direct research with the purpose of predicting and explaining the result of the research. (Caliendo and Kyle 1996; Radhakrishna, Yoder and Ewing, 2007), defined theoretical framework as a method used to provide the rationale for conducting the research. According to (Ad-El-Khaliak and Akerson, 2007), theoretical framework is important in a research because a research is theory driven and should show how research fits into an existing theory and research and its contributions and intellectual goals.

This study agrees with the various definitions of a theoretical framework and for the objective of this thesis will define theoretical framework as the structure that can hold or support a theory of a research study. The importance of theoretical framework to this study is that it helped in making predictions, interpretation and analysis based on an existing literature; it also guided the choice of the research design and questions and towards appropriate data collection methods and providing a connection to existing literature.

Conceptual framework however prepares the research question that examines the research problem and issues that necessitated the research (Regoniel, 2015). A conceptual framework has been defined as an analytical tool, consisting of many variables and contexts and its major purpose is making conceptual distinctions and organising ideals (Richard, 2014). The differences between a theoretical and conceptual framework are:

Theoretical framework is built on existing assumptions such as the realist theory while the conceptual framework is developing a theory based on your own concepts or relevant variables. In a theoretical framework, not all assumptions of a theory are utilised in a research while a conceptual framework utilises all its assumptions in the research. Theoretical framework provides an analysis of the relationship between factors of a phenomenon, while conceptual framework deals mainly with the relationship between a research variable provided by the conceptual framework.

5.2 Theories used to study African Union and United Nations Cooperation on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Four major theories have been used to study collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. These theories are Resource Exchange theory, the Globalist theory, Realist theory and the Collective Security Theory. Collective security theory was selected as the theoretical framework of this the thesis because it remedies the weaknesses of other theories . The collective security is a security arrangement comprising of all or majority of states within and outside a particular region and it is not limited like the other theories with regards to collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations.

5.2.1. The Resource Exchange Theory

The Resource Exchange theory is based on the postulation that cooperation between international institutions like that of the African Union and the United Nations on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is as a result of “resource complementarity” due to

scarcity of resources (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014). (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014) used the Resource Exchange theory to study the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, where sub-regional, regional and international institutions like the European Union and the United Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Using Burundi (2003), Darfur (2007), Mali (2013) and the mission of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM) as case studies, (Brosig and Motsamai, 2014) argued that the peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations in the aforementioned countries was a result of scarcity of resource, capability gaps and complementary capabilities. They identified the following intervening variables as determinants of exchange of resources between international organisations, congruence/compatibility of security policies, institutional match and strife for institutional autonomy.

(Lwanga, 2017), using the exchange resource theory argued that Collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia resulted to legitimacy to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with regards to the African Union and funding with regards to the United Nations. Therefore, resource scarcity influences organisations to cooperate in order to manage scarce resources, utilise available resources through the resource dependency approach which is geared towards the combination of individual capabilities (Lwanga, 2017).

The strength of the Resource Exchange theory is that it acknowledges the facts that due to the complexity of conflict in Africa, no single organisation can on its own successfully carryout a peacekeeping operation in Africa. And while acknowledging the lack of financial capabilities of the African Union and other challenges in its Peace and Security Architecture, it also acknowledges the African Union's comparative advantages such as proximity, cultural understanding, historical affiliation and local/internal knowledge of African conflict. The Resource Exchange theory demonstrates that resource pooling and burden-sharing is the basis of cooperative peacekeeping and provide an understanding of organisational cooperation (Lwanga, 2017).

The weakness of the Resource Exchange theory is its inability to acknowledge the political dimension of cooperative peacekeeping such as political, economic and national interest as seen in most of the conflicts in Africa, where countries and organisations involved in peacekeeping operations do so based on the above variables. It also fails to take into

consideration issues of non-cooperation and other factors such as delays and time gaps in cooperation (Lwanga, 2017).

5.2.2. The Globalist Theory

Another theory used to study the collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is the Globalist theory. The Globalist theory was used to study the cooperation between the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations through the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999.

Nye (2002) defined Globalism as a world that is characterised by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances, and when states undertake peacekeeping operations, it is because they wanted to reduce humanitarian crisis the selected states. Globalists are of the view that the international community must intervene to avoid bloodshed totally and that states hiding behind sovereignty must not be accepted when issues such as the total contravention of human rights or genocide occur as seen in Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi in 1993 (Galadima, 2006).

According to Grinin (2012), state sovereignty started declining from the late 20th century due to the process of globalisation such as international financial flows, multinational corporations, international media empires and international interventions as seen in Libya (2011) and the new world order. This has resulted into states giving and reducing their sovereign rights willingly, because globalisation brought about technology and new pattern of trades that created a new pattern of network among states across national boundaries (Grinin, 2012).

Globalisation has brought about increase in trade resulting into open boundaries which has created a haven for terrorism and organised crimes to thrive with consequences on the security of states. Before the emergence of globalisation, conflicts across the world were mainly inter-state conflicts. Globalisation has seen conflict spreading from the host country to several countries. An example is the Boko Haram insurgency which started from Nigeria but later spreading across the West African region with consequences not only on the security of countries within the region but their sovereignty.

(Phahlamohlaka, 2008), argued that this fragmented conflicts involving armed non-state actors operating in failed states and deprived areas conduct attacks on civilians, governmental and private institutions resulting into humanitarian crisis, regional insecurity and instability. Globalisation has also resulted into a reduction in countries's defence budget, with emphasis on deterrence, privatization of state security, involvement of non-state actors in state defence and participation of geographical establishments in the provision of peace and security with implications on state sovereignty (Phahlamohlaka, 2008).

While economically advanced states, such as European states, have delegated certain sovereignty powers to international organisations like the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, states that share close ideology such as China, Iran, North Korea and Saudi Arabia have maximum state sovereignty (Grinin, 2012).

In the global system, states are the major actors due to the fact that states possess supreme and independent authority without interference from others. This sovereignty held by states has been affected by the impact and process of globalisation, impacting on the security of states through open borders brought about by free trade and international organisations taking over the traditional roles of states in the international system. Therefore to combat increasing insecurity and instability, the concept of sovereignty need to be reconsidered, so that states can pursue a dominant role in intercontinental peace and security due to the availability of resources within their reach.

(Weiss and Chopra, 1992) argued that the imperatives of Globalism have transformed the world into a global village, leading to a global moral independence and expanded humanitarian space. The Globalist theory refers to the cooperation between the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations in Sierra Leone as humanitarian interventions, to safeguard human lives and prevent an humanitarian crisis (Galadima, 2006). During the Liberia civil war from 1989, over 250,000 people were killed (Cillers, 2004) and in Sierra Leone in 1999, over 75000 people were killed (Gubereki, 2006). The strength of the Globalist theory is that states no longer pursue their security objectives individually, and there is increasing cooperation among states in issues bordering on peace and security (Baylis, 2005).

5.2.3 The Realist Theory

The realist theory is another theory was used to study partnership in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The realist theory has been used to examine the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Obinna, 2015) and the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Lanz, 2010). The origin of realism can be traced to the works of Thomas Hobbes and Nicolo Machiaveli (Goordin, 2010:132). According to realists such as (Mearshemer 2002; Morgenthau 2002; Waltz 1990), realism is centred on the following premises: The state is the central actor in the global system, a system characterised by anarchy with the state being the only actor capable of regulating interactions in the international system. The primary concerns of states is having the military capabilities to defend themselves and protect their territories. Interactions among states are based on self interest and resources attainment and the story of international relations is that of great power politics.

Using realism to study the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), (Lanz, 2010) argue that materials interest and competition between intervening states were the major factor in the cooperation of the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur. This is in support of the argument of (Waltz, 1990) and (Mearsheimer, 2002) that cooperation among states can only succeed due to the alignment of state interests and preferences. Also using the realist theory to analyse the African Mission in Somalia, (Obinna, 2015) argued that the involvement of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia was based on domestic and economic concerns. A major weakness of the realist theory is its emphasis mainly on power politics and national interests as the basis of institutional cooperation. This theory fails to take into consideration other emerging factors brought about as a result of globalisation (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Another weakness of the realist theory is one of its assumptions about the state being the major power in the international system (Waltz, 1990). This assumption did not take into consideration the impact of non-state actors in conflicts across the world. This is more so on the African continent where non-state actors like terrorist, ethnic and religious movements are playing a major role in countries like Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.

The major strength however of the realist theory is that it provide an understanding of the nature of human behaviour with a clear analysis of inter-state and institutional relationship and the nature of such interactions.

5.2.4 Collective Security Theory

This chapter earlier discussed three other theories which were the Globalist, Resource Exchange and Realist theory that had been used to examine partnership of the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa and the strengths and weaknesses of these theories were stated. However, collective theory remedies these weaknesses because it is a security arrangement which comprises all or majority of states within a particular region. Collective security is not limited to resource complementarity of the resource exchange theory, nor based on national and self interest of the realist theory and not influenced by the process of globalisation. Collective security is joint interventions to challenges to peace and security. This section will be divided into four subsections, starting with definitions of collective security, weaknesses of collective security theory, strengths of collective security theory and conditions that make collective security successful.

5.3. What is Collective Security?

The development of the theory of collective security which is summarized in a phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all”, can be traced to the Holy League of Venice in 1454, the treaty of London in 1518 and the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The above treaties were early examples of collective security mechanisms although it was limited to the nations bound by these treaties but after the Napoleonic war on 1815, collective security became an international concept in the concert of Europe, which was an attempt by European powers to keep the existing state of affairs and prevent war (Reichard, 2006:9).

Although the concert of Europe existed without written rules or permanent institutions, it was based on a balance of power arrangement where the expansionist activities of every European power would be checked by other powers and countries in Europe (Georges-Henri, 2010). On 28 July 1914, the world erupted into a major war caused by factors such as imperialism, the spread of nationalism, territorial and economic conflicts and complicated alliances and triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Bosnian Serb (Ruth, 2006). The League of Nations was formed in 1920 with the concept of collective security to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedies of the 1st world war. According to (Struic, 2017), the League of Nations was the first global institution established on the concept of collective security in modern world.

The League of Nations collapsed with the beginning of the 2nd world war in September 1 1939 and in 1945, the United Nations was established with its charter making strong

provisions for the principle of collective security. Articles 39-51 of Chapter VII of the charter gives the Security Council of the United Nations the principal right to maintain or restore international peace and security through individual or collective interventions to threats to international peace and security. These responses to threats to international peace and security can be through the deployment of armed forces and sanctions totally complied to by all concerned parties.

The United Nations charter in chapter vii defined the concept of collective security with regards to its application by the United Nations. On definition of collective security, (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995:52) defined collective security as an agreement between states based on specific standards and regulations sustain stability and combining them to stop any form of hostilities. This agreement between states are mostly limited to traditional collective security measures directed mainly at inter-state aggression where a state combine with other states to deter or fight against an aggressor which is typical of United Nations collective security arrangements. However these traditional methods of collective security create complications for addressing challenges of non-state actors. According to (Gleason and Shaihutdinov, 2005), applying the principles of collective security to the threats imposed by non-state actors comes with several challenges such as difficulties in identification of non-state actors and groupings unlike state actors that are known. Also the fragmented modes of operation of non-states actors provide serious challenges to traditional methods of collective security.

In order to address the issue of non-state actors, collective security theory has adopted several mechanisms which include decentralising institutions into various functions and designs (Gleason and Shaihutdinov, 2005). This is to enable collective security institutions deal effectively with all the issues of non-state actors and their challenges to peace and security with the conclusion being the elimination or neutralisation of these threats.

Therefore in dealing with non-state actors, collective security involves international, regional and sub-regional cooperation and coordination and the involvement of various security institutions with several initiatives. A good example is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram. The MNJTF is under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) a sub-regional organisation with contingents from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria and authorised by the African Union's Peace and Security Council with logistical support and funding from the United States, United Kingdom and France

working together through the centre for coordination and liaison (CCL) to support the MNJFT (EC, 2019).

Sub regional organisations in Africa are involved in collective security arrangements in several conflicts across Africa, such as in South Sudan, Sahel, Central Africa and in the Lake Chad Basin (Ani, 2018). This shows that collective security theory assumes that the Africa's sub-regional institutions and the African Union all play vital roles in collective peace and security. The primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa lies on the African Union through its collective security instruments at the national, regional and sub-regional levels through the units of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture such as the African Standby force. In 2008, a multilateral agreement was signed among the African Union and the eight regional economic institutions in Africa with emphasis in peace and security collaboration. This means that the African Union and the regional organisations in Africa are collectively involved in the enhancement of peace and security in Africa.

According to (Andreatta 1996; Organski 1960; Rourke and Boyer 1998), the concept of collective security rest on the following four principles.

- Firstly, all states must only use force for self defence purposes only, meaning that collective security theory does not allow the use of armed force against any other country and nations must only apply force in defence of their territories and populations.
- Secondly, the concept of collective security rest on the principle of indivisibility. This implies that a threat to the peace of a nation is a challenge to the collective peace of all nations and therefore challenges to peace should be seen as collective threats which have the capabilities of undermining other nations.
- Thirdly, as a result of the threats to the peace of a nation, all nations must collectively tackle such threats to peace by uniting together to take a collective decision about the aggressor and undertake collective actions to restore peace.
- Fourthly, having collectively agreed about the aggressor and the aggressor seen as a common enemy, nations must then put together resources within their disposal such as finances, personnel, logistics and military capabilities and form a collective security force with authorisation from an international organisation such as the

Security Council of the United Nations to contain the aggressor or aggressors and reestablishing international peace and security.

It is of significance that the host government must give its consent before a collective security force is deployed. This assumption is vital especially in dealing with independent actors. The consent of the host government of the state where the aggressor or aggressors are being contained or eliminated is vital because the state has to relinquish some of its sovereignty to the collective security force or the international organisation under whose authority the collective security force is operating and this is to allow certain restrictions on autonomous military actions and for a successful peacekeeping operations (Jordaan, 2017).

It is also important for major states within the international system to accept the legitimacy of collective security and act together to deal with states that constitute threats to peace and security (Jordaan, 2017). Therefore, states coming together to take a collective action against an aggressor or aggressors must act within the norms and rules of the international system. Also, such collective actions must be authorised by the Security Council of the United Nations and operative under the auspices of a supra-national or global organisation such as the African Union and other regional institutions. This will provide such collective security actions legality.

With regards to Africa, the African Union, as part of its collective security measures, came up with the ideal of local solutions to the problems of Africa which resulted in the formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (Nathan, 2013). According to (Jordaan, 2017), the following sections of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture are committed to the promotion of collective security. Article 2 of the agreement dealing with the formation of the African Union Peace and Security Council state that: The Peace and Security Council of the union is hereby established, as stated by Articles 5 (2) of the constitutive Act, as a permanent decision making arm of the African Union responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of the conflicts and the peace and security council shall be a collective security and early warning arrangements to make sure that responses to conflicts and crisis conditions across Africa is fast and successful (AU, Protocol 2002, Article 2).

Article 3 of the Agreement dealing with the formation of the African Union Peace and Security Council stated the objectives of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as: Enhancing the process of peace and security and promote stability in Africa, expect and stop hostilities, enhance and establish process of building peace and reconstruction after the

end of hostilities, organise and balance endeavours in stopping and tackling terrorism, build a common defence strategy and enhance and inspire democratic practices. The constitutive Act of the African Union in Article 4 (h) gives the African Union the privilege to respond in a member state with regards to issues on grave conditions such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: Article 4: h). Article 4: (j) gives also rights to member states to ask for the African Union to intervene so that peace and security can be restored (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: Article 4: J). The above represent a departure from the non-intervention policies of the Organisation of African Unity to that of non-indifference based on the assumptions of collective security (Jordaan, 2017).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which is the major postulation of collective security was also preserved in the constitutive act of the African Union which adopted the Ezulwini consensus in 2005 which recommended the Responsibility to Protect as a mechanism for the prevention of mass atrocities. The Ezulwini consensus is a common African Position adopting collective security measures to prevent conflicts and atrocities through collaboration with international and regional organisations on inter-state and internal conflict, conventional weapons, trans-national organised crime, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping capacity and terrorism all geared towards the Responsibility to protect (Lobakeng, 2017).

The first test of the postulation of collective security by the African Union was with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 with the collective efforts of member states of the African Union like South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tunisia and the United Nations. The African Union was a successful test case for collective security. Agoagye(2004) cited in Svennson (2008) argued in support that by the time the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) ended its mission on 31st May 2004 to be co-hatted into the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), 95% of Burundi was relatively stable. This point to the argument of this study that the collective security theory is the most suitable theoretical framework for explaining the collaboration of the United Nations and the African Union on peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The African Union as part of its peace and security mechanisms is collaborating with the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. The African Union Peace and Security Council is also collaborating with the United Nations Security Council in Peace-building in areas such as demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, reformation of the African

Union security sectors, post-conflict reconstruction and development and also collaboration in combating increasing terrorism in Africa (AU, 2013).

The African Union is therefore involved in collective security measures through cooperation with the United Nations in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia and the Central African Republic. The chief goal of collective security is to maintain peace through dialogue, diplomacy, multilateralism and international organisations, to limit the outbreak of war among countries and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine of collective security has led to increasing intervention for humanitarian purposes in Africa and increasing cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the African Union, the United Nations and other global organisations such as the European Union.

With the type and dimension of African conflicts which is fragmented and occur on a smaller scale within the peripheries of states, collective security seems to be the ideal theoretical framework for this study because these fragmented conflicts can only be resolved effectively through the involvement of various actors like the African Union, the regional organisations across the continent, global institutions like the United Nations and international actors like the United States, United Kingdom and France through logistical assistance and funding. (Cilliers and Schunemann, 2013).

5.3.1. Weaknesses of Collective Security Theory

The concept of collective security theory has been marginalised by the world powers particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Krisch, 2004). And as evident in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), the enforcement action of United Nations collective security is now conducted on the basis of alliances or coalition. The collective security mechanisms of the United Nations is the prerogative of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council such as Russia and the United States and its application is determined by these hegemonies. (Krisch, 2004) argued that during the cold war, the application of collective security was determined by the United States in favour of its allies and United Nations collective security became an instrument for the propagation of United States foreign policy and self-defence.

Another weakness of collective security theory is the operationalisation of the practice of collective security through several methods such as forceful interventions by a few states promoting their national interest as seen in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011), as against a

collective security system based on strict-rules therefore undermining the practice of collective security (Joensson, 2010). Some of this means of enforcement of collective security theory has created more destabilization rather than stabilization in its areas of operations due to a lack of a formal mode of operation thereby defeating the traditional principles of collective security. (Joensson, 2010) argued that the collective security system is upheld by its traditional principles such as state sovereignty with its principles of non-intervention while its practice is to protect civilian population, creating an unending compromise between the collective security system and practices of which consequences is humanitarian crisis and increasing insecurity.

Another weakness is the lack of a central military force in the absence of states refusing to be part of a coalition against an aggressor. This occurred at the era of the league of nations with the non ratification of the treaty of Versailles such the punishment of Germany and as a result could not stop the commencement of the 2nd world war (Aleksovski, Bakreski and Avramovska, 2014).

Another weakness of the collective security theory is some of its conditions which cannot be fulfilled because of its demanding nature such as: All states must agree to the status quo and must use force only for the purpose of self defence and the definition of aggression must be agreed upon by states to avoid paralysis where its cases arise. States must provide adequate funding, deployment of their armed forces not as a result of their national interest on aggressive states and sanctions imposed must be observed by all states.

This has failed because of economic and political interest of states as evident in Kosovo (1999) where China and Russia opposed sanctions by the United Nations Security Council as a result of the activities of Russia in Chechnya (1999-2009) and China in Tibet (1950) to prevent similar sanctions (Aleksovski, Bakreski and Avramovska, 2014).

5.3.2. Strength of Collective Security

The strength of collective security theory will be examined in this sub-section which is as follow:

Collective security is an effective deterrent against an aggressor because collective security member states will be involved in a coalition against an aggressor to protect their national interest and security (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995).

Collective security has led to increasing cooperation among states which promote trust among states and reduces the resources spent by states geared towards internal defence since states can put resources together to fight an aggressor (Mearsheimer, 2002).

Collective security enhances stability and reduces hostility among states because an aggressor will understand that its actions will be contain by a collection of states which its combine will overwhelm its single capabilities. A good example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that has been able to bring stability to Europe (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995).

Collective security enables the identification of aggressors and this is because the actions of an aggressor is determined by a committee of states thereby reducing the risks of misunderstanding and misconceptions when an action is taken against an aggressor and at the same time limiting the risks of cooperation among states.

It also provides a framework for actions against certain situations. It create rules, norms and agreement on actions to be taken when there is a violation of peace and security by international institutions like the United Nations and the African Union and limit the risks of such actions on individual states , creating states expectation of reciprocity (Andreatta, 1996).

5.3.3. Conditions that make Collective Security Successful

The following are some of the conditions that make collective security successful:

Nation states must be satisfied in maintaining the status quo such as boundaries of states and must apply military force only for self defence and there must be a consensus among states on what implies an aggression.

States especially regional powers must involve their resources such as finance and military to stop any form of aggression and must abide by sanctions imposed on an aggressor and must not assist such a nation and must allow the common defence of all member states to override their national interest. (Joensson 2010; Rendall 2007).

Table 2: Alignment of Research Questions with the Collective Security Theory

RQ1: To analyse the effectiveness of the AU/UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa	Using one of the principles of collective security stating that nations must put together resources at their disposal such as finances, personel, logistics, military capabilities to form a collective strength to reestablish
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	international peace and security.
RQ2: How are the failures and successes of AU/UN cooperation demonstrated in these peacekeeping operations.	Using collective security mechanisms such as decentralisation of institutions into various functions and designs to deal with non traditional challenges of peacekeeping operations such as the activities of armed non state actors and traditional ones such as funding.
RQ3: What is the prognosis for future cooperation between the two bodies.	Through collective security arrangements at the international, regional and sub-regional organisational level and coordination with the involvement of various security institutions with several initiatives.
RQ4: How could the prognosis be improved to bring about effectiveness in future peacekeeping operations in Africa.	By the state relinquishing some of its sovereignty to the organisations involved in the peacekeeping operations. This will result to certain restrictions on autonomous military actions and more effective peacekeeping operations.

From the table 2 above some of the principles of collective security theory, application of collective security mechanisms such as the decentralisation of institutions of collective security into various functions and designs has made it possible to collective security arrangements to deal with traditional challenges of peacekeeping operations such as funding and logistical constraints. And non traditional challenges such as activities of armed non state actors especially in fragmented conflicts in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic where the African Union and the United Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations. Apart from this, the prognosis for future collaboration in peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations is through international, regional and sub-regional collective security mechanisms coupled with the coordination and involvement of various security institutions with several initiatives.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical framework that examined the collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. Using collective security as our theoretical framework, this thesis argued that the collective security framework is the most suitable theory for explaining the collaboration on peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and African Union in Africa due to the fragmented nature of conflicts in Africa, that spread to other countries across boundaries creating humanitarian and economic crisis and increasing regional insecurity and instability. Section 5.1 engages with the definitions of theory, theoretical and conceptual framework and its differences. Section 5.2 critically discussed other theories that have been used to study African Union and United Nations cooperation; these theories are the resource exchange theory, globalists and realist. This chapter culminates with a review of the collective security theory in section 5.3, its strengths, weaknesses, conditions that make it successful and its application to this thesis. The next chapter give a substantive illustration of the thesis research methodology and detailed chosen method for the data collection and analysis.

CHAPTER 6

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

6.0. INTRODUCTION

According to Best and Kahn (1998), a good research uses valid and reliable procedures of data-gathering, instruments and techniques. This chapter will explain the reason for choosing the methods and procedures for this research work. Means of data collection, collation and analysis will be highlighted and this chapter will examine the research design, research paradigm, sampling method and recruitment, means and how data was collected, methods of data analysis and methods used to ensure trustworthiness of the research instruments, limitations and problems encountered in the course of this research work and the ethical principle involved.

6.1. Research Design

This chapter describes the appropriate research design involved in how data was collected, collated and investigation of data for this research work. It explains the research paradigm, sampling methods and recruitment, methods of collection of data, methods to guarantee validity and reliability, methods of data analysis, reflexivity, ethical principles and limitations.

6.2. Research Paradigm

Research paradigm is a broad method of connected procedure and thoughts that explains the dimension of enquiry based on the three major research process which are ontology, epistemology and methodology and it is a system of scientific and academic ideals, values and assumptions with regards to the nature and conduct of research (Thomas, 2003).

A research paradigm defines the perspective of the researcher and guides the researcher on the types of research methods to be used in the course of the research and in the analysis of data collected (Kivunja and Kuyini, 2017). This research work adopted a case study and qualitative paradigm which involved a structured gathering, presentation and analysis of data on the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in peacekeeping operations in Somalia from 2007-2018, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur

(UNAMID) in peacekeeping operations in Darfur from 2007-2018 and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic from 2014-2018.

The methods involved the collection of data texts, literatures, documents and the use of interviews to collect relevant data and analysing them based on qualitative techniques and a case study research approach. The qualitative approach gives broad insights to a research work and it is a set of how data is collected and investigated through the usage of purposive sampling, semi-structured and open-ended interviews and its an effective model that can be used to analyse the actual situation of things in a natural way. It also takes into consideration the different observations and interpretations of participants to have a complete understanding of the situations on ground (Mohajan, 2018).

While a case study approach to research is a qualitative research method that gives an indepth explanation of a complex stituation. It allows the researcher to choose a particular geographical spread and a limited numbers of respondents as the research participants to be able to gather data within a particular context (Zainal, 2007).

(Yin, 1989:14) argued that the necessity for the use of a case study research is because of the aspiration to have an understanding of social situation that is compounded. A case study approach enabled this research to use multiple methods with both primary and secondary data sources. The qualitative research approach on the other hand allowed this reseach to be able to investigate and narrate the nature and quality of the behaviour of people, experience and understand in relation to the subject matter of this research (Hamza, 2014).

(Flick, 1998:19) argued that the concentration of the subject's points of view and on the meaning they attribute to the experiences and events as well as towards the meaning of objects, activities, and viewpoints, informs a large part of qualitative research which is the selected method for this research work. Qualitative method used allowed this research to examine the extent to which the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeeping operations led to viable peace in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. The method examined some factors such as the mandates, funding, the role of concent and legitimacy, roles of African Economic Regional communities, the impact of armed non state actors and the complex nature of the African envinroment and their impact

with regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. The method also unraveled UNAMID, AMISOM AND MINUSCA mandate, specifically with regards to achieving sustainable peace in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic, examined the conditions that brought about conflict in Darfur, Somalia and CAR and appraised the effectiveness of the various peacekeeping operations. This design was used based on the chief objective of this research which is to examine the African Union and United Nations cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic.

6.3. Sampling Technique

Due to the impossibility of studying the whole population, this research adopted a sampling method of data collection. According to Ogunbameru and Ogunbameru (2010:43), sampling is referred to as a smaller representation of large population and the importance of sampling is to avoid the various difficulties faced by researchers in their attempt to study the whole population. Since researchers cannot make direct observations of the entire population, data is collected from a set of individuals and used to make inferences about the entire population (Ogunbameru and Ogunbameru, 2010, 43). For selection of respondents for this research work the following sample method were adopted.

Purposive sampling was used to select key informants and this presented this research with important data relevant to the research questions. The purposive sampling which allows for the selection of respondents whose experience is valuable for a proper understanding of the focus of attention of this research was selected because the objectives of this research required the knowledge of experts in peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. This research also used network sampling and participants were asked to suggest other participants who qualify. Participants with expertise in the field of peacekeeping operations were selected from the African Union, educational institutions, ACCORD, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, the South African Institute of International Affairs and the political affairs offices of the embassies/consulates of the case studies which are Somalia, Sudan (Darfur) and the Central African Republic.

Therefore, a total of 30 key informants respondents (KIRs) were purposively selected for this research. The choice of these respondents was based primarily on their specialization,

expertise, experience and participation in peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.

Tabel 3: Tabular presentation of the sample size.

Numbers of Respondents	Positions/Expertise	Institutions/Affiliations
8	These are senior lecturers and their areas of specialization is in the areas of political science and international relations with specialiaization in African conflict and peace and security in Africa.	They are from African institutions of learning which are the university of Zulu-land, Johannesburg, Witswatersrand, Jos and Addis-Ababa university.
10	These are experts on the crisis in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.	The African Union specialised agencies which are the department of political affairs and peace and security.
6	These are field and desk officers of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. They are members of the peacekeeping troops from Nigeria and South Africa and are involved in the actual operations of these peacekeeping operations.	Peacekeeping operations which are UNAMID (Darfur), AMISOM (Somalia) and minusca (CAR).
6	These are researchers with expertise in the field of peacekeeping operations in Africa with publications in the field of peacekeeping and peace and security in Africa.	Research institutions in South Africa which are ACCORD in Durban and the Institute of peace and security in Pretoria.

Total Number of Respondents (30).

6.4. Sources of Data.

The primary and secondary sources of data are the two types of data. The secondary data were gathered through the existing information from national and international sources like the

University of Kwazulu-Natal (UKZN) database, journal and conference papers, articles, books, reports and thesis. Primary data sources used are interviews and official documents of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations.

6.5. Interviews

The use of interviews was one of the primary source of collecting data. The importance of the interview is that accurate and reliable information can be obtained, and on time too. Instead of writing the reponse, the subject or interviewee gave the needed information orally and face-to-face. It also presented the opportunity to evaluate the sincerity and insight of the interviewee. The semi-structured interview was used in this research work.

According to (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989:83) interviews that are semi-structured make it possible for comprehensiveness to be achieved by presenting the chance on the interviewer's part to investigate and enlarge the responses of the interviewee's. This also can result to development of some sort of balance between the interviewer and the interviewee, leading to space for negotiating, discussing and expanding of the responses of the interviewee's. (Bernard, 1988) argued that the benefit of the semi-structure interview is allowing the interviewer to be in control of the procedures of getting information from the interviewee, while equally following new leads as they emerge.

This was the most challenging starting with drafting of interview questions according to the focus of this research. The second major challenge was getting the right respondents with specialiazation in the field of this research work. Most letters that I sent to prospective interviewees were not replied, the few that responded declined. However, when my first respondent agreed to participate, he linked me with other experts in my area of research. The third challenge was funding because majority of respondents were based outside South Africa and I wanted a face to face interview methods.

I had to make use of social media platforms such as skype in interviewing respondents from the African Union and members of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. Interviews with respondents within South Africa were done face to face but most were busy and some appointments were fixed very early in the mornings or late at night.

The interviews were explosive and some of the information/data gathered were first hand experiences of respondents in the specialiasation of peacekeeping missions in Africa. As the

interview process progressed, I learnt several lessons about interviews. I learnt the importance of allowing the respondents the freedom to speak. I also learnt the importance of asking short and precise questions. It is also important to reassure the participants about the confidentiality of the interviews.

The interview guide were questions directed at several classifications of respondents with regards to their experience in the field of peacekeeping operations and arranged correspondently across respondents to enhance uniformity in the gathering of data and allowing researcher to compare the data collected from the different respondents. As shown in Table 6.1, interviews were conducted with lecturers from the following African institutions; University of Zulu-Land, University of Witswaterands, University of Jos, Addis Ababa University and the University of Johannesburg. A letter of introduction and a copy of the interview questions where sent to the respondants. The average interview lasted for one hour. Sixteen interviews were conducted through Skype and IMO and fourteen were conducted face to face. The researcher used the interview guide to focus the interview and to ensure some degree of compatibility, while allowing for flexibility in pursuing greater insight into unique practices and programmes. The interview questions comprised 30 questions which were divided into 2 sections which are: Demographic data and questions bordering on the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.

6.6. Validation of the instrument.

According to (Bamisaye, 2001:74-76) validity is “the process by which a researcher actually measures what he claims to measure, it is the extent to which differences among individuals, in scores reflect true differences among individuals and the characteristics being measured”. To ensure validity and reliability in this research work, the results were based on qualitative data. The instruments used such as the semi-structured interview under went scrutiny so that any form of bias or prejudice will be removed . Data collected were cross checked with self – reliant sources for the purpose of fair assessment and authenticity, attempts were made to separate facts from personal views using comprehensive analysis with regards to oral interviews.

6.7. Methods of Data Analysis.

The research work adopted in-depth content analysis and descriptive analysis method. According to (Prabad, 2008:173) “content analysis is the scientific study of the content with

reference to the meanings, contents and intentions contained in messages”. (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976) argued that content analysis may be seen as a procedure where message contents forms the premises for illustration of reasoning and concluding about the contents.

According to (Krippendorff 1980; Sandelowski 1995), content analysis is a means of research making use of systematic and fair ways of describing and quantifying phenomena and it allows researchers to examine issues relating to theories to improve an understanding of the data. Scholars such as (Morgan, 1993) have criticised content analysis as a method of research analysis due to it being too simplistic as a technique and argued that content analysis does not lend itself to detailed statistical analysis and its a method of analysis is not sufficiently qualitative in nature. However the advantage of content analysis are: The method is content sensitive, the research design is flexible which can be used to enhance a grasp of communication meaning and finally, it is concerned with meanings, intentions, consequences and context.

Therefore the indepth content analysis procedure was adopted due to its structured, objective and quantitative way of calculating communication variables in the study. This method involved extensive reading, prognosis, review and representation of conclusions from the review of every important data collected from the two sources of data, the primary and secondary sources. To deal with the danger of bias of sources of data, critical analysis of data from both primary and secondary source was carried out and the expertise of this research supervisor also helped to resolve this.

This research looked at case studies and therefore made a comparative analysis using descriptive method of analysis. This involved a descriptive analytical narrative method involving inquiry, analysis descriptive interpretation of data collected from interviews and discussions with resource persons and groups. This method helped to describe, analyze and examine the role of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic.

6.8. Research Reflexivity.

According to (Shacklock and Smyth, 1998) reflexivity refers to the responsive disclosure of the part of beliefs and values which researcher hold in the choice of research methodology, for generating knowledge and its making as a research account. (Patnaik, 2013:100) argued that reflexivity is the awareness, assessment and reassessment by the researcher of the researchers own contributions and the consequent research findings. According to (Gouldner,

1971) it is frequently barely considered as logical attention to the place of the researcher in qualitative research. According to (Koch and Harrington, 1998) using the term in wide spread research deliberations is of the believe that the researcher should be involved in critique and appraisal of self and explaining the impact of the experience of the researcher on the research process stages. Reflexivity has a significant role in qualitative methodologies and of great importance in this research work. With regards to this research, the interviews i conducted led to a process of reflection about my initial assumptions and preconceptions about this research topic. I also becaome more objective unlike in previous research where i controlled by emotions and background and as a result all the analysis done in the course of this research are done impatially and effectively.

To deal with the issue of reflexivity in this research, the bracketing tool was used. Before the commencement of this research my past knowledge with my personal experiences, previous findings of the research topic was set aside and written down. This was followed by taking notes/memos during the interviews while alighting my biases and preconceived notions in my mind, taking notes of them while also keeping them in check. Finally during the analysis of the data collected my biases and preconceived notions about the research topic were made known in the interpretation of the data. According to (Koch and Harrington, 1998) bracketing is the deferment of all biases and beliefs with regards to the circumstances being researched before the commencement of the collection of data. The three phases of bracketing defined by (Wall, 2004) which are bracketing pre action, bracketing in action and bracketing on action were applied. The researcher engaged in self-critique with self-appraisal periodically in the process of this research to ensure that a distance is maintained between preconceived ideals, biases, beliefs, feelings and intentions about the subject matter and study area. The research findings according to (Van Manen, 1984) help rid the research of value judgments and to achieve this indifference, the researcher undertook a pre-field record of all personal beliefs, ideas and biases as regards the subject matter with the study area. Reflexivity was also considered at every stage of this research work through the examination and making clear the decisions made and making a review of the political and context conditions surrounding the research.

6.9. Ethical Principles.

Respondents in social science research do not owe researchers any information and their participation in any research is based solely on their own volition. According to (Asante-

Kissi, 2012) the only way participants protection can be guaranteed is if nothing in the research is traced to specific individuals or groups. Respondents were given a consent form indicating voluntary participation, guaranteeing their autonomy while protecting their confidentiality. In the analysis of data collected, statements or quotations made were not associated with the respondents name. To ensure that ethical principles were upheld in this research, the researcher made adequate efforts to present the research in such a way that it did not suppress, falsify or invent evidence.

6.10. Summary

Data collection is very crucial in research, as it determines the overall objectives of the research study. This chapter provided an in-depth information on the study and it established the facts, views and opinions, thereby ensuring the validity of the objectives.

The response from lecturers, researchers in the field of peacekeeping, staffs of the African Union and members of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA through the interview provided their general opinions and views on the research objectives. Their responses provided an overview of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic.

The data collected provided detailed information on all the objectives, showing the challenges confronting AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA. Several factors were examined such as the role of consent and legitimacy of peacekeeping operations, the role of African Economic communities and the impact of non armed state actors, the role of external actors, funding of the African Union peacekeeping operations, local owners and the complex nature of African environment. These gave the researcher an indepth analysis of the situations on ground a major advantage of the qualitative method of approach. The data collected from the interview are analysed and discussed in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

DATA PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS

7.0 The African Union and the United Nations Cooperation on Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

The Organisation of African Union (OAU) established in 1963 was transformed in July 2002, to the African Union (AU). This was done with the ideal that one of the major obstacle to the socio-economic development of Africa is the raising conflicts on the continent. Therefore there is the need to encourage peace, security and stability as a precondition for the application of developmental and integration agenda, with the following principles, the settlement of conflicts in a peaceful manner and the right to live in peace and security (AU, 2012).

In December 2003, the agreement forming the African Union Peace and Security Council was approved and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was formed as the African Union's highest ranking arm for conflict prevention and settlement of conflicts (AU, 2012). The agreement confirms the position of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC) against the backdrop of the United Nations as the maintenance of international peace and security and the United Nations own recognition of regional arrangements as recommended by chapter viii of the charter of the United Nations (AU, 2010).

Also, the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, an initiative of the African Union in its resolve to find African solutions to African problems through the following components, Peace and Security Council (PSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWs), African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise (POW) and the African Union Peace Fund and several norms such as, Supreme fairness of member states, denounce unconstitutional changes in government and the African Union just responses in member states in issues relating to mass atrocities and unconstitutional changes of government, that prevent and enhance a culture of peace and security and promote coordination with the United Nations on peace and security in Africa (Alfredo, 2013).

Also, the African Union and the United Nations acknowledges that the United Nations Security Council has the prime but not exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace and security including the African continent and also, both institutions also acknowledge that no single organisation alone can cope with the multitude of peace and

security challenges in Africa and that while the African Union is an important source of political authority for addressing threats to peace and security in Africa, it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities to take decisive action alone to resolve these threats (Boutellis and Williams 2013; UN 2012).

Therefore in order for the African Union to be able to meet its mandate of undertaking peacekeeping operations in Africa, it did not only established its peace and security architecture but also forged close working relationships with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa and as a result, there is a deepening relationship between the African Union and the United Nations in their efforts to respond collectively to Africa's security challenges through collaborative multidimensional peacekeeping operations in particular. The African Union and the United Nations collaboration in peacekeeping operations has greatly intensified in recent years through the following collaborative endeavours in preventing conflict, mediating and peacekeeping: Annual joint consultative United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUSPC) meetings since 2006, AU-UN Joint Task Force and desk-to-desk exchanges, where political regional developments and responses on the elimination and administration of conflicts are assessed and discussed since 2008, capacity building for mediation and the United Nations assisting the African Union in developing mediation plan of action and making operational the African Union panel of the wise and the establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), to enhance the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in the area of peace and security (Aning 2010; Okumu and Jaye 2010; UN 2014).

On peacekeeping operations in Africa, the African Union since 2006 has been partnering with the United Nations based on chapter viii of the United Nations charter which gives subsidiarity to regional arrangements and this is the basis for the African Union and the United Nations collaborating on peacekeeping operations in Africa Frameworks for cooperation were developed and some of these vision frameworks are: Collaborative efforts in conflicts and crisis situations with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and Counter-Terrorism (AU, 2012).

In 2006, the document declaring the enhancement of the the African Union collaborating in peacekeeping operation was signed by the Secretary General of the United Nations which

resulted to the advancement of the establishment of the African Union Peacekeeping Support team in 2007 under the auspices of the United Nations department of peacekeeping operations which led to proficiency in the provision of much needed skills, logistical assistance and transferring of technical knowledge to the division of peace support operations of the African Union. Some of the main contexts of this document are: Organisational development, development of human resources, financial administration, human rights, political, legal and electoral matters, social, economic, cultural and human development and food security and environmental protection (Clement and Smith, 2009:9).

The African Union and the United Nations have cooperated in peacekeeping operations in, for example, Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been engaged in peacekeeping operations in Somalia since March 2007 with the United Nations providing logistical support and funding (UN, 2012). The African Union and the United Nations established a hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (Sudan), the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in July 2007, with the United Nations providing funding, command and control structures (UN, 2007). A United Nations Security Council Resolution 2127 also established an African Union support mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) on 5th December 2013, to stabilize the country and was re-hatted into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in September 2014 (UN, 2014).

Therefore in the last few years, cooperation in peacekeeping operations amongst the African Union and the United Nations has developed into a meaningful, practical and pragmatic partnership and the African Union has proven overtime that it has the capacity to undertake high-risk stabilization type peacekeeping operations geared towards an humanitarian intervention as evident in Burundi with the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 and in Sudan with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 (UN, 2009). These according to the Brahimi Report (2000) are the no-peace-to-keep type of peacekeeping operations at which the United Nations are particularly bad and has been advised by the Brahimi report (2000) not to undertake (Deconing, 2010).

However with regards to the peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations, several challenges is limiting the effectiveness of this cooperation in peacekeeping operations as a result of the political and strategic calculations of both institutions and the

African Union lack the funding mechanisms, support capacity, logistics and personnel to sustain these peacekeeping operations. One of these challenges is structural imbalances which constitute an impediment to peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations and the two organizations are unequal entities in the sense that the United Nations has more knowledge of peacekeeping and more advanced structures for coordination of peacekeeping operations while the African Union's lack of expertise and resources in peacekeeping operations is a major motive for its collaboration with the United Nations on Peacekeeping operations in Africa but also raising various technical, budgeting and administrative challenges especially on the part of the African Union (Aoi, Deconing and Thakur 2007; Deconing 2010).

The African Union and the United Nations collaboration on peacekeeping operations is asymmetrical given that advice and resources are flowing from the United Nations to the African Union and not the other way round and there is a larger gap between the demand for peacekeepers and the available supply of resources required to meet peacekeeping targets and therefore the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations funded and supported by the international community undermine the ability of the African Union to take independent decisions on the mandate, size and durations of these peacekeeping operations in Africa (Murithi 2008; O'Hanlan and Singer 2004).

African Union's reliance on external resources rebuff it the independent privilege to make decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peacekeeping operations, the numbers of peacekeepers, the nature of their equipment and support, the duration of the mission and the level and intensity of their operations and whenever a mission of the African Union is deployed, external sources of funding must be sought undermining its credibility on the continent and the primary maintenance of peace and security and limits its ability to exercise local ownership of certain initiatives (Benwick, 2015).

In Somalia, AMISOM member states provided troops while the United Nations provided funding, training, logistics and planning support, resulting in a think tank led by Former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo has proposed various ways in which the African Union can raise its own funding through a levy of USD 10 on plane tickets to Africa and USD 20 on hotel accommodation could raise more than USD 700 million annually (AU 2014; UN 2012).

The creation of an African Standby Force one of the units of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture will give more credence to the partnership with the United Nations on peacekeeping in Africa but such plans remains crippled by lack of funding and equipment and by continental rivalries between African powers and political differences between African Union member states and non-African members especially at the United Nations Security Council pose a major challenge to the partnership of the African Union and the United Nations on peacekeeping in Africa. At the January 2012 United Nations Security Council debate on collaboration between the United Nations and regional institutions in the maintenance of international peace and security (Fletcher 2015; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). Moses Wetangula the then Kenya's foreign minister argued that;

The practice in the past two years seems to indicate an undesirable trend that appears to be selective on the part of the United Nations Security Council and that seems to disregard full consideration of the position and/or recommendations of the African Union or its organs. (UN, 2012)

In 2011, members of the Security Council of the United Nations and those of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union totally disagreed with regards to their various responses to the crisis in Libya (2011, Cote d' Ivoire (2010-11) and Mali (2012) with regards to the funding of the African Union Mission in Somalia and with the passing of the United Nations Security Council resolution 2100 (2012) allowing a United Nations force for Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union considered this resolution "not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the African Union and the United Nations have been striving to promote for many years on the basis of the provisions of chapter viii of the United Nations charter" (AU, 2013).

Therefore the lack of a strong unified African Union voice in the United Nations due to limited African Union representation, lack of a strong mandate, human and financial capacities is a major challenge to peacekeeping collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations and as a result there is a lack of an effective bridging role between the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union member states at the United Nations. That when a clear African Union position is presented , African members of the United Nations Security Council do not automatically represent the Africa Union's official position at the United

Nations and vote in accordance with it as evident with the vote over the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) ordering a no-fly zone over Libya, when all three elected African members of the United Nations Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) voted in favor despite an earlier African Union statement saying no to any military responses in Libya (AU 2011; Williams and Boutellis, 2014).

There is also the challenge caused by doctrinal gap between the United Nations and the African Union regarding peacekeeping deployments. While the United Nations aims at deploying in situations in which there is peace to keep, the African Union endorses a different approach arguing that “in certain situations, peace has to be created before it can be kept” (AU, 2007) creating tensions, fueling rather than solving some of the conflicts as seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998-date), Somalia (2007) and the Central African Republic (2012).

(Bar 2009, 2), identified the following six challenges confronting the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa: Allowing coordination and unity and the several actors, lack of the United Nations, the African Union and its partners to rebuild the post-conflict countries economies, the development of new challenges to security such as trafficking of drugs and activities of transnational criminals, coming to terms with transnational justice especially with the emergence of the International Court of Justice (ICC), governance matters on a larger scale such as security sector reform, public administration, public finance management and bolstering commitment to the international community despite the recent global financial and economic crisis. Institutionalization of peacekeeping is also occurring within an international climate that is complex and there are several actors with agendas that varies which restrict concentration on root causes and important issues and the United Nations together with the African Union are yet to build ordinary benchmarks. That collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations should be designed from the beginning to enhance and appreciate national efforts while being sensitive and adjustable to the happenings on ground and there presently a lack of guidelines for the partnership in peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations, while the application of chapter 8 of the United Nations charter is vague and that the doctrines and points of view of both organisations often diverge (Avezov 2013; Motjope 2011).

Intra-African Union rivalry and the controversies of the United Nations Security Council's relationship with Africa's Regional Economic Communities represent another challenge to collaboration on peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations, chapter viii of the United Nations laid emphasis on regional arrangements while not differentiating what is regional and sub-regional arrangements and this has led to several potential challenges as evident in Madagascar in 2009, between the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Ellis (2009), the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Cote d' Ivoire (2010-11), Mali (2012) and this intra-African Union rivalry especially in cases mentioned above where Africa's Regional Economic Communities and the African Union adopted different policies complicates the partnership on peacekeeping operations in Africa between the African Union and the United Nations (Nossiter 2011; Williams and Boutellis 2014).

Peacekeeping partnership of the African Union and the United Nations were motivated by certain political and security situations that inspired the institutions to build practical solutions and did not arise from combined evaluation of the circumstances or a joint perception of addressing them and where the governmental agenda of both the African Union and the United Nations co-exist, practical division of labour evolved in a situation where African states contributed troops and the United Nations support with an extensive logistical and funding in an adhoc method and approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on separate cases (De coning and Gelot 2012; Williams 2011).

Examples are the re-hatting of the African Union Mission in Darfur to the AU-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with access to the United Nations assessed peacekeeping budget and other forms of assistance, the counter Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Regional Cooperation Initiative authorized by the African Union in November 2011 and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in June 2012 is benefitting from support from the United Nations peacekeeping operations present in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (AU, 2012).

On the African Union's institutional capabilities with regards to its collaboration on peacekeeping operations with the United Nations, the African Union needs international support to organize, manage and lead its peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is not well designed for working with outside partners and this complicates the African Union's ability to effectively accept needed offers of support from other entities and that gaps in the African

Union institutional capacity present the organisation with significant challenges in recruiting and deploying personnel, meeting logistical requirements, managing peacekeeping operations and sustaining forces on ground (Andrew and Holt, 2007:3).

The Prodi report (2008) a joint African Union and United Nations report on peacekeeping operations in Africa stated that;

Much of the African Union's institutional weakness stems from the fact that it is an organisation in transition, structures and procedures that were conceived in the days of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are at odds with, and inadequate to support, the African Union's increasingly proactive approach. Even the structures agreed upon at the African Union summit held in Maputo in 2003, suffered from the lack of clear expectation of what the commission's programmes should be or what they should deliver and from the failure to meet the approved staff complement was due to an inefficient recruitment process, encumbered by the application of the quota system. Lack of flexibility in human resources management and African Union conditions of service have often resulted in the failure to attract and retain appropriately qualified personnel, thereby creating difficulties in developing capacity and an ongoing need for external assistance. Developing the institutional capacity to rectify this human resources problem is a major challenge and need to be accorded the appropriate priority. (UN, 2008)

The Prodi report (2008) concluded by stating that "if the African Union commission aims to properly embrace wider peacekeeping and an integrated approach to tackling conflict, a step change is required in terms of doctrinal understanding and approach which entail working cross-department and cross-discipline and building the necessary expertise required to mount and manage peacekeeping operations" (UN, 2008).

The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) at its 502nd meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 29 April 2015 arrived at the following positions on the United Nations review of the United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa: The

application of the spirit of chapter viii of the United Nations charter without prejudice to the role of the United Nations Security Council, on one hand, and without undermining or otherwise curtailing the efforts of the African Union to develop its own capacity to provide adequate responses to the peace and security challenges in Africa, on the other, the African Union collaboration with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa should be viewed as a strategic partnership based on consultative decision making, division of labor and burden sharing, the African Union has identified the following principles which should underpin its relations with the United Nations, not on the basis of adhoc but in a systematic, principled and predictable manner, collective security in the context of chapter vii of the United Nations charter, support for African ownership and priority setting and partnership on the basis of consultative decision making, division of labour and burden sharing.

Mutual respect and keeping to the principle of comparative advantage with the following elements: Political legitimacy: That the political authority of external actors is proving increasingly debatable as conflict transform from inter-state to intra-state. Responses from outside are increasingly being seen unwillingly by national actors for several reasons such as sovereignty, historical reasons and perceptions linked to impartiality. Flexibility: That regional organization has proven to be more adaptable in dealing with security challenges in their regions than other international organizations and these tools gives the African Union the authority to intervene in all types of conflict in Africa.

Division of labor underpinned by complementarity, the African Union and the United Nations need to create a division of labour based on consensus to enhance unity and reduce competition, provide for African ownership setting of priorities, workable and fresh application of the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage and the Security Council of the United Nations should be forthcoming to demands made by the African Union relating to particular conflict and crisis situations in Africa and called on the United Nations to mark in a systematic way the issues relating to the financing of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union carried out with the authority of the United Nations through the use of the United Nations assessed contribution. (AU, 2015)

Lopsided and hybrid security challenges, religious extremism and transnational criminal networks traverse in several countries is leading to new challenges to peacekeeping and that connections between extremism, trafficking, smuggling and elite networks raise high demands to African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Example is piracy of the Horn of Africa especially in Somalia where the African Union mission (AMISOM) is presently collaborating with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations and the remaining challenging areas to the African Union and the United Nations collaboration on peacekeeping in Africa are: Converging ideas on the preconditions for deployment and transitions as the African Union is often called upon to deploy to active conflicts where there is no viable ceasefire and/or peace agreement, differing interpretations of norms such as protection of civilians or unconstitutional changes of government, differing conceptualization and approaches to the use of force and combat roles in peace operations and challenges and conflicts surrounding the principle of subsidiarity and proposals and expectations for financing African Union peace operations and shared purposes help actors stay committed, which is the aim of having a strategic partnership and for the African Union to be an effective partner, what is needed is a forward looking perspective, not continuing turf battles and competitions (Deconing, Gelot and Karlsrud, 2015).

Also peacekeeping is more difficult as a result of the following factors: A significant number of conflicting groups, lack of a peace accord signed by majority of the conflicting groups before deployment, uncontrolled access to natural resources, hostility from neighbouring states or networks, large numbers of combatants. Cases with more than 50,000 soldiers are considered difficult, a high likelihood of 'spoilers', the unwillingness of major or regional powers to engage in conflict management/peacekeeping, wars of secession and collapsed functioning state institutions and peacekeeping operations such as those deployed in Africa's strategic environment such as remote areas with harsh physical terrain and a lack of access to infrastructure face huge logistical problems and peacekeeping operations deployed in warring African states had to contend with most of the aforementioned factors (Downs and Stedman, 2002).

Therefore there is a need for addressing the changing nature of conflicts in which international organizations such as the United Nations have structured their support and that peacekeeping in the last 20 years, when led by regional organizations like the African Union, has often engaged in contexts where there is no peace to keep and a particular challenge with the African Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa has been dealing with the key pillars of peacekeeping which are consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self defence or defence of the mandate (Havard, Lisa and Havard, 2010).

The dimension of conflict in the period after the cold war create the most absorbing argument for the involvement of members of the civil society in negotiations of peace, individual citizens, the family together with the community are breached, forced and destabilised as part of the political, economic and socio-cultural blue-print of the armed actors and that this is the forefront of modern warfare. As people become directly impacted by armed conflict, they establish a major interest in being part of its resolution. Staying in the same environment with the armed actors, the civil societies have a larger need and more potentials to participate in peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts. And surely, the strength taken by an acceptable government or representatives of the United Nations can have a major effect on the chances for agreement. However, in conditions of protracted internal conflict, violence pierce through the social structure, dealing with a large number of armed actors, often with contradicting levels of autonomy and accountability, as well as a complex tapestry of related and independent conflict dynamics at the level of the community. This was evident in Mozambique in 1992 when after almost three decades of civil war, collaborative effort by Mozambique protestant and Catholic leaders helped bring about direct negotiations between the Frelimo government and the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) (Mckeen 2005; Sengulane and Goncalves 1998).

Therefore the increasing complexity of environments in which peacekeeping operations are deployed has created the need for constant connection between peacekeeping and the local communities and that strengthening engagement with the various actors that operate within a particular sub-national level allows peacekeeping operations to understand better and react to conflict trends that might be occurring in a particular locality and that this was a major factor in the success of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in 2009, where the civil society interacted with the local communities and created strategies that supported the conflict management initiatives and enhanced local governance on a daily basis and the Civil Affairs division of the United Nations Mission in Sudan since 2011 has been invited in facilitating reconciliation process at the local level, directly supporting and advising local and traditional authorities in governance (De Carvalho, 2012:29).

Another challenge to the partnership in peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa is culture clash and different bureaucratic cultures have further impeded collaboration between the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with other key issues such as:

The absence of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils and the agenda for their annual meetings and that while the United Nations Security Council has a formal public agenda, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union does not, separate working models, and the manner the councils adopt reports/decisions and the lack of consistent communication between the respective Presidents of the two council (Williams and Boutellis, 2013:24).

Despite the formation of several coordination tools since 2007 between the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, a joint ideal on how to resolve crisis in Africa has not been achieved, and combine assessments and planning between the United Nations and the African Union have been taking place regularly with a combined Sahel mission, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and also in Mali and these analysis remain conditions specific rather than on the basis of mutual relevant ideal and the aforementioned while not being a problem demonstrate that while improved partnership may be available between the two organisations technically, this does not guarantee effective cooperation at the governmental level between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations. And that in each case, the United Nations has provided capacity substitution rather than genuine collaboration and capacity building and the African Union's limited human and financial resources and its limited ability to maintain institutional knowledge and information management tools also make it difficult to consistently replicate successful processes when they do occur (Williams and Boutellis, 2013).

Finally while collaboration in peacekeeping operations are acceptable, they should not create a "license for any state or organisation with the capacity to intervene to do so" and as a result, there is the urgent need to create the framework of real continental and international cooperation in peacekeeping operations such as classification of duties between sub-regional bodies, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations (Aning 2007; Gowan and Johnstone 2007).

7.1. Introduction

Chapter seven examines the African Union and the United Nations collaboration in peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. The objective of this chapter is to present the data collected from 30 respondents made up of 14 of

the face-to-face interviews and 16 interviews through skype and IMO. This chapter will also analyse and discuss the finding.

In presenting the findings, this chapter is divided into two (2) parts. Part A entails a tabular description of the respondents profiles. Using AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic as a case study, Part B discusses the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

7.2. Profile of respondents

Table 4: Profile of Respondents

OCCUPATION	AREA OF SPECIALIAZATION	SUB-TOTAL
Senior Lecturers/Professors	Political Science/International Relations with specialiazation in Peace and Security.	7
Researchers	African Security/Peacekeeping	6
Staffs of the African Union	Peace and Security/Peacekeeping	10
Members of the African Union and United Nations PeaceKeeping operations in Africa	Peacekeeping	7
Total		30

The research was carried out in South Africa with 30 respondents were interviewed. The respondents include senior lecturers from the following African institutions: University of Zulu-land, University of Johannesburg, Addis Ababa University and University of Jos. The researcher also interviewed researchers working on peace and security at the Institute of Peace and Security in Pretoria, ACCORD in Durban, staffs of the African Union, members of the United Nations and the African Union Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, namely, AMISOM (Somalia), UNAMID (Darfur) and MINUSCA (CAR). 7 academics with specialization in peace and security from the above named institutions provided insight on collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. They also

had reasearch works on peacekeeping operations in Africa which provided this research work useful secondary sources of data.

Ten staff members of the African Union and seven members of Peacekeeping troops of UNAMID, MINUSCA and AMISOM were also interviewed, they provided useful information on the African Union and peacekeeping operations in Africa. Although they were skeptical of giving out information on the workings of the peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic, the information gathered from this cluster of respondents proved useful for understanding several activities and the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations challenges in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.

From the profile of the respondents, it can be revealed that they are the pertinent informants that the study sought for, hence the results presented are regarded to be of high validity. The respondents profiles were illustrated in Table 7.2.

7.3. Data Process And Analysis

The data collected from the semi-structured interviews were transcribed and categorised. Themes emerged during the course of the interviews which were analysed with regards to the research questions and as a result the following themes emerged.

1. Funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.
2. Clear and achievable mandates and the impact of the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine on the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa.
3. The Influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict on Peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic.
4. The impact of the consent of the conflicting parties/armed groups and peace accord on the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa.
5. The issue of legitimacy, acceptance and local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa.

6. Roles of Africa Regional Economic Communities and coordination with the African Union.
7. The activities and impact of Armed Non State actors on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.

Table 5 : Emerging Themes

Themes	No of Respondents	Brief
The funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.	30	How the AU/UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic are funded and how inadequate funding and financial constraints of the African Union affect the effectiveness of these Peacekeeping Operations.
Clear and achievable mandates	30	Arguments are presented on the mandates of AU/UN Peacekeeping operations. Also the the impact of the United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrines which are, unbiased, impartial, non-partisan and the non use of force except in self defence on these peacekeeping operations.
The Influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict	22	Several countries are involved in the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and CAR when the AU/UN are presently involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations, giving the conflicts a regional dimension and impacting on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations.
The impact of the Consent of the host government/warring parties/armed groups and peace accord	28	Here the importance of a peace accord in the effectiveness of the AU/UN peacekeeping operations is discussed and also the consent of

		the warring parties.
The issue of Legitimacy, Acceptance and local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa.	30	Respondents gave their views on acceptance and legitimacy of the AU/UN Peacekeeping Operations and the role of local ownership in the effectiveness of these peacekeeping operations.
Roles of Africa Regional Economic Communities	25	The conflicting roles of the RECs in the cooperative peacekeeping operations and lack of coordination between the the RECs and the African Union.
The activities and impact of Armed Non State actors. in Africa.	30	According to Pearlman and Cunningham (2012), Non state actors are organised political actors not directly connected to the state, but pursuing aims that affect vital state interests. They operate beyond the borders of the state and are a major challenge of the AU/UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.

The results relating to the arguments presented in Table 7.2 are presented and discussed in the following sections.

7.4 Discussion Of Emerging Themes 7.4.1. Funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Although, the African Union since its transformation from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa, has gained enough experience in peacekeeping operations across the continent. It still lack adequate financial capabilities to fund its peacekeeping operations or to make financial contributions to cooperative peacekeeping operations with the United Nations (Pharatihtlhe and Vanheukelom 2019; Williams 2014) For 99% of its peacekeeping fundings, the African Union relies on its partners. This results in dependency of its peacekeeping operations on external partners. Thus, the AU is involved

only in peacekeeping operations where its partners have a convergence of interest (Deconing, 2018).

The AU relies on the yearly contributions from 55 member countries and support from bilateral and multilateral donors to finance its operational costs, programmes and peace support operations. Each source of funding is problematic in different ways. (Pharatlhatlhe and Vanheukelom, 2019,p.3)

Based on this argument, this research wanted to know the effect of funding on the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, how funding impact on the African Union's collective security arrangements and its partnership with the United Nations on peacekeeping operations in Africa. In their response to the question, 100 percent of the respondents interviewed , are of the view that the Peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa are under-funded and that inadequate funding is a significant impediment to the effectiveness effectiveness of these peacekeeping operations. Respondents 1,5,9 and 13, traced the history of peacekeeping operations in Africa to the conflict in the Congo from 1960-1966 and argued that 75 percent of the United Nations funds are spent on its African peacekeeping missions, because Africa constitute the United Nations peacekeeping threatre in the world with over 35 peacekeeping operations on the continent. This argument is supported by (Deconing 2019; Blanchfied, Arieff and Blanchfied 2019) who argued that as of september 2019, out of thirteen (13) United Nations peacekeeping operations led by the department of peace operations, seven (7) are in Africa while four (4) are the largest United Nations peacekeeping operations. Therefore Africa 75% of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations are stationed in Africa with 75% of United Nations peacekeeping budget spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Building on the various argument with regards to funding, 85 percent of the respondents argued that AMISOM in Somalia is on a shoe-string limited budget and although UNAMID in Darfur, is a good case study of cooperative peacekeeping operations, its effectiveness is limited by a lack of adequate funding. Similarly, the humanitarian directive of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic is being hindered by limited funding. From January 2016, personnels of AMISOM in Somalia have not received their full allowances (Williams, 2019).

This group of respondents argued that the African Union do not have the capability to fully fund its peacekeeping operations. Hence, it relies on its partners like the European Union and the United Nations to finance peacekeeping operations in Africa. The respondents argued that

this created an unequal alliance between the African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the African Union lacks control over the peacekeeping operations.

The respondents' views collaborate (Bamidele, 2013:118) who argued that in the 21st century, over 70 percent of the United Nations peacekeeping operations were attributed to Africa with the cost of over 300 million dollars, and according to (Deconing, 2018), over 75% of the United Nations peacekeepers are situated in Africa with approximately 75% of the United Nations Peacekeeping budget also spent on peacekeeping operations in Africa. (Ajayi, 2008) argued that although the African Union has a comprehensive instrument and strategies on peace and security, inadequate resources impact on its ability for effective utilisation. Also, while the African Union is doing its best to intervene in peace and security in Africa, it cannot sustain its peacekeeping operations because of inadequate funding, logistical and administrative systems to back up peacekeeping operations across Africa operating on a long-term basis (ICG 2020; Stephen and Kristen 2018).

Several reports on the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic further confirms the respondents argument that inadequate funding especially on the part of the African Union limit the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. According to (Williams, 2013), the agreement associated with the formation of African Union Peace and Security Council (2002), stipulated a method of funding, with members sending troops bearing the participation cost for the first three months, and then go ahead to fund the operation. This system has never been effective in practice as each peacekeeping operations of the African Union had to develop its own adhoc financial mechanism which create unpredictable sources of funding which invalidate planning assumptions (Williams, 2013).

(Agada 2008; Deconing 2019; Gerlot, Gerlot and Deconing 2012; Pharatihah and Vanheukelom 2019; Williams 2018; Williams and Schulman 2012), argued that despite the financial contributions of the United Nations towards the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia, resources constraints continue to limit the achievements of AMISOM due to evolving requirements, increasing size of the force and the increasing security threats of Al Shabaab.

Respondents 1, 6,7,8,10,13,14,23 and 26 pointed out that the European Union's decision in 2016 to reduced its funding of AMISOM in Somalia is undermining the peacekeeping

operations. This point view is shared by (Williams, 2017) who argued that the decision by the European to cut its funding of AMISOM is causing political conflicts and disagreements between the African Union and AMISOM Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs), such as Burundi, Uganda and Kenya. The unpaid permitted amount to Burundian troops in AMISOM led to Burundi in December 2016 threatening to withdraw its more than 5000 troops and to sue the African Union. President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya in February 2016 threatened to withdraw Kenya's contingent from AMISOM over the European Union's decision on payments of troops permitted amount, leading to the morales of AMISOM'S 22,000 troops are being affected by the European pay cuts (Mastro 2016).

A further confirmation of the impact of funding with regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations in Africa of the African Union and the United Nations come from respondents views on funding of UNAMID in Darfur. All respondents interviewed argued that UNAMID in Darfur, the largest peacekeeping operation in the world is an appropriate case study of cooperative peacekeeping operations, but its effectiveness is limited by funding.

UNAMID, according to (Williams and Boutellis, 2014), is an unequal partnership because the African Union lack the necessary budget to make significant financial contributions to UNAMID leading to the reliance of the African Union on the United Nations budget and resources and lack of influence over the peacekeeping operations. With regards to its peace and security architecture, the African Union launched a peace/special fund with contributions from its external partners to support the 7% contributions from its member states which is very low and inadequate to support its peacekeeping operations and all operations involving peace and security in (AU, 2019).

Therefore, 93% of funds for making the collective security arrangements of the African Union operational is sourced from the European Union African Peace Facility (APF), voluntary bilateral support and the United Nations assessed contributions (Apiko and Aggad, 2018). Although collective security has provided the the peace and security undertakings of the African Union with the much needed finances, it has resulted in dependency and restricted possession of its peace and security instruments.

This research share the views of the respondents on funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The lack of adequate resources on the part of the African Union despite funding from its partners undermine the peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia and impact on its effectiveness.

On the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), all the respondents interviewed, are of the view that limited resources constituted a significant challenge of MINUSCA, which has a direct impact on its ability to fulfill its humanitarian mandate. The Stimson report on MINUSCA in August 2017, collaborated the views of the respondents on funding of MINUSCA by stating that the reduction of MINUSCA funding has reduced its efforts at extending state authority in the Central African Republic.

According to the United Nations 2016 report on the Central African Republic, “*MINUSCA lack sufficient funding for its humanitarian operations and this serve as one of its main challenges in pulling the country out of its current crisis*” (UN, 2016). (Cockburn, 2016) in support of this argued that MINUSCA soldiers have not received their salaries for months, resulting in ineffectiveness and indiscipline of a number of its forces.

MINUSCA has fewer resources compared to other UN missions given the immense size of the country, the scale of threats, and the number of tasks its been assigned. The mission is trying to do more with less, but it is struggling.(Cinq-Mars, 2017).

Drawing from the views of the respondents and literature reviews, it can be argued that the African Union lacks the capacity to adequately fund its peacekeeping operations which has limited the African Union ownership and command of its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations.

7.4.2. Clear and Achievable mandate

Studies have shown that another challenges of the African Union and the United States Peacekeeping Operations in Africa are the mandates of its Peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines (De Carvalho, Okumu, Kasumba and Jaye 2011; Isabella 2019). As a result of this, this research decided to know whether mandates of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA coupled with the doctrine of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations plays a significant role in their effectiveness. The following are the mandates of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA;

7.4.2.1. Mandate Of Amisom In Somalia

1. Limit the challenges caused by Al Shabaab and other armed movements.

2. Provision of security so that the political procedures can commence together with efforts at stabilising, reconciling and building of peace in Somalia.
3. Start a process of transferring the security responsibilities to the security forces of Somalia.
4. Continuation of enforcement measures against Al Shabaab and other armed movements in opposition.
5. Maintaining a presence in all the sectors stipulated in the concept of operations of AMISOM so that effective and legitimate governance can be established across Somalia together with the security forces of Somalia.
6. Assisting with free movement, passage and protecting everyone participating in Somalia peace and reconciliation process and making sure the electoral process in Somalia is secured.
7. Making sure major supply routes with those taken back from Al Shabaab, especially those vital to the improvement of humanitarian conditions, and those of significant to AMISOM logistics, while keeping in mind that it is the collective responsibility of the United Nations and the African Union to provide logistics for AMISOM.
8. Conducting within its capabilities operations together with the Somali security forces and involving other parties so that the national security plans of the Somalia can be implemented and contributing to a broader effort with regards to the training and mentoring of the FGS security forces.
9. Contributing within its capabilities when asked, to the formation of security circumstances that are vital to the provision of humanitarian support.
10. Engaging with communities in recovered areas, and promoting within its capabilities, understanding between AMISOM and the local populace, resulting to a longer term of stabilisation by the Country team of the United Nations and other actors.
11. Protecting and assisting the Somali government in the execution of their governmental functions.

12. Protection of AMISOM's personnel, facilities, installations, equipments and mission while ensuring the security and freedom of its personnel, together with personnel of the United Nations in the course of performing duties authorised by the Security Council.
13. Recieving on a transtory basis those that defected, when suitable and in partnership with the United Nations (UN, 2017).

7.4.2.2. Mandate Of Unamid In Darfur

1. Protecting the local populace with predisposing the Sudanese government responsibilities.
2. Make easier the delivery of humanitarian assistance and making sure humanitarian personnel are safe.
3. Engaging the Sudanese government and non-signatory armed groups with regards to the Doha document for peace in Darfur.
4. Enhancing reconciliation of community conflict with the use of measures to address its primary causes (UN, 2014).

7.4.2.3. Mandate Of Minusca In The Central African Republic

1. Supporting the process of transition.
2. Aiding humanitarian support.
3. Encouraging and safeguarding human rights.
4. Enhancing justice and the rule of law.
5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.
6. Repatriation processes. (UN, 2014)

While some of the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA were clear and unambiguous such as protection of the civilian populace, providing humanitarian assistance and involvement in mediation and reconciliation process in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, some of the mandate of AMISOM were ambiguous and outside the scope of traditional peacekeeping such as counter-insurgency and warfighting which created complications for AMISOM. Therefore according to (Williams, 2014), peacekeeping

operations are unlikely to succeed where there is not in place a mandate that is clear and achievable with resources to match to match and realistic mandates are necessary for the success of peacekeeping operations (WEF, 2019). All the 30 respondents are of the view that mandate plays a major part in the effectiveness of any peacekeeping operation. 65 percent of respondents interviewed stated that before a peacekeeping operation is given its mandate and deployed, the following factors have to be considered: The origin of the crisis, the dimension of the conflict such as the actors involved which respondents 4 and 5 listed to be terrorism, inter-state and intra-state conflict eg civil war, the nature of the crisis such as ethnic, religious and political and the nature of the environment.

With regards to the United Nations and the African Union Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, (Respondent 1) argued that their mandates should include nation building and peace building. Using Somalia as a case study, respondent 1 argued that since the deployment of UNISOM in Somalia in 1991, the situation in Somali has escalated the mandate of peacekeeping. Respondent 1 further argued that AMISOM's mandate that took over from UNISOM should be more of peace enforcement than peacekeeping.

Respondent 4, 6, 7 and 14 argued that the African Union and the United Nations failed to take into considerations the problems encountered by past peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic and Darfur that could have assisted MINUSCA and UNAMID in the fulfillment of their mandates. They stated that MINUSCA's actual mandate was the protection of civilians which was a humanitarian mandate, but MINUSCA could not effectively achieve its humanitarian mandate because of the complicated political conditions in the Central African Republic and increasing regional insecurity. The respondents interviewed share a general view, that the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA has a one sided approach to peacekeeping and did not put into consideration, the terrain and environment, factors such as porous African borders and the regional dimension of the conflicts, which should determine the peacekeeping strategies. Respondents 11, 13 and 17 during the course of their interview, stated that although, AMISOM in Somalia had a broader mandate compared to the other two cooperative peacekeeping in Darfur and the Central African Republic, the tricky nature of the Somali environment is an impediment to its mandate.

Respondents, 3,4,7,8,19 and 22 stated that UNAMID in Darfur is operating without its full mandate due to the lack of a clear bench mark, that would have created an objective space for the peacekeeping operations to be effective. 100 percent of the respondents in the course of

their interviews stated that MINUSCA in the Central African Republic apart from its financial constraints is operating in a difficult country. The respondents argued that this mandate did not into consideration a bench mark for its operations. Respondent 5 argued that because African conflicts lack of boundaries and rules of engagement are challenges to its peacekeeping operations. Therefore, broader mandates such as protection of civilians, counter terrorism and insurgency is needed to guarantee the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Collaborating the views of the respondents, (Cocodia, 2015) argued that, the peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic of the African Union and the United Nations, is finding the conflict difficult to resolve due to factors such as, poor leadership, composition of the peacekeeping forces and the nature of its mandate. According to (Bamidele, 2013), “not only were mandates of peacekeeping operations in Africa more complex than ever, but there was a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled”. (Bamidele, 2013) argued that some of the mandates of UNAMID in Dafur and AMISOM in Somalia were externally driven and unrealistic. According to (Bokeriya and Mansur, 2018), the nature and scope of a peacekeeping operation is a major determinant of its success or failure and most peacekeeping mandates in Africa are unclear, ambiguous and cannot deal effectively with the fragmented nature of African conflicts especially when dealing with armed non state actors. Examples of these are: To reinforce the rule of law, improve the security sector, and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration.

That AMISOM’s attempt at demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants was a recipe for disaster. This was due to the lack of a peace accord with Al-Shabaab and the failure of AMISOM to realise that the potentials of the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration depends on the full awareness of its limitations (Sharif, 2018). In Darfur the entire process of demobilisation and reintegration of combatants into the society led to rancor from the local populace who preferred the war criminals to be punished than reintegration. Related to the above is the issue of the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine and its effectiveness on the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations. MINUSCA mandate of bring peace to the Central African Republic could not be effective because there was no peace agreement, its mandate did not include peace enforcement and inadequate logistics to keep peace in such a fragmented conflict (AI, 2016).

(Williams and Boutellis, 2014) argued that the issue of mandate and the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine has led to divergent views on peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations. That the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine which are, getting the assent of the parties involved, unbiasedness and force must not be applied except for the purpose of self defence and defence of the mandate were derived from lessons learned its peacekeeping operations which are, there must be a peace to keep, a truce or peace accord must be present and the peacekeeping operation must have a clear and achievable mandate with adequate funding. These United Nations peacekeeping principles have been criticised by African Union members as not application to peacekeeping in Africa. They are of the opinion that crisis in Africa are complex because of the involvement of several actors and as a result a different and more forceful peacekeeping approach is needed (Williams and Boutellis, 2014).

Respondent 26 and 28 however stated that the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines, cannot change, because the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, operate under the United Nations framework. Using the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Libya as an example, respondents 7 and 12 stated that peacekeeping operations in Africa cannot be impartial because of the humanitarian situation of conflicts in Africa. These respondents further claimed that the doctrine of impartiality creates problems for peacekeeping operations in Africa. As a result of the involvement of several non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the religious armies in the Central African Republic such as the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and ethnic militia groups in the conflict in Darfur, creating a situation of a multitude of actors. 45 percent of the respondents shared a point view, that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa need to have its own doctrines of peacekeeping to improve on the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. The fragmented dimension of African conflict and its complexity led to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations adopting offensive operations to respond to the activities of armed groups in the various conflict across Africa such as in Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic (Garcia, 2017).

The African Union's collective security arrangement has dealt with some of the issues of mandate of its peacekeeping operations in Africa through collaboration with the United Nations and Africa's sub-regional organisations. In Darfur, the collective security arrangements with the United Nations has made UNAMID mandate of protecting civilians, providing humanitarian assistance and mediation achievable. And in Somalia, apart from cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union collective security mechanisms in

Somalia such as collaboration with the United States, European Union and operating alongside the security forces of Somalia is impacting on AMISOM mandate of stabilization, anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism successfully (Deconing, 2017). In the Central African Republic, regional collective security arrangement with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) impacted negatively on MINUSCA mandate of supporting the peace process and transition due to divisions within the Sub-region from Chad and the Republic of Congo (Carayannis and Fowlis, 2017).

Based on the arguments with regards to clear and achievable mandate, it is clear that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, need different approach and principles to its peacekeeping missions in Africa as a result of the fragmented dimension of these conflicts and its complexity.

7.4.3. The Influence of External Actors and the Regional dimension of the conflict

The influence of external actors was identified by respondents as one of the factors impacting on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. 73.3 percent of the respondents are of the view that the failure of the African Union, neighbouring states and the sub-regional organisation to respond timely to the crisis in Somalia and the Central African Republic complicated the conflicts. According to this group of respondents, when steps are taken to immediately respond to a conflict at its initial stage, it reduces or put an end to the risk of the crisis spreading across borders. They shared a general view that the conflict in the Central African Republic and Somalia were not given immediate attention by the African Union. This delayed response led to the spread of the conflict to Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda in the Central African Region and that of Somalia spreading to Ethiopia and Kenya.

According to (Ekrikson 2013; Mohammed 2014);

There are external actors in the Somali conflict since the collapse of the country's central government and Somalia's case is a classical example of regionalised conflict. Since almost all states in the region have suffered spillover problems from Somalia.

Three reasons were therefore identified by some of the respondents for the regional spread of the conflicts, which are, large and porous borders, weak security institutions, corruption and regional mistrust. President Bozize of the Central African Republic outsourced national

security to foreign military forces such as MICOPAX, France and South Africa due to the deficiencies of the Central African Republic security forces. This resulted to the Central African republic dependence on this foreign military forces to protect the country (Vircoulon, 2015).

Therefore, 73.3 percent of the respondents argued that the participation of several actors from outside the Central African Republic and the spreading of the conflict across borders has contradicted the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, leading to peacekeeping roles outside their initial mandates, therefore, putting pressure on the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations and impacting on their effectiveness. They argued that the regional dimension of the conflicts resulted into hostility for the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations from neighboring states, coupled with a harsh environmental terrain that created enormous logistical problems for peacekeeping operations.

Respondent 1 gave a contrary view by arguing that the involvement of external actors is an advantage to the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and has given these cooperative peacekeeping operations the much needed logistical support. According to respondent 1, France was invited by the Central African Republic government, when the African Union and the United nations did not want to be involved. This respondent argued that France took the leadership role and made ready the ground for the stationing, first of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in 2014, before its co-hatting into MINUSCA.

Respondent 4 collaborated the argument of respondent 1, by arguing that in peacekeeping operations in Africa, we need the “champions” such as the role Britain played in Sierra-Loene, the United States in Liberia and that of Ethiopia and Kenya, although Kenya is not as effective as Ethiopia, are doing the same in Somalia. Respondent 6 also argued that Ethiopia and Kenya intervention in Somalia, assisted AMISOM with the Al Shabaab situation and that France is equally playing a very important role in the Central African Republic, and that France, was welcomed by the people of the Central African Republic from a colonial and capacity point of view.

Collaborating some of the opinions of those interviewed in relation to external actors and the regional dimension of the conflicts and its effect on the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa, (Bamidele, 2013) argued that the multiplication of actors

involved in peacekeeping operations resulted to strategic and tactical challenges. At the tactical level, it was not easy to enhance coordination among the various actors with regards to goals and methods while at the strategically, the proliferation of actors led to challenges related to interaction between the actors.

(Freear and De Coning, 2013), collaborated the argument of respondents 1, 4 and 6, by arguing that the influx of several external actors resulted into proliferation of peacekeeping mechanisms and complicated peacekeeping operations particularly in Somalia. The compounded system of international and regional actors, the entire collective effect and what their joint efforts are able to produce, is a sign of the shape of future international responses, like an interconnecting model based on multi-stakeholders collaboration and partnership. According to (Albrecht, 2015), since 2010 and especially in 2014, AMISOM encountered several successes by recapturing areas formerly taken by Al-Shabaab. It is however glaring that the organisational and strategical course are fragmented mainly as a result of the domestic interests of several of the countries contributing troops such as Kenya and Ethiopia that are more concerned with protecting their borders than in making sure Somalia is stabilised.

(Mateja, 2015), also collaborated the views of respondents 1, 4 and 6 by arguing that while the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as a rule have a single-state mandate, the conflicts in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Darfur (Sudan) are all regional conflicts, and their neighboring states are part of the conflict dynamics. Because of this, the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations is increasingly relying on regional contributions because regional states are interested in conflicts that affect their security and political interests and therefore, are willing to contribute to high-risk situation.

(Deltenre and Liegeois 2016; Straus 2012; Van der Liyn and Smit 2013) collaborated the argument of the respondents by arguing that; porous borders across Africa facilitate the regional spread of conflicts, rebellions and insurgencies by proxy sponsored by various actors. They argued that insurgent groups not move across borders, from one conflict to another combining local grievances with international ideologies as seen across the Sahel, Sahara, Libya, Somalia and Northern Kenya. Therefore, the incidence and type of armed conflict, as well as its resolution in Africa, has obvious repercussions for the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.

Analysing the role of external actors and its implication on the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, (Mulugeta, 2014) argued, using Ethiopia

intervention in the conflict in Somalia, that the military responses in 2006 in Somalia by Ethiopia was criticised by many as a mistake and counter productive, and was seen as an extension of American security policy. Ethiopia military responses in Somalia resulted to a suitable time for AMISOM to be deployed and led to the solidification of the process of peace and state building in Somalia. It encouraged collective security at the regional level leading to Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Djibouti joining AMISOM and the intervention by the Ethiopian army in Somalia in 2011, assisted in driving out Al-Shabaab from its main strongholds.

The Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union in its defence pact of 2005, has committed its members to the enforcement of its collective security measures and for member states to collaborate and assist each other in combating inter-state and intra-state threats to peace and security (Jordaan, 2017). However with regards to the argument about the influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict, member states of the African Union lack cooperation on security issues which complicates the African Union collective security arrangement and creates challenges for its peacekeeping operations in Africa.

In Somalia external actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are involved in counter-insurgency against Al-Shabaab to protect their national security and national interest leading to multiple peacekeeping mechanisms. Also issues of mis-trust between African Regional Economic Communities and the African Union has weakened the African Union collective security arrangements to deal with the influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict due to lack of division of labour, consultative decision-making among member states as evident in Libya (2011) where member states of the African Union in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted in support of UNSC Resolution 1973 of 2011 against the roadmap for Libya of the African Union. Also in Mali (2012) where the Francophone led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) allowed France to play a dominant role over that of the African Union and also in CAR (2015) where France intervened through the endeavours of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

Therefore collective efforts by African Union member states to operate effective collective security mechanism in the conflict in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic has been hindered by external actors such as France and the attempts by countries within the regions of these conflict to promote and safeguard their national interest and security over collective interest.

Based on the above facts from the arguments of the respondents and collaboration from various scholars, it is clear that even though the influx of external actors and the regional dimension of conflicts in Africa, might have its own advantages, it equally lead to complications in peacekeeping operations, leading to proliferation of peacekeeping operations and impacting on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

7.4.4. The impact of the Consent of the host government/warring parties/armed groups and peace accord

One of the basis restriction ascribed on peacekeeping missions by the regulations of the global system is that they can lawfully carryout its operations if it has the consent of the host government, and that incomprehensive peace accord or agreement can affect the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and for collaboration between the United Nations, host government and regional organisations to be effective, an inclusive peace process must be seeked (Gilder 2019; Jones, Gowan and Sherman 2009). Based on the above assertion, this research wanted to know, the impact of the host government consent, opposing parties/armed groups and peace accord on the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. Most of the respondents, 93.3 percent of them, are of the view that the host government and conflicting groups giving their approval and a peace accord are important to the effectiveness of the Peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

This group of respondents argued that the lack of a comprehensive peace accord taking into consideration all the warring groups and their consent before and after deployment is one of the major challenges of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa. Repondent 1, argued that the opposing parties consent and a peace agreement is very important, and that most of the succesful peacekeeping operations are those with a comprehensive peace agreement and consent. Respondent 1, supported this views by arguing that the lack of a peace agreement impacted on the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia,that without a peace agreement, the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic cannot be resolved. The above argument is supported by 93,3 percent of respondents interviewed with the following narration:

1. That the Sudanese government is not in full support of UNMID peacekeeping operations in Darfur which is affecting its effectiveness, and have at several occassions requested UNAMID to leave.

2. There is no viable political agreement and binding peace agreement among the warring parties in Darfur which is leading to a continuous limbo in Darfur.
3. That AMISOM in Somalia has the full consent of the government but not that of the warring parties such as Al-Shabaab and other Islamist armed movements and this complicates the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM.
4. That in the conflict in Somalia, the peace agreements do not recognise the local actors and as a result, AMISOM is experiencing several challenges in its peacekeeping operations.

Respondents 4, 8, 9, 21, 22, 23 and 30 argued that in the conflicts in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, the consent of the major stakeholders is very vital because if they give their consent, the minority groups will be compelled to accept. That the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic will only be effective if they have the full consent of majority of the warring parties. Also according to Ndolo (2011), the United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone, the first peacekeeping operations of the United Nations to Sierra-Leone in 1999, (UNAMSIL), and the United Nations Observer mission in Angola, MONUA, deployed in 1997, failed to achieve their mandates because they did not have the consent of majority of the warring parties.

However, the United Nations operation in Cote D' Ivoire, UNOCI (2002-2017) despite the fragile consent of the state government was able to achieve its mandate of resolving the crisis and achieving stability like the United Nations Mission to Chad and the Central African Republic, MINURCAT in 2010 because they were able to get the consent of majority of the warring parties (Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011).

Respondent 5 however gave a contrary view on the importance of peace accord for the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, by arguing that peace agreement can never be reached before deployment if we are to prevent another Rwanda. And because there are several rebel groups involved in any particular conflict in Africa with several of them unidentifiable, a comprehensive peace agreement consisting of all warring groups cannot be achieved.

Collaborating the argument, respondents 2 and 7 argued that the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, Somalia and Darfur

were deployed without any political processes to guard them, but were deployed with the view of having a diplomatic resolution to the crisis. This they argued led to a disconnection between the political side and the peacekeeping sides, resulting in AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic having no major political achievement or development. Collaborating the argument of the respondents on the importance of the host government permission and the majority of the warring parties and a comprehensive peace agreement to the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa in the literature, Jones, Gowan and Sherman (2009) and Bamidele (2013) argued that a major challenge of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Darfur was that the Sudanese government placed significant constraints on the activities of the peacekeeping operations of UNAMID as a prerequisite for granting continuous consent, and therefore there was no real consent by the host country in the case of UNAMID in Darfur. (IRRI, 2016) argued that none of the peace accords presented a resolution to the crisis in Darfur, because of absence of real commitment to peace from the Sudanese government and the various opposing parties in Darfur were not adequately represented.

(Williams, 2010) argued that peacekeeping operations must not be a replacement for a successful political blueprint and a procedure for peace, but a part of it and it is often said that, peacekeepers cannot perform without a peace agreement in place and that the history of peacekeeping particularly in Darfur is closely tied to the history of peace negotiations. That the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Darfur and the Central African Republic could not be effective as a result of the peacekeeping operation operating in an atmosphere of a conflict that is in progress, and the opposing parties continue to engage each others and conducting attacks on civilians. According to the Peace and Security Council Report for 2015:

AMISOM struggled to make headway, because there are no conditions for peace in Somalia, weak government and violence involving Al-Shabaab and other militia mean that national dialogue towards some constitutional normalcy and transitional political arrangements cannot take root. Under these conditions, AMISOM has become a force focused on managing conflict, rather than keeping or building peace.

According to (Caparini, 2016), the most resilient norm of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa has proven to be that of host state consent,

while resistance from some member states, opposition to the deployment of peacekeeping operations on their territory, impact on its effectiveness from deployment. With UNAMID in Darfur experiencing the following constraints from the Sudanese government,

1. The government of Sudan did not approve the list of countries contributing troops to UNAMID.
2. Troops from countries like Nepal, Thailand and Nordic countries were not accepted by the Sudanese government based on the argument that they wanted only troops from African countries without recognising the relevance of these countries to the success of UNAMID.
3. The Sudanese tried to slot in certain arrangements into the position of the forces protocol, allowing them to monitor the movements and operations of UNAMID. The Sudanese government did not give permission that will enable UNAMID forces to operate at night and restricted the operations of UNAMID in some areas.
4. Prior to the deployment of UNAMID, the Sudanese government refused to provide land for bases for UNAMID.

The Capstone Doctrine (2008) elaborating more with regards to the impact of assent of the host government/warring parties and a peace agreement on peacekeeping operations argued that when the peacekeeping operation do not have the consent of majority of the warring parties especially the major parties, the United Nations peacekeeping operations will have to make use of enforcement action to achieve its mandates. The Capstone doctrine was issued in 2008 and sets the principles and guidelines for United Nations peacekeeping operations. A follow-up from the Brahimi Report (2000) that made the following suggestions on strategic, political and operational advancement towards making sure peacekeeping operations are more effective;

1. The international community must make sure that peacekeeping is the appropriate choice with regards to the dimension of the crisis.
2. The warring parties must be ready to agree to an end to all hostilities and a peace accord and achieve their goals through diplomatic and peaceful ways.
3. All major parties involved in the conflict must accept the involvement of the United Nations and its part in assisting them settle the conflict.

4. That the peacekeeping operation must be part of an all-inclusive plan of action to assist in conflict resolution while considering its regional nature, and considering the political, economic, developmental, institution-building, humanitarian and human rights features.
5. The Security Council of the United Nations must make sure that the mandate can be achieved. This must include the approving the deployment of a significant number of troops to carry out the mandate's of a mission and member states providing troops that are properly trained and well equipped (Murithi, 2009).

When interviewed about the warring parties in the crisis in Somalia and the Central African Republic where the African Union and the United Nations are both involved in peacekeeping operations, 93.3 percent of the respondents argued that armed non state actors are extremist groups, difficult to negotiate with since they are outside the context of international relations, a contradiction of the argument about the conflicting groups giving their consent, complicating the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Another collaboration of the argument of the respondents in the literature is from (Volker, 2008), who argued that:

The first and most important strategic hinderance for any peacekeeping operation is the availability of a peace accord, that is abided by and supported by the political will of major stakeholders. This was the case for successful peacekeeping operations in Namibia and Mozambique by the United Nations at the end of the cold war. By comparison, the Darfur peace agreement does not have the broad support of the parties who signed it and, as one participant pointed out, a peacekeeping operation, will not serve as an alternative for the lack of a political process. The best a peacekeeping operation can do is supporting the political process.

Although the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations, according to the respondents interviewed, were deployed to Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic without a peace agreement in place, peace process were initiated after deployment through the efforts of regional economic communities, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development working under the institutional structures of the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) started the peace process in Somalia in 2002 (Healy, 2009). In the Central African Republic, collective security dealt with the agreement of peace accord through mediation by the African Union, United Nations, the Community of Sahel-Saharan

States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African States and France (Knoope and Buchanan-Clarke, 2017).

A major core assumption of United Nations peacekeeping is that before a peacekeeping operation can be deployed, it must have the approval of the warring groups thus a peacekeeping operation cannot succeed if there is the absence of a peace to keep and a peace agreement (Boulellis and Williams, 2013). The changing nature of conflict in Africa has rendered such principles very difficult to achieve before deployment. The crisis in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic has seen the involvement of several warring parties coupled with the collapse of state structures such as in Somalia, complicating the peace and mediation process, which the African Union collective security mechanisms has failed to deal with due to conflict of interest connecting the African Union, the United Nations and regional economic communities.

7.4.5. The issue of Legitimacy, Acceptance and Local Ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Legitimacy, acceptance of the peacekeeping operations and local ownership have been identified by 100 percent of the respondents, as factors impacting on the effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa. According to Wiharta (2009), "Sixty years after the deployment of the first United Nations peacekeeping operation, there are concerns that peacekeeping is headed in crisis and questions over the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations are important factors in these problems". Also, legitimacy of a peacekeeping operations within the local population is a major element in determining the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission (Whalan, 2017).

(Suchman, 1995) defined legitimacy which he divides into three such as normative, cognitive and pragmatic as the general opinion that the actions of an organisation conform to laid down norms, values and beliefs,

1. Normative legitimacy: This is the ability of convictions about what gives the right to a separate person or establishment to exercise control. An organisation is legal because of its consideration as the righteous possessor of authority by the quality of a given community.

2. Cognitive legitimacy: This focuses on the psychological level which is the standard an organisation is received. That an organisation is legal if as a result of us treating and accepting it as a given.
3. Pragmatic legitimacy: This focuses on the “interest based” acceptance of an institution by groups that are mostly affected. That an organisation is considered legal when the groups affected consider it to be in their interest for it to be received (Suchman, 1995).

The differences between these three types of legitimacy is that while pragmatic legitimacy is based on perceptions from the organisation’s host, normative legitimacy is the perception of the people such as the local population about the activities of the organisation while cognitive is based on perceptions from stakeholders (Suchman, 1995). (Merslades, 2005), when defining legitimacy argued that if local actors perceive the peacekeeping operation as legitimate, it will have a remarkable impact its effectiveness and such legitimacy will not only give room for approval, it will also lead to the local actors giving the much needed support to the peacekeeping operation. According to Respondent 1 and 3, the issue of legitimacy is important to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. Using UNAMID in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia as examples, respondent 1 and 3 argued that UNAMID is a good case study of the importance of legitimacy and when it became a hybrid collaborative peacekeeping operation of the African Union and the United Nations. It brought in Muslim countries and troop contributing countries that were far from Darfur, therefore, the “Darfurians” preferred the United Nations troops contributing countries that those of the African Union because of religion.

Respondent 5 argued that AMISOM in Somalia lacked acceptance among the local populace because AMISOM troops are mostly from neighbouring countries and because Somalis are Muslims, they see AMISOM as infidels. Also the actions of peacekeepers of AMISOM, that were involved in the raping of Somali women undermined the legitimacy and acceptance of AMISOM by the local populace (Respondent 15). According to (Williams, 2013), AMISOM as a result of its partnership with the Ethiopian national defence force, ENDF, its authenticity in the perception of the local citizens were undermined. The ENDF was accused of atrocities against civilians, AMISOM also of killing over 100 civilians and causing harm to over 300 civilians as of September 2008. The opinion of (Respondent 15) is collaborated by Wiharata (2009) argument, that;

Percieved shortfalls in an operation's legitimacy can seriously undermine its interlinked and mutually reinforcing elements namely, political concensus, legality and moral authority, and that the conduct of its personnel largely determines the moral authority of a peace operation.

Respondent 12, 18 and 22 argued that the atrocities from the peacekeepers impacted on the legitimacy of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic. The local population in the Central African Republic are frustrated with MINUSCA due to persistent violence, their perceived ineffectiveness and several sexual abuse scandal implicating several peacekeepers of MINUSCA (CRS, 2019). According to respondents 12, 18 and 22, AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA are not well accepted by the local populace, the host government and the warring parties, making it very difficult for the peacekeeping operations to operate effectively.

Respondents 21 and 29 collaborated the views of Respondent 12, 18 and 22 by arguing that AMISOM in Somalia lacked adequate acceptance from the Somalia government and the local actors, and has no viable local partner on ground to give AMISOM the required legitimacy. When interviewed about acceptance of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations, a respondent has this to say:

AMISOM has legitimacy in the eyes of the government and not in the eyes of Al Shabaab, and it is difficult for AMISOM to gain acceptance with Al Shabaab, because the group (Al Shabaab) do not have the recognition of the international community and UNAMID in Darfur is recognised by the rebel groups, without acceptance by the Sudanese government. That a major challenge of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa, is that they do not have legitimacy and acceptance from the local actors.

In attesting to the argument about the impact of legitimacy and acceptance with regards to the effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations, 52 percent argued that it is a common challenge facing AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and they arrived at the following argument:

1. That the government in Somalia lacks legitimacy, and AMISOM support of the government affect its legitimacy and acceptance by the local populace.

2. That the Central African Republic has a new government in place, that manages to have a degree of control only in the capital (Banjui) and not in the rest of the country. MINUSCA acceptance is limited to the capital, and its legitimacy has become fractioned due to the involvement of its peacekeepers in various sex scandals.
3. The inability of UNAMID in Darfur to do more in terms of protecting of civillians, creates frustration among the people and impact on its acceptance by the local communities.

Collaborating the argument of the respondents that the activities of peacekeepers impact on its legitimacy and acceptance by the local populace, Global Security (2016) argued, that by December 2016, the United Nations had recieved fifty sexual abuse accusations by peacekeepers of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and sixteen of such sexual abuse occured in 2016, thirty-one in 2015, one in 2014 with two incident of sexual abuse not recorded with dates. The allegations, they argued involved peacekeepers from Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, Morroco, Pakistan and Zambia.

Collaborating the respondents views on the impact of legitimacy and acceptance with regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, (Bamidele, 2013) and (Wiharta,2009) argued, that the misconduct by peacekeepers such as in Somalia, gave the local populace the perception that peacekeepers were unanswerable, immune from the law, dishonest, taking advantage and maltreating the local populace, also sexually, and such wrong doing could put the whole peacekeeping operation at peril, seriously hindering its capability to bring about a productive change in host countries.

Analysing AMISOM in Somalia, (Beadle 2012; Freear and De Coning 2013) argued that the support of the civilian population became the central prize for AMISOM, and by vigorously going after the local populace support, AMISOM was able to achieve some successes, despite serious deficiencies in its early years. This argument point to the fact that, the acceptance of a peacekeeping operation by the local populace can impact on its effectiveness. According to (Williams, 2013):

In peace operations, maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant audiences, including the conflict parties, local civilians, international NGOs, and foreign

governments, is a crucial part of achieving success. Importantly, peacekeepers are never in total control of their legitimacy because it depends on the perceptions of other actors. The situation is made more complex, because the relevant constituencies may well come to different conclusions about the legitimacy of the same actor or action. Operations perceived as legitimate by these key audiences will be more likely to achieve their objectives, not least because force generation will be easier and locals will support the force, including by providing peacekeepers with good intelligence. Operation perceived as illegitimate will struggle on both counts.

On the argument by the respondents on the local possession of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. Local ownership means that the African Union are in charge of operations, objectives of interventions, logistics and command of the its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations and must take full responsibilities of its operations; Respondent 1 argued that:

You can't own without money and ownership has to do with resources. That ownership issues do not hold weight, since all the peacekeepers of the African Union and the United Nations are paid by the United Nation.

This was collaborated by Respondent 4 and 9 who argued, that the issue of local possession of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations is not an issue since international peace and security is the major responsibility of the United Nations. Respondent 3, 11, 13, 16, 27 and 30 argued that, the local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is very vital in conflict situations like those on the African continent. They are of the view that a familiar face is always better and therefore local ownership for maintaining peace in Africa is very important. When questioned by the researcher on how the African Union can take ownership of the joint peacekeeping operations with the African Union. 72 percent of the respondents are of the view, that it is very problematic, because conflicts in Africa like those of Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic usually metamorphosed into different dimensions, such as political, economic, religious, ethnicity and often spread across borders, to neighbouring countries, requiring expertise exceeding the capacity of the African Union.

The respondents argued that the African Union can only ask for ownership of its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations if it can fund these peacekeeping operations which it is technically and financially not in the full position to do. According to Respondent

24, the peacekeeping operations in Africa are all types of international interventions and it is the responsibility of the combined peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to have a percentage of local driven. Respondent 24, using the crisis in Burundi in 2015 as an example, argued that “African identity did not improve legitimacy and only showed that African responses will not be more accepted than foreign responses. However, the common view among the respondents is that, the joint peacekeeping operations between the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic is yet to achieve its effectiveness because local actors are not brought on board and as a result, local ownership by the African Union is very important.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, funding plays a vital role in peacekeeping and an important challenge of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operation is inadequate funding. The African Union also lack adequate fund for its peacekeeping operations and rely on its international partners which impact on its local ownership and control of its peacekeeping operations with the United Nations and creating unequal partnership with regards to areas of planning and policy making of its peacekeeping missions (Deconing, 2017). With regards to legitimacy and acceptance of the African Union peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, collective security gave the peacekeeping operations legal intervention status and international legitimacy and acceptance because they were authorised by the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations. According to (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018), peacekeeping operations will find it difficult to achieve its effectiveness with the strong assent of the host government and this can undermine its legitimacy and credibility among the local populace. In Darfur, the host government in Sudan wanted an all African peacekeeping troops from politically friendly nations and blocked the deployment of more experienced and well equipped military contingents from Europe which impacted on UNAMID effectiveness in Darfur (Sebastian and Gorur, 2018). In the case of AMISOM, it was deployed into a volatile security environment in Somalia and initially faced series of armed attacks from various warring parties, its acceptance by the host government and communities in Somalia enabled AMISOM to achieve some of its mandate and also increasing successes in its joint armed operations against Al-shabaab made possible as a result of its collective security mechanisms such as joint logistical, financial and technical support from the United Nations, the European Union and the United States giving the peacekeeping operation both acceptance and legitimacy (Wiklund, 2013).

7.4.6. Roles of African Regional Economic Communities

Closely related to the issue of acceptance of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations, its legitimacy and local ownership is the issue of inadequate harmonisation among Africa's regional economic communities and the African Union in its joint peacekeeping operations with the United Nations. Based on this, this research sought to know the impact of the roles of African regional economic communities in this joint peacekeeping operation.

83.3 percent of respondents responded that the roles of Africa's regional economic communities is very important in this peacekeeping partnership. A respondent used the Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS), as a case study, to showcase the importance of Africa's regional economic communities in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and argued, that ECOMOG, the West African Multilateral Armed Force formed by the Economic Community of West African States did a good job in Sierra-leone and in Liberia, before the intervention by the United Nations. That ECOMOG was successful in Liberia and Sierra-leone, because they had proper communication with the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.

According to respondent 1, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional economic institution actively participated in the conflict in Somalia and Darfur where the African Union and the United Nations are involved in cooperative peacekeeping operations. Respondent 1, argued that IGAD prepared way for AMISOM in Somalia and that Africa's regional economic communities can break and prepare the foundation for peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, because they have more knowledge about the issues. According to Deconing and Mateja (2019), the African Union and Africa's sub-regional organisations have become an important part of global peace and security and over the years there had been three types of African-led peacekeeping operations which are those deployed by the African Union, the regional economic communities in Africa and those deployed by an ad-hoc operations. Examples are ECOWAS (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, ECCAS (FOMUC) in Central Africa from 2002-2008 and the regional cooperative ingenuity against the Lord's resistance army (RCI-LRA) established in 2012.

The common argument among the 83.3 percent of the respondents is that Africa's regional economic communities have initially been involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa,

such as ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra-leone, but there is now a shift in focus because the African Union is more accepted and the involvement of regional economic communities in the conflict in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, created suspicion and as one of the respondent stated, “the involvement of IGAD in Somalia and Darfur, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African Republic, was seen as the involvement of a neighbour, leading to suspicion by the host government, warring parties and local communities”. Respondent 7 argued, that the African Union is more political and Africa’s economic communities more economical in their roles, and their roles in the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, complicates not only the peace agreements, but result into multiple actors and duplicacy of peacekeeping roles.

A respondent also posits that the nature of conflicts in Africa include religious, socio-political and traditional attributes and therefore, regional economic organisations have a role to take part in the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The respondent argued that regional economic communities understand the terrain, they speak the same language and although they usually are not at the forefront of peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, their roles makes communication easier and they are more receptive. This is collaborated by respondent 2, who argued that Africa’s regional economic communities are actively involved in peace negotiations in conflict areas like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), that is involved in mediation roles in Somalia and Darfur. In the course of the interview with respondent 2, which was conducted face to face, respondent 2 argued that;

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is the link between the communities in Darfur, the affected people and the donors. Because some of the members of its mediating team is from the same communities, they are equally acting as mediators between the warring groups, and their ‘behind the scene’ role is impacting on the peacekeeping operations of UNAMID.

According to respondent 12, although Africa’s regional economic organisations like IGAD, ECOWAS and SADC are playing greater roles in response to peacekeeping operations, their involvement in the cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa is an “uneven type of space” and lack of adequate coordination complicate

this uneven space. Describing the role of regional economic communities and its impact with regards to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, a respondent has this to say:

The relationship between the regional economic communities in Africa and the African Union in cooperative peacekeeping operations with the United Nations in Africa is not properly managed, such as the competition between ECOWAS and the African Union in Mali, and this can have a negative influence on the effectiveness of the AU/UN peacekeeping operations. The African actors should defend our common interest, there should be unity between the various African institutions, and they must define their priorities and engage external actors based on these priorities.

In attesting to the argument of the respondents on the impact of the role of regional economic institutions in Africa on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa in the literature, (Adebayo 2002; Boulden 2003; Coleman 2007; Howe 2001; Khadigala 2003; Malan 2008), is of the opinion that before the formation of the African Union in 2002, peacekeeping operations in Africa were mainly carried out by sub-regional organisations in Africa, like ECOWAS and SADC, and this was because the regional economic communities were attempting to fill the gap created during the 1990s when several United Nations member states refused to participate in several African conflicts, for example in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra-leone, Burundi, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

That the United Nations absent of commitment led to the regional economic institutions in Africa, into peacekeeping operations, that were not well developed and its execution not ready, leading to the following challenges;

1. Peacekeeping operations by the regional economic communities were not examples of peacekeeping operations, but enforcement operations to assist friends in trouble, such as SADC in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
2. Absent of unity and harmony within regional economic institutions member states.
3. Issues evolving around strategy, competency, deployment, management, logistics and provision of suitable materials.

4. Misconducts of peacekeepers and involvement in the exploitation of host countries natural resources.

With the formation of the African Union in 2002, and with article 4 (h) of the African Union constitutive act, giving the African Union the right to respond when there are cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in a member state and also stipulating that member states have the right to reestablish peace and security (AU, 2002). This set the pace for the involvement of sub-regional organisations in peacekeeping operations in the era of the African Union. Also, the African Union formed as its major mechanism for maintaining peace and security in Africa, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). According to (Caparini, 2016);

The APSA as a whole has been limited in its development and operationalization in particularly funding constraints, but also a certain rivalry between the African Union headquarters and the various regional economic communities, with which it must coordinate, as the RECs are essential building blocks of the African Union's institutional structure. The African Union relationship with the five sub-regions has often been sensitive, and tensions also exist within the RECs, which have seen an uneven progress in harmonisation of approaches and challenges in joint planning.

Therefore, one of the challenges of the partnership of the African Union and the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in Africa, is the controversies with regards to the United Nations Security Council association with the sub-regional organisations in Africa. According to (Williams and Boutellis, 2014), Chapter VIII of the charter of the United Nations did not separate regional and sub-regional arrangements which created several challenges such as;

1. Between the African Union and SADC with regards to the crisis in Madagascar in 2009.
2. The Economic Community of West African States and the African Union's disagreement over the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011 and Mali in 2012.

(Williams and Boutellis, 2014) argued that, the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding signed by the African Union and eight regional economic communities in Africa emphasised that the African Union has the major responsibility in Africa to maintain, promote peace, security and stability and asked the African Union to organise the efforts of the sub-regional organisations in Africa, to integrate their opinions in its dealings with the United Nations and keeping to the

principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. This they argued, limited the leadership role of the African Union with regards to the sub-regional organisations in Africa, and situations where the African Union and Africa's sub-regional organisations assumed separate policies, have tangled the collaborations in peacekeeping operations in Africa between the African Union and the United Nations. (Jentzsch, 2014) analysed several African institutions and programs on peace and security such as:

1. The instrument for stopping, managing and resolving conflict of the Organisation of African Unity (1993).
2. The African Union Peace and Security Council (2004), the Panel of the Wise (2007), The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2005).
3. The Economic Community of West African States, instrument for preventing, resolving of conflict and peacekeeping (1999), ECOWAS framework on prevention of conflict (2008).
4. Southern African Development Community Council for Non-Governmental organisations program for Governance and Security (2009).
5. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN) for pastoral and related conflicts (2002).

According to (Jentzsch, 2014), while the multiplication of establishments and programs to deal with peace and security in Africa, is welcomed, it has led to absent of coordination, structures duplicating and wasting of resources, making financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa complicated and unpredictable. Based on the above factors, it is clear that lack of adequate coordination between the African Union and the African regional economic communities impact on the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, and proliferation of African institutions and programs on peace and security further complicates this cooperative peacekeeping.

With regards to collective security and the functions of Africa Regional Economic Communities, the African Union Peace and Security made provisions for the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) to be functional at five subregional level with the functions as stated by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) (Jordaan, 2017), Apart from the African Standby Force to be operational at the subregions, Africa Regional Economic communities are increasingly involved in collective security arrangements with the

African Union. In the Central African Republic, the Economic Community of Central African States had participated in peace and security in the Central African Republic from 2008 to 2013 with MICOPAX a peacekeeping mission with support by the African peace facility before the African Union and the United Nations tookover the peacekeeping operations with MISCA and MINUSCA (Meyer, 2015).

According to (Meyer, 2015), member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have been mediating in the conflict in the Central African Republic with mediation from President Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo resulting to the Libreville peace accord among rebel armies in the Central African Republic and President Bozize in 2013. Since its deployment in 2014, MINUSCA, the African Union, ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are jointly involved in mediation initiatives in the Central African Republic (Zahar and Mechoulam, 2017).

Also the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) working under the institutional structure of the African Union Peace and Security council participated in the peace and security initiatives in Darfur and in Somalia since 2002 (Healy, 2009). Although one of the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic has been lack of adequate harmonisation between Africa's sub-regional institutions and the African Union, collective security arrangements has been actualised especially through joint diplomacy and mediation roles.

7.4.7. The activities and impact of Armed Non-State Actors

According to (Campbell and Banner, 2000), (Rodriquez, 2010), Carey (2012) and (Englehart2016), activities of armed non-state groups are very diverse and that, although, the general ideal of non-state armed groups are insurgents and terrorists, government occasionally promote the establishment of armed independent movements to attack their opponents. The Janjaweed in the conflict in Darfur is a good evidence (Respondent 3). (Englehart, 2016) argued that armed non-state groups are majorly a challenge to peace and security, with their activities revolving around the following methods.

1. Violation of the rights of states to protect their citizens from external abuse and maintain order.
2. Frequently targeting government officials, institutions and public monuments.

3. Violence against local civilians in and out of conflict zones.

According to (Cilliers and Schunemann ,2013), one of the threats to contemporary peacekeeping operations in Africa, is that conflict in Africa is increasingly getting fragmented due to the rising numbers of armed non-state actors participating in the the conflict. This is collaborated by (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012) who argued that “While non-state actors are politically well organised and not connected to the state directly, they go after objectives that impact of the important interests of the state, and they operate beyond the borders of the state and are a major challenge of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Peace operations are now becoming entangled in conflicts with regional and transnational dimensions, with a proliferation of armed groups (both rebel and criminal) to which host countries are not neutral. As a result, the relationship between peacekeepers and host states has been more complicated, as the latter do not always see an interest in complying with the mandate of those that came to assist them in reestablishing their state and the rule of law. In this context, the number of fatalities has increased since 2010, with a dramatic spike in 2017, as peacekeepers have been ill-prepared for these challenges. (Novosseloff, 2019, p3)

It is against this background that 30 respondents were interviewed on the activities and impact of Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. According to respondent 1, the activities of Al-Shabaab in the conflict in Somalia has complicated the peacekeeping mandate of AMISOM in Somalia. That since 2007, AMISOM has been involved in fighting against Al-Shabaab, changing its initial mandate from that of peacekeeping to peace enforcement, impacting on its effectiveness. This is collaborated by (Seftel, 2017) who argued that:

Today, AMISOM is faced with the same challenge it went through during its formation, how to bolster a Somalian government that was weak and at the same time engage an escalating terrorist adversary. This daunting task, combined with a recent uptick in the number of Al-Shabaab orchestrated attacks, has tarnished AMISOM’s accomplishments over the years.

According to (Williams, 2015), the nature of the conflict in Somalia, with the emergence of Al-Shabaab in 2007, has lead to AMISOM resembling a peace-enforcement operation than a peacekeeping operation, and with a fatality rate of over 4000 troops between 2007 and January 2015. Mostly to attacks by Al-Shabaab, AMISOM has become a very dicey

peacekeeping operation and is probably the most deadly peacekeeping operations conducted in Africa.

All the 30 respondents interviewed had a common argument, which is that the activities of armed non-state actors such as the Janjaweed in Darfur, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic, had resulted in increased turbulent in the conflicts which is destabilising not only the states involved by the entire regions. This they argued, widens the mandate of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA, and has been a disaster to the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations as a result of the following factors;

1. Killing of several peacekeepers by the armed non-state actors (Militia groups) in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, has not only impacted on the morals of the peacekeepers, but has changed their roles of engagement.
2. Increasing proliferation of small arms and weapons. Leading to increasing violent crimes in the local communities in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic, complicating the security situations on ground.
3. Increasing cross border crimes since the armed conflicts operate across borders and are transnational, resulting in increasing attacks against border communities.
4. Increasing humanitarian crisis especially in Darfur and the Central African Republic, as a result of the displacement of civilians, destruction of lives and properties caused by attacks by the armed non-state groups on civilian populace.

The above respondents argued has resulted in lack of adequate manpower and logistical constraints since the activities of these armed non-state actors has overstretched the force limits of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa. Collaborating some of the argument of the respondents in the literature, (Charnas, 2017) argued, using the conflict in the Central African Republic, where the African Union and the United Nations currently maintains over 12,500 peacekeeping troops as an example. That in the Central African Republic, the government of President Faustin Archange Touadera, maintain control over only the capital city (Bangui), while the militias, Ex Seleka and Ex Anti Balaka continue to clash outside the city. According to (Charnas, 2017):

Various other forces including illegal miners and remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army have emerged in the chaos that is currently engulfing the country. These groups increasingly targeted civilians and organisations, rather than engage in open conflict with each other. MINUSCA maintains 12,500 troops in the country, but this number is woefully short of the contingent that would be needed to secure populations outside of the capital who are at risk..

(Stimson, 2017), regarding the activities of armed non-state actors in the conflict in the Central African Republic, argued that, the activities of armed movements driven by both political and economic motivations, continue to threaten civilian security across the country. That in areas outside the capital (Bangui), where armed groups have established parallel administration, they detain, sentence and extort payments from persons accused of committing crimes, and displacing thousands of people. This has stretched the protection resources of MINUSCA and limit its peacekeeping operations in several parts of the country.

The Institute for Security Studies report on Darfur in 2015, collaborated the argument of the respondents with regards to the activities of armed non-state actors. The ISS (2015) report stated that, the conflict in Darfur has changed, becoming ever more fractured and internecine and violence has continually evolved. That it is vital to take into consideration the argument that the conflict has outgrown Darfur itself, which poses challenges for any effective peace talks, and that, this prevent UNAMID from fulfilling its mandates effectively. The report argued that other factors such as 60 attacks and hostile incidents against UNAMID personnel in the 90 day reporting period, attacks against agencies of the United Nations and other organisations involved in humanitarian roles add up to an extremely hostile operating environment.

According to (Bamidele, 2013), UNAMID in Darfur at various levels was confronted by over 20 armed militias and many of this armed groups were unprofessional and rarely respected the laws and customs of war, and the armed groups occasionally established alliances that was confusing and changing regularly, which made it difficult for UNAMID to know who to support.

Closely related to the activities of armed non-state actors and their impact on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African Union, is the nature of the African Environment. 80 percent of the respondents are of the view, that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, were

stationed in areas that was isolated and its physical terrain very harsh. They argued that the conflict zones lack basis infrastructure and create huge logistical problems for these peacekeeping operations.

Respondents 2, 5, 8,11,16,19 and 20, argued that, the vast plains and low hills of Darfur, the long coastlines of Somalia and thick rain forests of the Central African Republic, coupled with porous and open ungoverned borders made the countries ripe for exploitation by armed groups, and the multiplicity of armed non-state actors with various agendas, complicates the peacekeeping operations of the AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. This was collaborated by (Van Dyk and Koopman, 2012) who argued that:

Sudan is a vast, sun-baked dessert land with frequent dust storms. Temperatures are extremely high, making the heat unbearable especially for those who are not used to it. The heat makes one thirsty, but the water in Sudan is subjected to contamination through its distribution systems. This means that the peacekeeping soldiers should take extra measures when it comes to drinking water, because it can affect their hygiene and health. The soldiers hygiene and health are not only affected by the water, but also by the state of hygiene in the country.

This argument is supported by the respondents that of the opinion that absent of facilities like toilet and hygiene facilities and lack of infrastructure such as electricity and access road and the harsh terrain and unfavorable weather conditions make the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations difficult, leading to threats to the safety of peacekeepers and increasing frustration. The African Union through collective security has been dealing with the activities of armed non-state actors in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. In Somalia, the European Union had supported AMISOM to tackle the threats of armed non-state actors through the European Union naval force operation ATALANTA fighting piracy in the Indian Ocean and the European Union military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia), training the somali security forces in combating Al-shabaab and in the Central African Republic, in combating the Lord's Resistance Army and its consequences on regional peace and security, the regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) was established by the African Union Commission in 2013 comprising of the African Union and a regional task force (RTF)

comprising of troops from Uganda, South-Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic with achievements against the Lords' Resistance Army (AU, 2015).

7.5. Conclusion

As evidenced from the analysis of the data obtained from the respondents, this chapter finds out that seven factors contributed significantly on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African Union. The seven factors are closely related and are the challenges of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic. The Seven factors include the funding of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur, and the Central African Union, mandates that is clear and can be achieved and the impact of the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine, the influence of external actors and the regional dimension of the conflict, the impact of the consent of the host government/warring parties and peace accord, the issue of legitimacy, acceptance and local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, the roles of Africa's regional economic communities and coordination between the RECs and the African Union in peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the activities and impact of armed non-state actors on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

This chapter finds out that funding is a major determinant of any peacekeeping operations. This chapter maintains that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa are not adequately funded and the African Union lack the financial capabilities to adequately fund its peacekeeping operations. The African Union thus rely on the United Nations and its partners like the European Union for funding. This the chapter finds out not only impact on its effectiveness, but denies the African Union control over the joint peacekeeping operations in Africa.

This chapter finds out that AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA, examples of cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations, lack a mandate that is clear and can be achieved, as some of its mandates are not within the reach of the capabilities of this peacekeeping operations. Also the United Nations doctrines of impartiality, consent of the parties to the conflict, and the non-use of force except in self-defence of the mandate, cannot be applicable to peacekeeping operations in Africa, as a result of the dimension of the

conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, this chapter finds out that the conflict in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic has transformed into a regional conflict with the spread of the conflict from the root country to neighbouring countries, leading to the influx of external actors driven by economic and political interest, complicating the peacekeeping operations.

This chapter finds out that the host government giving its consent and majority of the warring party before and after deployment is vital to the success of a peacekeeping operations. Acceptance by the local communities and populace is also a strong determinant of the success of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa and the a major argument of the respondents, is that, a peace accord will be difficult for the African peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to be effective and without a peace accord as evident in Somalia and Darfur, there is no peace to keep.

This chapter finds out that legitimacy of the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping operations in the eyes of the people can impact on its effectiveness and the activities of its peacekeepers can undermine its peacekeeping operations, as seen in the Central African Republic, where peacekeepers on MINUSCA are involved in sexual abuses. This chapter also established that while local possession of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa can impact on its effectiveness and give it more acceptance among the residents, the African Union can only claim ownership of peacekeeping operations with the United Nations if it can fully fund the peacekeeping operations.

This chapter finds out that lack of coordination between the African Union and the Africa's regional economic communities involved in the conflicts lead to multiple peacekeeping roles and peace and create suspicion among the RECs and the African Union and impacting on the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

This chapter finds out that the activities of armed non-state actors also complicates the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The activities of armed non-state actors who operate across the porous and open borders have overstretched the capabilities of the peacekeeping operations, leading to logistical and troops constraints. The nature of the African environment, where peacekeepers are deployed into harsh terrains with unfavorable weather conditions and lack of basic facilities has resulted to frustration of peacekeepers and ill health. This chapter also conclude that while collective security dealt with some of the themes such as the clear and achievable mandate, the issues of legitimacy, acceptance and local ownership, roles of Africa Regional Economic Communities and the

activities and impact of armed non-state actors. It failed to deal with the issues of the influence of external actors and the spread of the conflict across borders and the impact of the consent of the opposing parties and armed groups, with the issues of funding, while collective security dealt with it, it created unequal partnership and impacted on the African Union local ownership and control of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

During the course of the literature review, certain gaps were identified which were filled in the course of this dissertation. The gaps identified in chapter 3 has shown that the challenges of peacekeeping missions in Africa are not restricted to just lack of adequate funding, lack of capacity by the African Union and logistical constraints but to factors such as the complex nature of the African environment, activities of armed non-state actors, impact of external actors, the role of consent, legitimacy, peacekeeping doctrine and peace agreement. The contribution of these to the body of knowledge is the exposing of new areas for more research on cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations.

The next chapter will concentrate on summarizing the key points of the study, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 8

FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0. Introduction

This chapter end the arguments by signifying the vital findings of this dissertation while giving recommendations on effective peacekeeping partnership of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. This chapter is therefore divided into four main segments namely, Findings, Contributions to knowledge, Recommendations and Conclusions

8.1. The Findings

Primary and secondary sources of data collected was used in the course of this dissertation to examine the collaboration in peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.. As set out in Chapter one (1), the three major aims of the thesis are to:

1. Examine the peacekeeping collaboration of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa.
2. Examine the challenges confronting the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa with Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic as case study
3. Identify lessons for future cooperative interventions.

Chapter three achieved the fulfillment of the first major objectives where after an analysis of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Europe and Asia, and that of the African Union peacekeeping operations in Africa, the United Nations and the African Union collaboration on peacekeeping operations in Africa was examined. The focus here was on the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union and its components such as the Peace and Security Council, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise and the African Union Peace Fund. Chapter three reviewed literature of authorities in the field of Peace and Security to examine this peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations. The general view is that, there is a deepening relationship between the African Union and the United Nations in their effortsto respond collectively to Africa's security challenges through collaborative multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

The second (2) objective which is aimed at examining the challenges facing the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations using Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic as case study was realised in chapter seven, entitled Qualitative Data Analysis and Findings. This chapter engages the use of interviews with experts on peacekeeping and Africa peace and security, including some secondary sources to discuss the achievements, challenges and expectations of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic. The ensuing sub-sections discussed the findings of the first and second objectives as discussed in chapters three and seven.

8.1.1. Funding of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

The basic argument in chapter three is that while the African Union is an significant means of political authority for dealing with threats to peace and security in Africa, inadequate finances impact on its decisive action to single handly resolve these challenges. Notably, many respondents argued that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic are under-funded and inadequate funding constitute a significant factor impacting on the effectiveness of these peacekeeping operations.

This the respondents argued created an unequal collaboration between the African Union and the United Nation in peacekeeping operations in Africa and resulted to the African Union lack of control over the peacekeeping operations. The lack of adequate funding of the African Union peacekeeping operations led to the development of two basic arguments, which are:

- a. Local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.
- b. Issues relating to Peacekeeping doctrines and mandates.

8.1.2. Local Ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

One of the major basic arguments in this thesis is that local ownership of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa is very important in conflict situations like those on the African continent. The respondents interviewed argued that a

familiar face is always better and therefore local ownership for keeping peace in Africa is very important.

It is argued that for local ownership of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to be possible, the African Union must fully establish its peace and security architecture. Chapter 3 categorised five components of the African Union which are, the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Peace Fund (PF) as follow:

This thesis argue that local ownership of the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa can only be actualised if the units of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture can be fully effective and Africa can adequately fund its peacekeeping operations.

8.1.3. Peacekeeping Doctrines and Mandates

Chapter seven reviewed the peacekeeping doctrines of the United Nations such as, the host country giving its consent, impartiality and opposing parties involved in the conflict must be treated equally and no discrimination and force must only be used for the purpose of self defence and how it applies to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union in Africa. Many of the respondents interviewed are of the opinion that the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrine make the African Union incapable of deploying an effective peacekeeping operation in a situation like Somalia. The basic argument in chapter seven is that the United Nations Peacekeeping doctrines creates problems for peacekeeping operations in Africa and that the peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa need to have their own doctrines of peacekeeping to improve on the effectiveness of its peacekeeping operations.

As argued in chapter seven with regards to mandates of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations in Africa, mandate plays a vital part in the effectiveness of any peacekeeping operation and before a peacekeeping operation is given its mandate and deployed, the following factors should be considered; The origin of the conflict, the dimension of the conflict such as terrorism, conflict among states and within the boundaries of a state and the actors involved and the nature of the conflict and the environment.

At the backgrounds, this thesis have argued that focus on peacekeeping collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations have mainly been financial, military and

bureaucratic aspect, but the root causes of the conflict in Darfur (Sudan), Somalia and the Central African Republic such as poverty, underdevelopment, weak and failed states and crisis of development were not addressed.

For cooperative peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations to be effective, there is the need for the origin of the conflict to be properly addressed and mechanisms put in place to resolve these causes. The next section will explore the achievements, other challenges and effectiveness of the Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

8.2. Exploring the achievements, other challenges and effectiveness of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Chapter seven engaged the Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic to investigate the achievements, challenges and effectiveness of the peacekeeping collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa. The following are some of the achievements and challenges of the Peacekeeping operations of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa.

8.2.3. The influence of External actors

The conflict in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic are conflicts that have spread across borders to become a regional conflicts and as a result led to the intervention and involvement of neighbouring countries in the conflict. Although the involvement of external actors has contradicted the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic, stretching the mandates of the peacekeeping operations, it has also provided the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic with the much needed logistical support and funding.

Ethiopia intervention in Somalia led to the solidification of the process of peace and state building, and encouraged regional security cooperation. This has also created complications in peacekeeping operations as a result of proliferation of peacekeeping operations.

8.2.4. The activities and impact of Armed Non-State Actors in the conflict in Somalia, Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic

The Janjaweed in Darfur, Al-Shabaad in Somalia, the Lord's Resistance Army and the various ethnic and religious armed groups in the Central African Republic like the Seleka and the

anti-Balaka, continue to constitute a challenge to peace and security and contradicts the peacekeeping operations of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. Their activities evolved around the following methods:

- Violation of the independent duties of state to maintain order and safeguard its citizens from external abuse.
- Frequently targeting government officials, institutions and public monuments.
- Violence against local civilians in and out of conflict zones.

The argument in chapter seven is that conflict in Africa is increasingly getting fragmented due to the rising numbers of armed non-state actors involved in the conflict and poses a major challenge to contemporary peacekeeping operations in Africa.

8.2.5. The Nature of the African Environment

This is closely connected to the activities of armed non state actors and their impact on the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, as a result of large and porous borders, a complex climate and transnational criminal networks. The African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping operations deployed in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic are operating in areas that are isolated, with a physical landscape that is harsh and absent of access to infrastructure, leading to significant problems logistically.

8.3. Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis has added to the spread of the knowledge in peacekeeping operations, particularly in the effectiveness of institutional cooperation in peacekeeping operations. These contributions are as follow:

1. Peacekeeping operations must have political acceptance, acceptance by the local population and consent of the host government in terms of its mandate and its composition.
2. While it is suitable to make sure that peacekeeping operations mandate is made clear, it is not absolute because the particular conditions on ground in the conflict zones determines the scope of its mandate.

3. AMISOM, UNAMID AND MINUSCA experience in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic highlighted the importance of availability of resources especially the moral of the troops and the effectiveness of the mission.

8.4. Conclusion

The collaboration on peacekeeping operations in Africa of the United Nations and the African Union have revealed several of the contemporary challenges of peacekeeping operations especially in Africa and in an intra-state conflict situation. This study gave a representation about what can take place when a peacekeeping force confronts armed non state actors in its peacekeeping operations.

This study reviewed also, the nature of the peacekeeping collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations in Africa, by examining the experience of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. It also examined the challenges encountered by AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions, which gave the basis for arriving at some conclusions. AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA stationed in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic, raised some important questions about its legitimacy, acceptance, funding and successfulness.

In July 2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transitioned into the African Union and structured to react to conflicts on the continent of Africa. And since 2002, peace and security has been the central components and attempted to deal with the several violent conflicts on the continent with solutions arrived at from the African continent to respond to problems of Africa, through the formation of the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union (APSA) and its components which are the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), with the authority to respond in situations where human rights are grossly abused and government is changed unconstitutionally, a Panel of the Wise, to enhance the objectives of the Peace and Security Council and to promote high level mediation efforts.

An African Standby Force (ASF), developed around five sub-regional brigades, which are Southern, East, West and North Africa, planned to be stationed within thirty (30) days in response to conflicts on the continent, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and a Peace Fund.

Despite the formation of the Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, the African Union faces several challenges in its peacekeeping efforts in areas such as absent of organisational capacity to develop policy, plan and manage peace operations and also financial constraints to devote to the goals of its Peace and Security Architecture and have seen collaboration in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations as one of the ways to address these problems.

Recent experience in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic has underscored the need to pursue the African Union Peace and Security Architecture. The interventions by the African Union and the United Nations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic resulted to several opinions on the legitimacy, acceptance, and ownership of the peacekeeping operations, mandate, funding and the importance of a peace agreement.

The conflicts also have a regional dimension due to the spread of the conflict from the host country to bordering countries because of the strategic nature of the African environment such as large and porous borders and the involvement of transnational armed non-state actors, leading to the involvement of Africa's Regional Economic Communities like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and their coordination with the African Union, create the possibility of such regional arrangement that will serve as a condition for a novel arrangement in Africa of collective security, and an African Centred solutions to a peaceful atmosphere in Africa. This coordination between the African Union and Africa's Regional Economic Communities reduced hostilities and atrocities in Darfur, Somalia and the Central African Republic.

Finally, the peacekeeping mandates of the African Union and the United Nations should allow for enough flexibility and dynamism to take into consideration the nature and dimension of the crisis and strategic classification of the environment. In strengthening the cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and the African Union, there is the need for the adoption of peacekeeping doctrines suitable to the nature and dimension of the conflict through a proper assessment of the host country's political, social, security and physical environment.

8.5. Recommendations for Effective Peacekeeping Cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations in Africa

This thesis gives recommendations on policies with implications for cooperative peacekeeping operations between the United Nations, African Union and other regional organisations. This thesis suggest these policy course of actions for a peacekeeping operation that will be more effective and efficient;

1. Peacekeeping mandates should be properly stated out as possible before deployment. The vision, concept, doctrine and procedures should not be restricted to only peacekeeping but also concentrate on peace-support operations. Doctrines and mandates of the peacekeeping operations should consider issues such as the origins of the crisis, nature and dimension of the conflict with emphasis on human security. The concept of the operations should be clearly stated before deployment, with adequate knowledge and information about the operational environment. The African Union and the United Nations should make sure there is a peace agreement and must avoid deploying a peacekeeping operations where there is no peace to keep. A greater consensus should be sought from the host countries and warring parties and neighbouring countries before deployment with a broader mandate through the problems identified with the following recommendations.
 - Develop a more robust civil/military relations
 - Need to engage with local leaders in other to be able to operate
 - More engagement with the civil societies such as Oxfam, playing major roles in conflict zones such as providing reliefs and medicals. They are usually advocacy groups and they can help channel the discussions along the conflict.
2. The United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping operations must develop a multifunctional force. The African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic consists mainly of infantry units. There should be a balance of both military and civilian component. The cooperative peacekeeping operations should include the following:
 - Humanitarian Affairs specialists
 - Officers for Civil Affairs
 - Personnels involved in Administration and logistics

- Political Affairs officers, since peacekeeping operations are also political tools. Political affairs officers will provide responses to policy makers and political solutions to the conflict
 - Financial Managers
3. African Union member states should make haste to establish the African Standby Force and make it operational. This will provide the African Union the much needed troops and logistical requirements to effectively conduct a successful peacekeeping operation. The African Standby Force should be trained in specific areas of expertise of peacekeeping operations.
 4. Ensure that peacekeepers of the African Union and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations fully abide by international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians and civilian objects. In this regard, all soldiers and officers to be deployed by the African Union and the United Nations should be provided with appropriate training in international human rights and humanitarian law before deployment. A discipline unit should be set up to oversee the imposition of military discipline with the various African Union and United Nations peacekeeping forces and to address violations of international humanitarian law and other serious abuses.
 5. The Peacekeeping Operations of the African Union and the United Nations should go along with African traditional peace and conflict resolution mechanism. The involvement of local leaders is very important to play localised roles in the various communities. They can help in logistical issues, such as taking positions against the government or rebel groups and focusing on societal imbalance and injustices in the conflict zones. Since the nature and dimension of conflicts in Africa has religious and ethnical attributes, traditional institutions therefore have a major duty to play in the resolution of conflict. They understand the terrain, they might not be at the front of peacekeeping, but in the general plan, it is important to include them because it helps in making communication easier. They are also more receptive and there it is very important to incorporate traditional institutions and religious leaders in the localities of the peacekeeping operations. They can also act as advisory roles to the peacekeeping operations because the people look up to them and respect them and can listen to them.

6. Increased collaboration and coordination amongst the African Union, the United Nations and Africa's regional economic institutions. Africa's Regional Economic institutions have more knowledge about the issues within the regions and they can break and prepare the foundation for peacekeeping operations of the African union and the United Nations in Africa. They are the region most affected by the conflict and stronger cooperation and effective coordination between them can prepare the way for deployment of the African Union and the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) prepared the way for AMISOM in Somalia and the Economic Communities of West African State (ECOWAS) for the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Africa's Regional Economic Communities are the pillars of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture and if the frosty partnership between the African Union and Africa's Regional Economic Communities is not resolved, the African Standby Force cannot be fully functional.

7. Establishment of a comprehensive public awareness unit.

From the inception of peacekeeping operations of the African Union and United Nations must establish a comprehensive and integrated public awareness strategy by providing details with regards to the mission structures, aims and objectives, dimension and limitations of the mandate, political, social and the host country political, social and other significant circumstances. The peacekeeping mission public awareness should evolved around the following audiences;

- Global Crowd
- The warring groups
- The host communities and population
- The civil societies and community medias

Successful correspondence and association with the mentioned audiences is vital for the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

8. Funding of Peace and Security in Africa

As seen with UNAMID in Darfur, AMISOM in Somalia and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, the African Union Peace and Security Architecture are hindered due to inadequate funding. The African Union Peace Fund is under-

resourced and limits the effectiveness of African centred solutions on serene atmosphere in Africa. The African Union must find alternative sources of funding and be less dependent on its foreign partners, the African Union must find avenues through which progress towards self sustainability can be made. The Olusegun Obasanjo report on alternative sources of funding for the African Union must be fully effective. The Olusegun Obasanjo report, proposed a US \$2 hotel levy and US \$10 airfare levy and it also recommended that African Union member states should increase their general contributions to the African Union with a new recipe for dividing the pay load, based on four assumptions of fairness, predictability, flexibility and compliance. According to (Fabricius, 2015), the African Union has always been affected by a huge acceptability space between its huge ambitions and its limited capacity and its attempt at more financial freedom is in principle a significant step in blocking that space.

9. Poor Governance and Political instability is one of the root causes of the various conflicts in the Central African Republic, Darfur and in Somalia. Therefore, the African Union through its developmental arm, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) with emphasis on good governance and economic development must be fully utilised. The Central African Republic has abundant deposit of mineral and biological wealth controlled by armed groups which with good governance could turn around the country positively. The African Union must put in place instruments to make sure that strategies and actions of the countries involved confirm to the agreed values in the following key focus areas which are democratic practices and administration of good leadership and socio-economic advancement. The goal of the African Union Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is to put Africa on the road to good governance which is also one of the core objectives of NEPAD. NEPAD strongly affirm the necessity for Africa to become masters of its own fate and occupy a key position in global politics and economy. Good governance will lead to sustainable development which is vital for Peace and Security in Africa and its aspirations for growth and continental development.

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Appendix1: Ethical Clearance Letter



30 March 2016

Mr Olumide A Fafare 214585645
School of Social Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Fafare

Protocol reference number: HSS/0276/016M

Project Title: The African Union and United Nations Cooperation on Peacekeeping in Africa

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 16 March 2016, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

.....
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

Cc Supervisor: Professor AM Johnston & Dr Bheki Mngomezulu
Cc Academic Leader Research: Professor Sabine Marschall
Cc School Administrator: Ms Nonhlanhla Radebe

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Founding Campuses  Edgewood  Howard College  Medical School  Pietermaritzburg  Westville

Appendix 2: Template of Informed Consent

Dear Participant,

My name is Fafore Olumide Adetokunbo, a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. I write to kindly request your inputs on a doctoral project titled 'Cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace Keeping Operations in Africa'. The project is developed against the backdrop that despite the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture and its components, the African Union is limited in its peacekeeping operations due to lack of institutional capacity to develop policy, plan and manage peacekeeping operations and also financial constraints to devote to the goals of its Peace and Security Architecture and have seen cooperation with the United Nations as one of the ways to address these problems. Informed by the foregoing concern, the project seeks to examine this peacekeeping cooperation and challenges and make recommendations for future effective cooperation in peacekeeping operations.

I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter. Please note that:

- a. The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- b. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- c. Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- d. The interview will take about 15 minutes.
- e. The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning. If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures).

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: olumide2004@hotmail.com; Cell: 0737177790 My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: +27824038876.

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

Appendix: 3 Template of Informed Consent Declaration

I,
(Full names of participant), hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent /(do not consent) to have this interview recorded (if applicable).

Signatures of participantDate.....

Appendix 4: Interview Instrument

Section A: Demographic Data:

1. Institution Name -----
2. Gender.-----
3. Please indicate the length of your experience in the field of peacekeeping in Africa.-----

4. Please indicate your highest qualification. -----
5. Present position in your institution. -----

Section B: Questions to be asked:

1. Please tell us briefly who are you?
2. What do you think peacekeeping is? What is it suppose to do? How?
3. What are your perceptions about peacekeeping operations in Africa?
4. What should be the focus of the AU-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa?
5. And who is in the best position to carryout effective peacekeeping operations in Africa?
6. Briefly assess AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic.
7. And, what are the limitations and challenges if any facing AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA?
8. How important is the legitimacy and acceptance of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA by the people of Somalia, Darfur and CAR to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions? Briefly explain.
9. What are the barriers or challenges to the acceptance and legitimacy issues of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA?
10. Should the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Africa make space for local ownership of the peacekeeping operations? Is this very important? And why?
11. How important is the consent of the warring parties/armed groups involved in the crisis in Somalia, Darfur and CAR to the effectiveness of AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA? Briefly explain.
12. Should Regional Economic Commissions such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC play more prominent roles in peacekeeping operations in Africa? What kind of roles and how?
13. In other continents of the world we see the civil societies play prominent roles in peacekeeping, can that be reciprocated in Africa? What roles can they play in the peacekeeping operations in Somali, Darfur and CAR?

14. How important is gender equality to peacekeeping operations in Africa?
15. What roles can women play in the cooperation between the AU and UN on peacekeeping operations in Africa?
16. Considering the roles played by tribal and religious leaders in the crisis in Somalia, Darfur and CAR. Should African traditional institutions such as those of the Chieftains, age groups and religious institutions be actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa? What peacekeeping roles can they play and how important is such roles to peace in Africa?
17. How important is negotiation and diplomacy to effective peacekeeping operations in Africa? And why?
18. Are the UN peacekeeping doctrine of unbiased, impartial, non-partisan and the non use of force except for self defence applicable in the situation in Somalia, Darfur and CAR? And why?
19. What are the right strategies, doctrine and mechanisms for effective peace keeping operations in Africa?
20. What are your concerns about the influence of external actors such as France and the United Nations to the effectiveness of AMISOM in Somalia, UNAMID in Darfur and MINUSCA in CAR?
21. What is the impact of foreign imposition of solutions and western cultural norms in Somalia, Darfur and the Central African Republic on the peacekeeping operations in these countries with regards to their cultural diversity, socio-economic and political environment?
22. What military, police and civilian capacity is required to make AMISOM, UNAMID and MINUSCA more effective?
23. How important are peace agreement to peacekeeping operations in Africa? And if important, how?
24. Is there peace to keep in Darfur, Somalia and CAR due to the fact that AMISOM and UNAMID have been in operation since 2007 and MINUSCA since 2012?
25. In what ways can the AU-UN cooperation on peacekeeping operations in Africa be improved for future effective cooperative interventions in Africa?